Cognitive Phenomenology

Phenomenal states are mental states in which there is something that it is like for their subjects to be in; they are states with a phenomenology. What it is like to be in a mental state is that state´s phenomenal character. There is general agreement among philosophers of mind that the category of mental states includes at least some sensory states. For example, there is something that it is like to taste chocolate, to smell coffee, to feel the wind in one´s hair, to see the blue sky and to feel a pain in one´s toe. Is there also something that it is like to consciously think, to consciously judge and to consciously believe something? Are such cognitive states, when conscious, phenomenal states? Is there a clear distinction between sensory states and cognitive states? Or, can our knowledge, thoughts and beliefs influence our sensory experiences? Is there a cognitive phenomenology?

It is challenging to give a clear characterization of the cognitive phenomenology debate, since different contributors conceive of the debate in different ways. Central for the debate is the question of whether conscious thoughts possess a non-sensory phenomenology. Intuitively, there is something that it is like to consciously think, consciously judge and consciously believe something. However, the debate about cognitive phenomenology is not, strictly speaking, about whether there is something that it is like to consciously think. Rather, the debate concerns the nature of cognitive phenomenology. Is the phenomenology of cognitive states reducible to purely sensory phenomenology? Or, is there an irreducible cognitive phenomenology? A sceptic about cognitive phenomenology claims that conscious cognitive states are non-phenomenal. But, conscious cognitive states may seem to be phenomenal because they are accompanied by sensory states. For instance, when one thinks that ´Paris is a beautiful city`, one´s thought may be expressed in inner-speech and an image of Paris may accompany it. These accompanying sensory states are phenomenal states, and not the thought itself. Contrary to this, the proponent of cognitive phenomenology claims that a conscious cognitive state can have a phenomenology that is irreducible to purely sensory phenomenology.

Other debates have also been placed under the ´cognitive phenomenology’ label. There is an ongoing debate within the philosophy of perception about how cognition influences our sensory experiences. Philosophers tend to agree that, for example, an expert ornithologist´s perceptual experience of a type of bird can differ from that of a novice, even if the viewing conditions for both expert and novice are the same. The expert´s knowledge of birds can influence her experience. However, what philosophers disagree about is how the expert´s knowledge influences her experience, and how her knowledge contributes to what her experience is like.

When we talks about a state being conscious, being conscious should be understood as being phenomenally conscious. A phenomenal state is a mental state that is phenomenally conscious in that there is something that it is like for the subject of that state to be in that state. Phenomenal states are states with phenomenology. What it is like to be in a phenomenal state is that state´s phenomenal character. An example of a phenomenal state is a visual experience of the blueness of the sea. Another example is an auditory experience of the sound of waves. There is something that it is like to have these experiences. There is also something that it is like to simultaneously visually experiencing the blueness of the sea and auditorily experiencing the sound of the waves (Bayne & Chalmers 2003). Our everyday conscious experiences are often complex in that they involve simultaneously thinking, feeling and experiencing within different sensory modalities. Such a complex experience is referred to as an overall phenomenal state.

Examples of sensory mental states are perceptual states, proprioception, bodily feelings and pains. Examples of cognitive states are thoughts, judgments and beliefs. According to some views, emotions and categorical perceptual experiences (such as experiencing something as being a type of bird) should also be categorized as cognitive states, or as partly cognitive and partly sensory states (see Chudnoff 2015a, Montague 2017).

Two Kinds of Mental States

Traditionally, it was common to distinguish between two kinds of mental states, namely sensory states and propositional attitudes. Paradigmatic examples of propositional attitudes are cognitive states such as beliefs, desires, thoughts and judgements. Propositional attitudes are intentional states since they are about or represent objects, properties or states of affair. They are states with propositional contents that can be linguistically expressed by using a ´that-clause`. The content of my belief ´that it will rain tomorrow` is ´that it will rain tomorrow`. When I believe ´that it will rain tomorrow` I am having a certain attitude towards that content, namely the attitude of belief. I could have had a different attitude towards the same content, I could for instance desire ´that it will rain tomorrow`.

According to the traditional view, sensory mental states, unlike cognitive states, have qualia. On this view, qualia are seen as phenomenal properties that can be separated from intentional or representational properties. For example, my visual experience of a red rose in front of me is intentional in that it is about or represents ´that there is a red rose in front of me`, but it is also something that it is like for me to experience the red rose. The redness that I experience is a property of my experience, a quale. While conscious sensory states are regarded as phenomenal states with qualia, conscious cognitive states are said to lack qualia. They are seen as non-phenomenal states.

Lately, this traditional view has been challenged. Firstly, proponents of intentionalism argue that when I experience a red rose I experience the redness as a property of the rose itself, and not as a property of my experience of the rose. My experience of the red rose has a phenomenal character, but this phenomenal character is embedded in the intentional content of my experience. Secondly, proponents of cognitive phenomenology challenge the assumption that cognitive states are non-phenomenal states when conscious.