Tuesday, August 27, 2019

The Nature-Culture Divide


Nature and culture are often seen as opposite ideas—what belongs to nature cannot be the result of human intervention and, on the other hand, cultural development is achieved against nature. However, this is by far not the only take on the relationship between nature and culture. Studies in the evolutionary development of humans suggest that culture is part and parcel of the ecological niche within which our species thrived, thus rendering culture a chapter in the biological development of a species.

An Effort Against Nature

Several modern authors—such as Rousseau—saw the process of education as a struggle against the most eradicated tendencies of human nature. Humans are born with wild dispositions, such as the one of using violence to achieve one’s own goals, to eat and behave in a disorganized fashion, and/or to act egotistically. Education is that process which uses culture as an antidote against our wildest natural tendencies; it is thanks to culture that the human species could progress and elevate itself above and beyond other species.

A Natural Effort

Over the past century and a half, however, studies in the history of human development have clarified how the formation of what we refer to as "culture" in an anthropological sense is part of the biological adaptation of our ancestors to the environmental conditions in which they came to live.
Consider, for example, hunting. Such an activity seems an adaptation, which allowed hominids to move from the forest into the savannah some millions of year ago, opening up the opportunity to change diet and living habits. At the same time, the invention of weapons is directly related to that adaptation—but from weapons descend also a whole series of skill sets characterizing our cultural profile, from butchering tools to ethical rules relating to the proper use of weapons (e.g., should they be turned against other human beings or against uncooperative species?). Hunting also seems responsible for a whole set of bodily abilities, such as balancing on one foot as humans are the only primates that can do that.

Now, think of how this very simple thing is crucially connected to dance, a key expression of human culture. It is then clear that our biological development is closely tied to our cultural development.

Culture as an Ecological Niche


The view that came to be most plausible over the past decades seems to be that culture is part of the ecological niche within which humans live. Just as snails carry their shell, so do we bring along our culture.

Now, the transmission of culture seems not to be directly related to the transmission of genetic information. Certainly the significant overlap between the genetic makeup of humans is a premise for the development of a common culture that can be passed along from one generation to the next. However, cultural transmission is also horizontal among individuals within the same generation or among individuals belonging to different populations. You can learn how to make lasagna even if you were born from Korean parents in Kentucky just as you can learn how to speak Tagalog even if none of your immediate family or friends speak that language.


Intuition and change. The modern Heraclitus - Henri Bergson



 (1859-1941)

Henri Bergson was born in Paris in 1859. His father was Jewish from Poland and his mother was Anglo-Irish. He was gifted in mathematics, and at an early age won an award for a unique solution to a mathematical problem, as well as a solution to a complex problem that Pascal had claimed to have solved (though he failed to have it published). At the age of eighteen, Bergson attended the École Normale Supérieure for four years, after which he began a career in teaching at Clermont-Ferrand in 1883. In the following year at Clermont-Ferrand, he published a critical study of the philosophy and poetry of Lucretius that has continued to be influential to Classical studies in France to date. Bergson was awarded his doctorate in 1889 for his Essai sur les données immediates de la conscience (Time and Free Will) along with a short Latin thesis. The essay was published the same year by Felix Alcan in his series La Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine.

Bergson shifted his focus away from mathematics and mechanics, preferring to develop his thoughts, first presented in Time and Free Will, in the humanities and philosophy, particularly to concepts of the mind, the intuition and the experience of time, or duration. Matter and Memory, his next publication in 1896, continues these investigations. For Bergson duration involves the succession of conscious states in an immeasurable flow, and real time therefore is the experience of duration as apprehended by intuition, time perceived as indivisible. He is led to a theory of mind-body relations, opposing the preference of the separate operations of instinct and intellect. In 1903 he wrote An Introduction to Metaphysics, which is a further elaboration of the central role that the intuition plays on his theory of knowledge.

Bergson was promoted to a professorship in 1898, and became Maitre de conferences at his Alma Mater, L'École Normale Superieure. Two years later he received another professorship at the Collège de France, where he accepted the Chair of Greek Philosophy in succession to Charles L'Eveque. At this time his lectures began to draw students and academics as well as a general public, leading some to name the college the "house of Bergson." In 1891 Bergson married the cousin of Marcel Proust and had a daughter.

Over the years, Bergson wrote many articles for periodicals, and at the request of his friends, he decided to allow the publication of these in a two-volume edition. The second volume, published in 1919, L'Energie spirituelle: Essais et Conferences (Spiritual Energy: Essays and Lectures) was translated into English by Dr. Wildon Carr under the title, Mind-Energy. It contains a series of Bergson's most influential lectures, most notably Le paralogisme psycho-physiologique (The Psycho-Physiolgical Paralogism), which now appears as Le Cerveau et la Pensee: une illusion philosophique, the lecture he delivered at the Congress of Philosophy at Geneva in 1904, and the Huxley Memorial Lecture of 1911, Life and Consciousness, L'Ame et le Corps, which contains the substance of the four London lectures on the Soul. Bergson was awarded a Doctor of Letters by Cambridge in 1920. In France, the College de France relieved him of his duties as a lecturer while allowing him to hold his chair. This permitted him time to devote to his new work on ethics, religion and sociology.

The concept of intuition was an on-going investigation for Bergson. He held that intuition is stronger than intellect. He also sought to wed current theories of biological science with those of consciousness, linking his own idea of an intuitive method and the problem of biological evolution as considered by Darwinism. Bergson posited an immaterial force, élan vital, as a creative impulse that better explained the expansive thrust of life than the ideas of Darwin. His ideas may have anticipated theories of relativity and modern theories of the mind. Due to these concepts, his ideas were greatly criticized by the Catholic Church. However, Bergson himself converted to Christianity in 1921.

In Duration and Simultaneity (1921) Bergson describes a non-linear notion of time linked to philosophical investigations of change. As he previously argued in his lectures, unlike space, time is not measurable by an objective standard, in particular, it cannot be divided into a linear series of discrete instances. The experience of time requires something of an understanding of a continuum of movement, perceptible when two subjects are moving in a likewise fashion, which Bergson explicates with the example of two people on separate trains. This contention is tried out here against Einstein's theory of relativity. Tracing the development of the theory from 'special' to 'general' relativity, Bergson posits that a fundamental requirement of the theory is an impossibility — it is based on the assumption that the experiences of two observers moving at different speeds within two different physical systems might be thought of as simultaneous. This is to ignore the limits of possible experience of time (while maintaining a disruption in the concept of space). Most academics concede that his arguments in 1911 with Einstein were not thoroughly grounded and therefore lost their credibility. Bergson would later drop the debate.

Bergson's concepts regarding time and duration have had a great influence on such philosophers as Gilles Deleuze and Alfred North Whitehead, who expanded Bergson's notions of duration and evolution from their applications to organic life into the physical realm. Jean- Paul Sartre also paid tribute to him as well as Martin Heidegger, who used some of Bergson's concepts, such as "no-being".

Bergson won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1927 and maintained the status of something of a cult figure in the years between World Wars. He published only one book during the last two decades of his life, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932; trans. 1935), in which he aligned his own philosophy with Christianity. Although not a practicing Jew, Bergson renounced all of the posts and honors previously awarded him, rather than accept the Vichy government's offers to excuse him from the scope of their anti-Semitic laws. He decided to join the persecuted and registered himself at the end of 1940 as a Jew. For his last seventeen years he suffered from crippling arthritis and died of bronchitis on January 3, 1941, at the age of eighty-one.


Monday, August 26, 2019

Levinas: Totality and Infinity Summary


Ethics as first philosophy
Emmanuel Levinas is one of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth, but the complexity of his thought, as well as Heidegger’s, prevents a real spread / democratization of his work. One of his most important works is Totality and Infinity: An essay on exteriority. In the latter, Levinas, according to a phenomenological method, describes how subjectivity arises from the idea of ​​infinity, and how infinite is a product of the relationship of self to another.
His project, ultimately, is to ask the primacy of the other so to ask entity unconditional and based on the epiphany of the face. Others and me is me responsible for him. The infinite is another who meets me. In other words, the infinite is the starting point of morality, its foundation. This infinity is irreducible to knowledge, any knowledge of the principles. Levinas rejects any moral intellectualism. However, Levinas admits that man is not naturally moral, it must be awaken to ethics: it is the desire of others.
Thus, Levinas makes ethics, respect for others, the first philosophy. It is therefore a reversal of the ontological approach to the subject.
But the ultimate goal of the project is that lévinassien a radical transcendence, of God.
Levinas : from the same to the other
Levinas argues that ontology enacts a relationship with another being that reduces to the same. Instead, Levinas adopts an approach that does not reduce the other to the same, but considers the separation between himself and the other as inherent in the relationship with Being.
According to Levinas, the externality is how the individual transcends finite into the infinite. The externality is a relationship in which the self is separate from the other. The externality is a relationship where the being of self and other can not be aggregated or fused to infinity, because they are completely separated.
Intersubjectivity is the product of interiority. The Interiority is a subjective report in which a being refers to itself. Subjectivity allows itself to be considered as separate from the other. The externality is a state of being in which the self can not be merged into a whole.
The home must be separated from each other in order to have the idea of ​​infinity. The idea of ​​the infinite is in itself a form of transcendence in relation to the Other. This is the idea of ​​the infinite in me that saves me solipsism and open myself to the externality.
The other is absolutely other than the Self. The Other is other than oneself. The Other is infinitely transcendent reality.
The idea of ​​infinity requires the separation of the Same and the Other. This separation is a drop in the same and the other from the whole.
Levinas distinguishes between the idea of ​​totality and the idea of ​​infinity. The idea of ​​trying to integrate all the different and the same in all, while the idea of ​​infinity maintains separation between the other and the same. According to Levinas, the idea is all theoretical, while the idea of ​​infinity is moral.
The importance of face
Face of the Other is how the Other reveals itself. The face of the Other is the exteriority of his being. Face to face is an ethical relationship, and calls the freedom of self responsibility. Levinas explains that the face of the Other talking to yourself. Language begins with the presence of the face with the expression. Language is a system of interaction in which meaning is derived from the face of the Other. The Other is the signifier, which manifests itself in language by the production of signs, which offer objective reality or thematize the world. But the Other itself can not be thematized. The theming is a form of objectification: the Other is irreducible gold, definitely subject, infinitely other.
Face, this absolutely other, is not a negation of the self. The presence of the Other does not contradict the freedom of self. I can kill the other, but his face reminds me of my responsibility.
Conclusion of the summary on Totality and Infinity:
Totality and Infinity is a profound and challenging work. Levinas expresses a interesting perspective on the problem of modern alienation in that it explains how the separation can be understood as a fundamental condition of being.

Friday, August 23, 2019

PARMENIDES


Parmenides (c. 485 BCE) was a Greek philosopher from the colony of Elea in southern Italy. He is known as the founder of the Eleatic School of philosophy which taught a strict Monistic view of reality. Philosophical Monism is the belief that all of the sensible world is of one, basic, substance and being, un-created and indestructible.

According to the ancient writer Diogenes Laertius (c. 200 CE), Parmenides was a student of Xenophanes of Colophon (who some claim as the founder of the Eleatic School) but left his master’s discipline to pursue his own vision. Even so, the stamp of Xenophanes’ teachings can be seen in the work of Parmenides in that both assert that the things in life which one thinks one understands may be quite different than they seem to be, especially regarding an understanding of the gods. Xenophon's insistence on a single deity, who in no way resembled human beings, seems to have been the basis for Parmenides' claim of a single substance comprising all of reality. Parmenides was a younger contemporary of Heraclitus who claimed that all things are constantly in motion and change (that the basic `stuff' of life is change itself). Parmenides’ thought could not be further removed from that of Heraclitus in that Parmenides claimed nothing moved, change was an impossibility, and that human sense perception could not be relied upon for an apprehension of Truth.

 According to Parmenides, “There is a way which is and a way which is not” (a way of fact, or truth, and a way of opinion about things) and one must come to an understanding of the way “which is” to understand the nature of life. Known as the Philosopher of Changeless Being, Parmenides' insistance on an eternal, single Truth and his repudiation of relativism and mutability would greatly influence the young philosopher Plato and, through him, Aristotle (though the latter would interpret Parmenides’ Truth quite differently than his master did). Plato devoted a dialogue to the man, the Parmenides, in which Parmenides and his student, Zeno, come to Athens and instruct a young Socrates in philosophical wisdom. This is quite an homage to the thought of Parmenides in that, in most dialogues, Plato presents Socrates as the wise questioner who needs no instruction from anyone. While Parmenides was an older contemporary of Socrates, it is doubtful the two men ever met and Plato's dialogue is considered an idealized account of the philosopher (though accurate in portraying his philosophy). Zeno of Elea was Parmenides' most famous student and wrote forty paradoxes in defense of Parmenides’ claim that change – and even motion – were illusions which one must disregard in order to know the nature of oneself and that of the universe.

Nothing is capable of inherently changing in any significant fashion because the very substance of reality is unchangeable and 'nothingness' cannot be comprehended.

Zeno's work was intended to clarify and defend Parmenides' statements, such as, "There is not, nor will there be, anything other than what is since indeed Destiny has fettered it to remain whole and immovable. Therefore those things which mortals have established, believing them to be true, will be mere names: "'coming into being and passing away,' 'being and not being,' 'change of place'..."(Robinson, 116). In other words, Parmenides argues that we may think the world we live in is comprised of multiples but, in reality, it is One. Nothing is capable of inherently changing in any significant fashion because the very substance of reality is unchangeable and 'nothingness' cannot be comprehended.

Even so, it seems that Parmenides' ideas themselves were hard to comprehend for his listeners, necessitating Zeno's mathematical paradoxes. Parmenides' main point, however, was simply that nothing could come from nothing and that `being' must have always existed. He writes:
There is left but this single path to tell thee of: namely, that being is. And on this path there are many proofs that being is without beginning and indestructible; it is universal, existing alone, immovable and without end; nor ever was it nor will it be, since it now is, all together, one, and continuous. For what generating of it wilt thou seek out? From what did it grow, and how? I will not permit thee to say or to think that it came from not-being; for it is impossible to think or to say that not-being is. What would then have stirred it into activity that it should arise from not-being later rather than earlier? So it is necessary that being either is absolutely or is not. Nor will the force of the argument permit that anything spring from being except being itself. Therefore justice does not slacken her fetters to permit generation or destruction, but holds being firm. (Fairbanks, 93)


Simply put, his argument is that since `something' cannot come from `nothing' then `something' must have always existed in order to produce the sensible world. This world we perceive, then, is of one substance - that same substance from which it came - and we who inhabit it share in this same unity of substance. Therefore, if it should appear that a person is born from `nowhere' or that one dies and goes somewhere else, both of these perceptions must be wrong since that which is now can never have been `not' nor can it ever `not be'. In this, Parmenides may be developing ideas from the earlier philosopher Pythagoras (c. 571-c.497 BCE) who claimed the soul is immortal and returns to the sensible world repeatedly through reincarnation. If so, however, Parmenides very radically departed from Pythagorean thought which allows that there is plurality present in our reality. To Parmenides, and his disciples of the Eleatic School, such a claim would be evidence of belief in the senses which, they insisted, could never be trusted to reveal the truth. 

The Eleatic principle that all is one, and unchanging, exerted considerable influence on later philosophers and schools of thought. Besides Plato (who, in addition to the dialogue Parmenides also addressed Eleatic concepts in his dialogues of the Sophist and the Statesman) the famous Sophist Gorgias employed Eleatic reasoning and principles in his work as Aristotle would also do later, principally in his Metaphysics.

Tuesday, August 20, 2019

Wittgenstein and Language

Wittgenstein puts the language at the top of his philosophy. According to him, each language has its limits.



The Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921)  asserts six central thesis.
1. The world is everything that happens. ”
2. What happens, the fact, is the existence of states of affairs. ”
3. The logical picture of facts is the thought. ”
4. Thought is the meaningful proposition. ”
5. The proposition is a truth function of elementary sentences. ”
6. The general form of the function of truth is [p, x, N (x)] This is the general form of the proposal. ”

Things are connected by relationships. These relationships are the backbone of the world logic that defines the junction between language and the world. “A is related to b” or “ARB”, is the general form of a state of affairs. To be meaningful, a statement must represent the existence or nonexistence of states of affairs. If the state of affairs “in the statement placed on a trial basis” exists, we say that the proposition is true.  The reality is composed of different states of affairs, each of which should be described by an elementary sentence. Wittgenstein has a clear vision of the world in which all philosophical problems – in particular the fundamental problems of logic, mathematics and mechanics – can be solved. But this does not solve any problems of life, quite the contrary:

We know that even if we have an answer to all possible scientific questions, our life’s problems have not even been addressed. ”

Each language has, in fact, its “limits”, in other words, properties that can not be expressed in the same language, but that can only be shown:
For example, although we can not say what the meaning of life, there is still something, but we can not express, it appears, it is the mystical element. ”
There are limits to what we can talk, God, the ego, the sense of the world and the mystic are outside the scope of the word: ineffable.

Objects form the substance of the world or a human subject is not the world, there is a limit of the world (5632), or rather the world of this and we can never talk about it in a proposal. If one does, however, you enter a dead end. [One can not speak for anyone, but we can talk about the facts surrounding it.] Ethics and religion are also held outside the world outside of the speech provided to sense and scientific investigation. Where the last argument of the Tractatus, which simply says:
Philosophy can not find any truth. Its sole task is to clarify our thoughts by analyzing our use of language. The philosopher is a kind of vigil of thought whose mission is to show the limits of speech sense.


Wittgenstein’s SECOND PHILOSOPHY (1929-1951)

The Philosophical Investigations offer a more flexible alternative theory, which is as follows: “A whole cloud of philosophy condensed in a droplet theory of language.” Know the meaning of a word or phrase is to understand them. And understand is to be able to use them, “the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” The meaning of a word is not in its concrete reference, but its use in the language. Now Wittgenstein conceives language as a game: the game of language. Like pieces of chess must follow the rules assigned to them, the words are set by the language. Speaking becomes a game in which the activities of life. Description of an object by its appearance or from his actions, construction of an object from a drawing or description; reporting process; translation from one language into another; request; thanks, greetings, prayer, oath, these are all language games. The rules of grammar (the game) can not be denied. It is impossible that a rule is followed only once. The meaning of words is governed by common usage. Since a private sensation can not be part of a language game, one can not describe it meaning.
What we mean by “truth” and “reality” is constituted by how we use these words in everyday life. We have a tendency to have an absolute conception of the world, as if truth and reality are dependent on us. The “truth” and “reality” are formed by our language games.

If a lion could talk we would be incapable of understanding.” Because the lion’s way of speaking would be part of a form of life so different from ours that it would make no sense for us. The lion would have its own conception of reality, different from ours. The Lion and we would each have our own idea about what is correct, according to our forms of life.

Philosophy fight against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language. Its purpose is to “show the fly the way out through which to escape from the bottle flies.” It led to the discovery of some pure non-sense understanding of the bumps is running to attack the borders of language. The world is measured by the language, its limits are logical statements; we can only show the unspeakable and the “secret”. Philosophy is not a doctrine, it is an activity.
Wittgenstein’s philosophy is not an end in itself but a tool that helps to understand the position of each. Once all the flies out of the bottle is language, philosophy is no longer anything, and once at the top, we do not need the ladder.

In asserting that all meaning is produced following the rules of a language game, Wittgenstein invalidates two philosophical traditions of rationalism and empiricism, since these are based on the description of the contents of the private mind. His position has provoked strong philosophical controversies.




Sunday, August 18, 2019

Analytic philosophy


Widespread in the Anglo-Saxon world, the analytical philosophy is not defined by its objects, but by its method of reasoning.

Analytic Philosophy VS Continental Philosophy

Following the new logic founded in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century by Frege and Russell, and the philosophy of Wittgenstein, the analytic philosophy is the dominant school of thought in the Anglo-saxon world, opposed to the “continental philosophy”, a term used to describe controversy both German idealism like HeideggerDeleuze or Derrida.


What is meant by “analytic philosophy”? Hence the question posed by the title of the book by Hans-Johann Glock: What is analytic philosophy? It covers, in fact, very different thoughts and certainly does not designate a specific philosophical doctrine, as analytic philosophers have deep disagreements between them, not just this or that particular issue, but even on the idea they have of philosophy. We can not identify analytic philosophy to american or british philosophy, since analytic philosophy has its roots in German authors such as Frege, and Austrian, as Wittgenstein.  Would the analytic philosophy be defined more by its object? Despite their interest for some issues, such as the language in such writers as Wittgenstein, Austin, Searle and Quine, analytic philosophers have, in fact, focused their discussion on every area, (politics, morality or metaphysics …).


How to characterize, under these conditions, analytic philosophy? Probably by a “family resemblance” or a certain style, common to different thinkers claiming this tradition whose main concern is clarity, precision and rigor in the arguments.



Saturday, August 17, 2019

Stuart Mill’s Philosophy


Mill (John Stuart), along with Herbert Spencer,is  the greatest british philosopher in the nineteenth century.

According to my appreciation of the genius of Mill, Alexander Bain said, he was primarily a logician, then a social or political philosopher”

General philosophy of Stuart Mill

Beyond Bentham and James Mill, the master which is directly connected to  John Stuart Mill is definitely David Hume, whose associationist theories are  behind Mill’s psychology. Especially in the Review of Hamilton‘s philosophy,Mill’s philosophy is purely empiricist, but the psychological empiricism, combined with a certain amount of physiology. There is an anachronism volunteer at the starting point of this doctrine. The major hypothesis of evolution (Evolution), the laws of inheritance and ancestral influences, these are all actions with distant and powerful, which the psychologist is now required to have and, even exceeding the horizon of simple psychology, led a total conception of things entirely new, as is the case for evolutionism of Herbert Spencer. In all these philosophical modern speculation, Stuart Mill hardly seems to have stopped, probably because he felt that, despite appearances, they did not reach the issue in its depth of knowledge and the be, and that this, far from helping to solve it, they presupposed the solution.

The reason for the conservative philosophy was certainly no ignorance or disdain for what’s new. It could not consist in the firm belief that it was above all individual experience is important, because all experience presupposes the more general and it conditions and determines any further developments.

As a result, the analysis of psychic phenomena, reducing the simple complex, the a priori in a process called contingent made in every conscience from the most distant of his training, this is the method inherited Hume Mill, which had himself received from Locke. And if attacked, preferably at the last and perhaps the greatest leaders of the Scottish school, to William Hamilton, that he recognized in it the master who personified the doctrine of intuitionism, not based, as in Kant, a critique of a priori conditions of knowledge, but an arbitrary assertion of reason dogmatic. Combat all forms of intuitionism, about all its pretensions, this is the constant goal of Stuart Mill, the goal is the unity of its controversial philosopher. A intuitionism ModeN oppose to the idea of ​​pre-existing data the theory of gradual growth, in short, to the revelation of history: that is, the philosophical, a process that will never be denied and success which he deploys the resources of infinite subtlety.

We speak not of immediate knowledge, awareness of external things directly, for example! Knowledge of this kind can only be mediated, and the testimony of consciousness, they seem so formal, open to interpretation. Mill drives and so far the horror of dogmatism in the school of Hamilton that he would prefer, rather than to subscribe, enter into the paradoxes of the most radical skepticism. His sympathy for the Pyrrhonism (Pyrrho) goes to justify the extreme claims of the school acataleptique and defend against the charge to make the contradiction.
It is quite possible, he argues, a person certainly of his doubt. Most people, I think, must have found a similar case on the particular facts which they were not completely certain, they were not quite certain to be uncertain. “(Chapter IX).


Skepticism, investigator, analytical, which is implemented mental activity the sharper is the eyes of the student of the Greeks, much preferable to a party torpor of a philosophy of belief.

But Mill is not a skeptic. The belief in the existence of the outside world, the reality of spirits, and even “a world hyperphysical to God,” not only he gave way, but he built on the only basis which, in its philosophy, provides the strength, the basis of associations. The combination – an indissoluble association – which leads us irresistibly to feel simple, transient, to the notion of sensations and possibilities perdurable last of these possibilities to separate the notion of a permanent general of all the possibilities of sensations . And this analysis we discover the origin of our ideas of material substance and the physical world.
Asks me if I believe it to matter, I will ask my turn if one accepts my definition. If so, I believe in matter, and the entire Berkeley school like me […] The faith of humanity in the real existence of visible and tangible objects, it is faith in the reality and the permanence of the potential visual and tactile sensations, regardless of any actual sensation. ”
According to Mill, such is the conviction of both naive and common sense, and the argumentum baculinum, says he has no other meaning. Finally, the same analysis, rather than focus on the objective side of our sensations, applies only in the inner side and subjective, we also will design the permanent possibilities of these states or states like mine to mine, but perceived by others than by me, and so will be obtained the notion of spiritual substance that I am and that spiritual substances are other humans.
The belief that my mind exists, even though it does not smell, he does not think that he is unaware of its existence, is reduced to the belief in a permanent possibility of these states.
We can not, on the occasion of the reduction famous, engage in discussion about whether it is an improvement or a decline instead against Hume’s analysis. It may be noted, however, that if Stuart Mill offers us a cosmic synthesis firmer and more comprehensive, more removed from the subjectivism of Hume, so close to the skepticism, it has been asking the very fact that the association two concepts of a new order, whose birth has some mystery here which may conceal a secret loan to the doctrines of pure reason: the concept of possibility and of permanence.

Logic by Stuart Mill

The work logic of John Stuart Mill is justly famous. It is one of the most vigorous efforts were made to change the character, purpose and object of a science that we had, since Aristotle, accustomed to regard as concerning only the shape of knowledge and as indifferent to his material. No one better than our philosopher was living in to complete such an effort: his father and his master, James Mill, had not it not, from childhood, trained in scholastic exercises of the discussion the most agile, and Analytics of Aristotle had they not been one of the favorite books of his austere youth? Dedicated logic and so he knew the secrets and detour weaknesses as him had not escaped. Of all the faults that seemed to threaten the sterility, it was a fundamental, hence all other derivatives, we mean the prejudice accredited by theorists that it regulates only the consequence, ie, d . the agreement of our ideas, and pays no attention to the truth.

Precisely what Mill wanted to do was the substitution of truth to the result, as the object of logic, in other words, this science, with it, become “the theory of evidence.” We should, as a new point of view, summarize what was his doctrine of names and prepositions. We should especially trace the transformation he has done to the theory of the syllogism. This reasoning, which has always passed for the precision tool of deductive logic, was considered a process of inclusion is to enclose specific terms in other more general terms themselves understood in universal terms, and the art to accomplish these interlocking successive boiled down, ultimately, the art of syllogiser. The syllogism, according to Mill, is pursuing a different goal, which is not to nest one inside the other classes of concepts, but to bring groups of properties and characters. Under these conditions, this operation will become more than a frivolous game, it will be an instrument of knowledge. Induction, ie experience in this area will be provided.

For her, the inductions will be established once and for all. One call to the experience may be sufficient, and the result can be saved as a general proposition, which is committed to memory or paper which is then no longer than syllogiser
Inductive generalization operations, that what is true in any deduction.
Therefore, it is clear that induction is not only understood, unlike the classical traditions, in science the logician, but that it may form the central division. Always anxious to avoid the assumptions that provide some semblance metaphysical Stuart Mill refuses to justify the act by induction a priori principles, preferring the risk of seeming to make a circle, instead of using a given transcendent . Causality to which he belongs is inductive operation itself as the result of specific induction, spontaneous, relentlessly accumulated experience that has never wavered: the experience by which history has determined invariable always and everywhere preceded the phenomena, objects of our observation. 

These inductions were spontaneous: the maxim summarizes the causal inferences justify the future, so that the association is that, ultimately, the logical step that one might have thought beyond the bounds of infinity of the association. Induce, as inferred, it is still a way to move from particular to particular, despite the appearance of universality or point of arrival or at the start, only road that leads only because it neglects the deserts of the a priori to cross the fertile field of observation and facts.
A particularly serious doubt weighs up a science course in this way, and the certainty that the guarantees will be considered precarious, when one considers that Mill refuses to extend to the infinite universe generalizations of an experiment that took limited theater world. But Mill is not moved to a risk as remote, and has taught at the school of Comte (positivism) to curb the ambitions of the human mind, lucky with a localized and science, as Bacon advised, to contain the growth of human understanding, reason with less need for wings of lead.

Ethics by Stuart Mill

Before outlining the actual legal part of the philosophy of Mill, we must mention one of his most original designs and the most suggestive, which forms a link between his psychology and logic on the one hand, and ethics, on the other. But the design itself can not be understood unless we determine the attitude observed by our author with regard to the problem of freedom. The thesis of free will is firmly opposed by him, and the refutation that in fact it certainly raises the song the most complete its review of Hamilton’s philosophy. Nevertheless Mill was forbidden to profess a necessitarianism simple bending under a fatality or external, or logical, the human will. Both the word itself need it seems a misnomer. His determinism is of such nature between the determinants of our actions reflected our desires, our ideas and volitions are at the forefront. Our character we have not imposed from without, for then reign in the human who knows what psychological fatalism. We have a part in shaping our character and this precisely because of our desire to shape: an element of truth is the honor of the theorists of free will be highlighted.

That they are satisfied with such a tribute and to accept as an equivalent of freedom within this chain of determinism, that’s what we do not have to vouch. At least Stuart Mill Should this theory to make possible a special science which remains to be the method and the results of moral and social surely can not be overrated; to call it, named it himself forged the science of ethology, or the formation of character.
An ingenious and penetrating thinker could not fail in its moral, to shine its know-how (or rather his ability to think). We will not dwell much, however, to summarize. This is in spite of the ingenuity and finesse that he could bring real property or renewal to a doctrine which, since ancient times, was of Epicurus all his perfection and even in England, the analysis of Hobbes, Hume, Bentham was able to modernize, but not really overhaul. This doctrine, in his book Utilitarianism (Utilitarianism) has exhibited extensively, is that, starting from individual selfishness, goes from self-love to the love of others and place, in meeting of that love, the ultimate end of morality. On this new ground again, it intuitionism that fight and it is a theory of acquisition that fits. It is enough, once again, to use the influence of the association to make sense of the process, hedonism itself, leads to altruism. Also with him consciousness is not she, as she had been with Bentham, an empty word. Without naming, needless to say, nothing resembling an innate faculty, the word conscience, however denominated something natural, that the association so strongly consolidated in the souls of disinterested ideas with the ideas that the reasons for eudemonistic act for the good of others end up spontaneously and substitute themselves for reasons to obey our narrow interests. Thus gradually the general happiness will appear as the happiness of each and all. In this way morality have its purpose, under its ideal. Finally, the association will also be able to account for the fact of the obligation. This will be the association, through the active intervention of a legislator, will base a theory of civil duty, justice and law.

Stuart Mill’s Social sciences and sociology

The political and social philosophy of John Stuart Mill is independent of all schools and it is impossible to understand in one of the classifications used among the parties. In books such as the Government representative and Freedom, we know solved individualistic, concerned with avoiding the interference of power much of the personal activity of citizens, as this share once abandoned, any initiative would be at risk, stronger the springs of human energy would find themselves relaxed. In all of us so it is an inviolable asylum to which the public should stop respectful. Does this mean that this asylum is infinitely extended and that the role of public action will be reduced to a minimum of control, the degree of intervention just enough so that many individuals observe the mutual rights without which s’ collapse any civilian organization? Our philosopher deems so little that it imposes on the state duties of interference. Yes, Mill recognized as legitimate for the government’s claim
Impose a legal obligation for parents to give their children a basic education
He is in favor of legislative action regarding child labor, in order to prevent the excesses of this work. High culture, exploration companies and, in general, works long range, so useful to the social body, but do not put just enough private enterprise: it is also the political power to promote and to support them. It has more than once protested in front of this part of the political program of Mill as having an inconsistency. But this inconsistency, why did not make the same criticism as the oracle of the Liberals, Adam Smith, who professed a similar requirement with respect to the state? And does it not a sign that the inconsistency complained of is more apparent than real


Not least is the original economic position held by Mill. His Principles of Political Economy were among his writing one of those who obtained the most lasting success, in a spirit compounds severely scientific, filled with facts and observations, it is a model of its kind. At the same time singularly bold views are pierced. It was, for example, declared approval of the thesis Malthusian (Malthus, New maltusianisme), whereby the evil to be avoided is for the states, not the decline in births, but to some fool increasing their number. It was also openly displayed a sympathy for the Communist propaganda which he had in France, studying closely the development sympathy he grew up to this point to argue that the difficulties opposed to Communism “does weigh in balance a speck of dust, “if we put the other side all the suffering and injustices that society so desperately saddened. It was still a committed membership and activist for the cause of social and political recovery of the woman. At this point only because it brings a competition theory. He was on the political platforms, the very active, very persistent and very happy champion.

It does remain to be done around this philosophy, which left outside of it none of the provinces of thought and human activity, to note what was his attitude toward theology. His criticism could hardly be more different dogmas save made by religious metaphysics she had done with other claims of intuitionistic thought. It knows that the criticism that human reason. However, in addition to reason and parallel to the right, there is another possibility that less severe and does not cover a narrow discipline, a faculty that rises above the observation and provides extensive career in range of possibilities: the imagination that dream, beautifies, poetizes. It seems that Stuart Mill would be handed over to the right of free care to address some of the ruins that analytical reason was sown. The imagination can restore the religious sentiment in its aspirations and hopes. Religion of humanity, of religion itself hypernature, ie the divine, that apparently it, the term unexpected depths to which the empiricist nineteenth, century has produced.


Cause & Causality in Philosophy


General definition

The cause, according to many philosophers, means a force that produces an effect.
The search for causes is natural to the human mind, which believes that “nothing happens without reason” This natural tendency has been themed in metaphysics (search for the origin of the world) as in epistemology (search laws of nature).
There are two types of approach:

The physico-theological proof

It is to go from cause to cause and to infer the existence of a first cause that would be God (Aristotle in particular). The notion of cause is a notion “animist” is sought for a total due.

Modern science

Since Descartes, science no longer seeks causes, that is to say, the history of a phenomenon, but the laws, that is to say, the consistent and predictable relations between phenomena.
One can distinguish, strictly speaking, the “efficient” cause is that by which an event occurs, and the “final” cause, which is that to which an event happens.

For example, a stone falls because of the wind (the wind is the efficient cause) and arrives on my head to punish me (the punishment is the final cause).

Quotes on causality

  • We believe know nothing until you have entered each time the why. In a sense, the question is what something is made and remains there immanent. In another sense, it is the shape and model. In another sense, this is what comes first beginning of change and rest. Finally, this is the end, that is to say the final cause (Aristotle, Physics)
  • In all, there must be a cause, or reason assignable, why it exists and why it does not exist (Spinoza, Ethics)
  • We can define a case as an object followed by another, and such that all objects similar to the first are marked with similar objects to the latter. Or, in other words: as if the first object had not been, the second never had existed (Hume,

  • An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding)

  • The concept of cause absolutely requires that A thing is such that another B drift and necessarily following an absolutely universal rule (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason)





Friday, August 16, 2019

Emmanuel Levinas -Ethics and the Other



Emmanuel Levinas was born in Kaunas, Lithuania in 1906. His parents were Jewish, and in his youth, Levinas read the Bible in Hebrew. Russian was the language of his early education, though he was also fluent in German. His studies in philosophy began in 1923 in Strasbourg, where he met Charles Blondel, and his life-long companion Maurice Blanchot. Levinas attended Husserl's final lectures of 1928-9, and became influenced by Husserl's Logical Investigations, though he quickly became a follower of Heidegger's Being and Time, which was to have a profound effect on his thinking. Both Husserl and Heidegger can be seen to have influenced Levinas' first three major publications: Theorie de l'intuition dans la phenomenologie de Husserl (The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology 1930), Existence and Existents (1947), and En Découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (1949). Furthermore, Levinas became influential in France for his translations of Husserl and Heidegger into French.

Levinas' later philosophy is directly related to his experiences during World War II. In 1939, he served as an officer in the French army, working as an interpreter of Russian and German. In 1940 he became a prisoner of war, and due to his officer status he was sent to a military prisoners' camp where he was put into forced labor. His wife and daughter managed to be kept hidden in a French monastery until his return, but the rest of his family were killed. This experience, coupled with Heidegger's affiliation to National Socialism during the war, led to a profound crisis in Levinas' enthusiasm for Heidegger. If it can be said that Heidegger is concerned with Being, Levinas positioned his concerns with ethics; for Levinas, ethics is beyond being — otherwise than Being.

Levinas found himself in a difficult context for his ideas around ethics in the 1930's and 40's, for Marxism, structuralism and in the early fifities, the beginnings of post-structuralism made it an unfavorable situation for Levinas to present his anti-universalist, anti-foundationalist and non-prescriptive ethics derived from a respect and responsibility for the Other. At this time it was the help of his close allies, Blanchot and Derrida, that kept him in the realm of serious discourse.

Levinas' career after his confinement during the war was spent at the Alliance Israelite Universelle, where he was appointed the Director. The postwar years were marked by his meeting with the Talmudic scholar, Monsieur Chouchani, with whom Levinas studied. These studies resulted in a series of five volumes of Talmudic readings. The last of these readings, Nouvelles Lectures Talmudiques, appeared shortly after his death. At this time he was writing this work Levinas was actively involved with the Colloque des Intellectuels Juifs de Langue Francaise, and the majority of his Talmudic studies originate in lectures he presented there. His Talmudic commentaries include Quatre lectures Talmudiques (1968), Du sacré au saint (1977), and L'au-delý du verset (1982).

Levinas began to develop his own philosophy in the late 1950's and early 60's as he became more critical of Heidegger, prior phenomenologists and Western thinking in general. He wished to go beyond the accepted and ethically neutral conception of ontology, publishing Totalite et Infini (Totality and Infinity 1961), his first monumental work which awarded him a Doctorat d'Etat. Influenced by the work of Franz Rosenweig and Martin Buber, Levinas attempted to address the problematics of ontology by investigating and analyzing the 'face-to-face' relation with the Other. The Other is not known or comprehended as such, but calls into question and challenges the complacency of the self through desire, language, and the concern for justice. Ethics for Levinas begins with the encounter with the Other while maintaining that such a relation cannot be simply reduced to a symmetrical relationship. It cannot be localized historically or temporally. Toward the end of the 1960's Levinas would propose that ethics is a calling into question of the "Same." Here, the encounter with the Other has no empirical basis as an event or non-event in linear time, nor is there a "self" that exists a priori to the encounter which may choose to avoid the traumatic experience of alterity. The encounter, a discovery of alterity in itself, is an originary and essential moment through which the self comes into being — it precedes freedom and determinism, action and passivity. This encounter has always already taken place, and its terms make up a central paradox in Continental philosophy.

In the same year as the publishing of Totality and Infinity in 1961, Levinas was appointed Professor of Philosophy at Poitiers, followed by an appointment in 1967 at Paris-Nanterre. He moved to the Sorbonne, Paris in 1973 and retired in 1976, although he continued to direct a seminar until 1980. His second major book, Autrement qu'Etre ou Au-Dela de l'Essence (Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence) was published in 1974, and since that time more than a dozen books have appeared, notably De Dieu qui vient a l'idee in 1982. In spite of his critical position to Phenomenology, Levinas' translations and writings had a major influence of French existentialism, most notably the work of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Derrida also would install Levinisian ethics at the heart of his Deconstructionist texts. It was the influence of his colleague, Derrida, who pushed Levinas to write Otherwise than Being (1998) in a language beyond the ontological character of his earlier work, Totality and Infinity (1969). A new set of terms are introduced which are largely or entirely absent from Totalité et infini: proximity, approach, hostage, persecution, expiation, substitution, illeity, enigma. Levinas even tempers the use of the word, Other, in favour of "the neighbour" (le prochain). One of the crucial aspects of Levinas's philosophical endeavor is to interrogate the language in which his enquiry is conducted, by disrupting the use of philosophical terminology with unfamiliar usages of such terms and disallowing a rigid set of propositions. His writing is reticent toward the privileging of drawing sameness between distinct phenomena, characteristic of much of Western thought. Even the definition of the Other could be considered an application of the rhetoric of the same, hence, Levinas went to great lengths to keep his texts flexible, changing and resistant to reification, a violence to the fragile concept of the alterity of the inassimilable Other.
Levinas died in Paris, December 25, 1995.

Thursday, August 15, 2019

The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory


The Frankfurt School, known more appropriately as Critical Theory, is a philosophical and sociological movement spread across many universities around the world. It was originally located at the Institute for Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschung), an attached institute at the Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany. The Institute was founded in 1923 thanks to a donation by Felix Weil with the aim of developing Marxist studies in Germany. After 1933, the Nazis forced its closure, and the Institute was moved to the United States where it found hospitality at Columbia University in New York City.
The academic influence of the critical method is far reaching. Some of the key issues and philosophical preoccupations of the School involve the critique of modernity and capitalist society, the definition of social emancipation, as well as the detection of the pathologies of society. Critical Theory provides a specific interpretation of Marxist philosophy with regards to some of its central economic and political notions like commodification, reification, fetishization and critique of mass culture.
Some of the most prominent figures of the first generation of Critical Theorists were Max Horkheimer (1895-1973), Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), Friedrich Pollock (1894-1970), Leo Lowenthal (1900-1993), and Eric Fromm (1900-1980). Since the 1970s, a second generation began with Jürgen Habermas, who, among other merits, contributed to the opening of a dialogue between so-called continental and the analytic traditions. With Habermas, the Frankfurt School turned global, influencing methodological approaches in other European academic contexts and disciplines. It was during this phase that Richard Bernstein, a philosopher and contemporary of Habermas, embraced the research agenda of Critical Theory and significantly helped its development in American universities starting from the New School for Social Research in New York.
The third generation of critical theorists, therefore, arose either from Habermas’ research students in the United States and at Frankfurt am Main and Starnberg (1971-1982), or from a spontaneous convergence of independently educated scholars. Therefore, tthird generation of Critical Theory scholars consists of two groups. The first group spans a broad time—denying the possibility of establishing any sharp boundaries. It can be said to include also scholars such as Andrew Feenberg, even if he was a direct student of Marcuse, or people such as Albrecht Wellmer who became an assistant of Habermas due to the premature death of Adorno in 1969. Klaus Offe, Josef Früchtl, Hauke Brunkhorst, Klaus Günther, Axel Honneth, Alessandro Ferrara, Cristina Lafont, and Rainer Forst, among others, are also members of this group. The second group of the third generation is instead composed mostly of American scholars who were influenced by Habermas’ philosophy during his visits to the United States.
Critical Theory: Historical and Philosophical Background
Felix Weil’s father, Herman, made his fortune by exporting grain from Argentina to Europe. In 1923, Felix decided to use his father’s money to found an institute specifically devoted to the study of German society in the light of a Marxist approach. The initial idea of an independently founded institute was conceived to provide for studies on the labor movement and the origins of anti-Semitism, which at the time were being ignored in German intellectual and academic life.
Not long after its inception, the Institute for Social Research was formally recognized by the Ministry of Education as an entity attached to Goethe University Frankfurt. Felix could not imagine that in the 1960s Goethe University Frankfurt would receive the epithet of “Karl Marx University”. The first officially appointed director was Carl Grünberg (1923-9), a Marxist professor at the University of Vienna. His contribution to the Institute was the creation of a historical archive mainly oriented to the study of the labor movement (also known as the Grünberg Archiv).
In 1930, Max Horkheimer succeeded to Grünberg. While continuing under a Marxist inspiration, Horkheimer interpreted the Institute’s mission to be more directed towards an interdisciplinary integration of the social sciences. Additionally, the Grünberg Archiv ceased to publish and an official organ was instead launched with a much greater impact: the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. While never officially supporting any party, the Institute entertained intensive research exchanges with the Soviet Union.
It was under Horkheimer’s leadership that members of the Institute were able to address a wide variety of economic, social, political and aesthetic topics, ranging from empirical analysis to philosophical theorization. Different interpretations of Marxism and its historical applications explain some of the hardest confrontations on economic themes within the Institute, such as the case of Pollock’s criticism of Grossman’s standard view on the pauperization of capitalism. This particular confrontation led Grossman to leave the Institute. Pollock’s critical reinterpretation of Marx received support also from intellectuals who greatly contributed to later developments of the School as, for instance, in the case of Leo Lowenthal, Theodor Wiesengrund-Adorno and Erich Fromm. In particular, with Fromm’s development of a psychoanalytic trend at the Institute and with an influential philosophical contribution by Hokheimer, it became clear how under his directorship the Institute faced a drastic turning point which characterized all its future endeavors. The following sections, therefore, briefly introduce some of the main research patterns introduced by Fromm and Horkheimer, respectively.
Since the beginning, psychoanalysis in the Frankfurt School was conceived in terms of a reinterpretation of Freud and Marx. The consideration of psychoanalysis by the Frankfurt School was certainly due to Horkheimer’s encouragement. It was Fromm, nevertheless, who achieved a significant advancement of the discipline; his central aim was to provide, through a synthesis of Marxism and psychoanalysis, “the missing link between ideological superstructure and socio-economic base” (Jay 1966, p. 92). A radical shift though occurred in the late 1930s, when Adorno joined the School and Fromm decided, for independent reasons, to leave. Nevertheless, the School’s interest in psychoanalysis, particularly in Freud’s instinct theory, remained unaltered. This was manifest in Adorno’s paper Social Science and Sociological Tendencies in Psychoanalysis(1946), as well as in Marcuse’s book Eros and Civilization (1955). The School’s interest in psychoanalysis coincided with a marginalization of Marxism, a growing interest into the interrelation between psychoanalysis and social change, as well as with Fromm’s insight into the psychic (or even psychotic) role of the family. This interest became crucial in empirical studies of the 40s that led, eventually, to Adorno’s co-authored work The Authoritarian Personality (1950). The goal of this work was to explore, on the basis of empirical research making use of questionnaires, to define a “new anthropological type”—the authoritarian personality (Adorno et. al. 1950, quoted in Jay 1996, p. 239). Such a character was found to have specific traits such as: compliance with conventional values, non-critical thinking, as well as absence of introspectiveness.
As pointed out by Jay: “Perhaps some of the confusion about this question was a product of terminological ambiguity. As a number of commentators have pointed out, there is an important distinction that should be drawn between authoritarianism and totalitarianism [emphasis added]. Wilhelminian and Nazi Germany, for example, were fundamentally dissimilar in their patterns of obedience. What The Authoritarian Personality was really studying was the character type of a totalitarian rather than an authoritarian society. Thus, it should have been no surprise to learn that this new syndrome was fostered by a familial crisis in which traditional paternal authority was under fire” (Jay 1996, p. 247). Horkheimer’s leadership provided a very distinct methodological direction and philosophical grounding to the research interests of the Institute. As an instance of Horkheimer’s aversion to so-called Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life), he criticized the fetishism of subjectivity and the lack of consideration for materialist conditions of living. Furthermore, arguing against Cartesian and Kantian philosophy, Horkheimer, by use of dialectical mediation, attempted to rejoin all dichotomies including the divide between consciousness and being, theory and practice, fact and value. Differently from Hegelianism or Marxism, dialectics amounted for Horkheimer to be neither a metaphysical principle nor a historical praxis; it was not intended as a methodological instrument. On the contrary, Horkheimer’s dialectics functioned as the battleground for overcoming overly rigid categorizations and unhelpful dichotomies and oppositions. It originated from criticism by Horkheimer of orthodox Marxism's dichotomy between productive structures and ideological superstructure, as well as positivism’s naïve separation of social facts and social interpretation.
In 1933, due to the Nazi takeover, the Institute was temporarily transferred, first to Geneva and then in 1935 to Columbia University, New York. Two years later Horkheimer published the ideological manifesto of the School in his Traditional and Critical Theory ([1937] 1976) where he readdressed some of the previously introduced topics concerning the practical and critical turn of theory. In 1938, Adorno joined the Institute after spending some time as an advanced student at Merton College, Oxford. He was invited by Horkheimer to join the Princeton Radio Research Project. Gradually, Adorno assumed a prominent intellectual leadership in the School and this led to co-authorship, with Horkheimer, of one of the milestones works of the School, the publication of Dialectic of Enlightenment in 1947. During the time of Germany’s Nazi seizure, the Institute remained the only free voice publishing in German language. The backlash of this choice, though, was a prolonged isolation from American academic life and intellectual debate, a situation described by Adorno with the iconic expression “message in the bottle” to refer to the lack of a public American audience. According to Wiggershaus: “The Institute disorientation in the late 1930s made the balancing acts it had always had to perform, for example in relation to its academic environment, even more difficult. The seminars were virtually discussion groups for the Institute’s associates, and American students only rarely took part in them” (1995, p. 251).
Interestingly, and not surprisingly, one of the major topics of study was Nazism. This led to two different approaches in the School. One marshaled by Neumann, Gurland and Kirchheimer and oriented mainly to the analysis of legal and political issues by consideration of economic substructures; the other, instead, guided by Horkheimer and focusing on the notion of psychological irrationalism as a source of obedience and domination (see Jay 1996, p. 166).
In 1941, Horkheimer moved to Pacific Palisades, near Los Angeles. He built himself a bungalow near other German intellectuals, among whom were Bertold Brecht and Thomas Mann as well as with other people interested in working for the film industry (Wiggershaus 1995, p. 292). Other fellows like Marcuse, Pollock and Adorno followed shortly, whereas some remained in New York. Only Benjamin refused to leave Europe and in 1940, while attempting to cross the border between France and Spain at Port Bou, committed suicide. Some months later, Arendt also crossed the same border, passing on Adorno Benjamin’s last writing: Theses on the Philosophy of History.
The division of the School into two different premises, New York and California, was paralleled by the development of two autonomous research programs led, on the one hand, by Pollock and, on the other hand, by Horkheimer and Adorno. Pollock directed his research to study anti-Semitism. This research line culminated into an international conference organized in 1944 as well as a four-volume work titled Studies in Anti-Semitism; Horkheimer and Adorno, instead, developed studies on the reinterpretation of the Hegelian notion of dialectics as well as engaged into the study of anti-Semitic tendencies. The most relevant publication in this respect by the two was The Authoritarian Personality or Studies in Prejudice. After this period, only few devoted supporters remained faithful to the project of the School. These included Horkheimer himself, Pollock, Adorno, Lowenthal and Weil. In 1946, however, the Institute was officially invited to join Goethe University Frankfurt.
Upon return to West Germany, Horkheimer presented his inaugural speech for the reopening of the institute on 14 November 1951. One week later he inaugurated the academic year as a new Rector of the University. Yet, what was once a lively intellectual community became soon a small team of very busy people. Horkheimer was involved in the administration of the university, whereas Adorno was constantly occupied with different projects and teaching duties. In addition, in order to keep US citizenship, Adorno had to go back to California where he earned his living by conducting qualitative research analysis. Horkheimer, instead, attempted to attract back his former assistant Marcuse when the opportunity arose for a successor to Gadamer’s chair in Frankfurt, but neither this initiative nor further occasions were successful. Marcuse remained in the United States and was offered a full position at Brandeis University. Adorno returned to Germany in August 1953 and was soon involved again in empirical research, combining quantitative and qualitative methods in the analysis of industrial relations for the Mannesmann Company. In 1955, he took over Horkheimer position as director of the Institute for Social Research, and on 1 July 1957 he was appointed full professor in philosophy and sociology. Even though greatly influential in philosophy, Adorno’s most innovative contribution is unanimously thought to be in the field of music theory and aesthetics. Some of his significant works in this area included Philosophy of Modern Music (1949) and later Vers une Musique Informelle. In 1956, Horkheimer retired just when several important publications were appearing, such as Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization and the essay’s collection Sociologica. These events marked the precise intellectual phase of maturity reached at that time by the Frankfurt School.
The sixties—which saw famous student protests across Europe—also saw the publication of Adorno’s fundamental work, Negative Dialectics (1966). This study, while far from either materialism or metaphysics, maintained important connections with an “open and non-systemic” notion of dialectics. It appeared only a few years later than One-Dimensional Man (1964), where Marcuse introduced the notion of “educational dictatorship”— a strategy intended for the advancement of material conditions aimed at the realization of a higher notion of the good. While Marcuse, quite ostensibly, sponsored the student upheavals, Adorno maintained a much moderate and skeptical profile.
In 1956, Habermas joined the Institute as Adorno’s assistant. He was soon involved in an empirical study titled Students and Politics. The text, though, was rejected by Horkheimer and it did not come out, as it should have, in the series of the Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology. Only later, in 1961, it appeared in the series Sociological Texts (see Wiggershaus 1995, p. 555). Horkheimer’s aversion towards Habermas was even more evident when he refused to supervise his Habilitation. Habermas obtained his Habilitation under the supervision of Abendroth at Marburg, where he addressed the topic of the bourgeois formation of public sphere. This study was published by Habermas in 1962 under the title of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, just before he handed in his Habilitation. With the support of Gadamer he was, then, appointed professor at Heidelberg. Besides his achievements, both in academia and as an activist, the young Habermas contributed towards the construction of a critical self-awareness of the socialist student groups around the country (the so-called SDS, Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund). It was in this context that Habermas reacted to the extremism of Rudi Dutschke, the radical leader of the students' association who criticized him for defending a non-effective emancipatory view. It was principally against Dutschke’s positions that Habermas, during a public assembly labeled such positions with the epitome of “left-wing fascism”. How representative this expression was of Habermas’ views on student protests has often been a matter of contention.
Discussions of the notion of emancipation had been at the center of the Frankfurt School political debate since the beginning. The concept of emancipation (Befreiung in German), covers indeed a wide semantic spectrum. Literarily it means “liberation from”. The notion spans, therefore, from a sense related to action-transformation to include also revolutionary action.
After his nomination in 1971 as a director of the Max Planck Institute for Research into the Conditions of Life in the Scientific-Technical World at Starnberg, Habermas left Frankfurt. He returned there only in 1981 after having completed The Theory of Communicative Action. This decade was crucial for the definition of the School’s research objectives. In The Theory of Communicative Action (1984b [1981]), Habermas provided a model for social complexities and action coordination based upon the original interpretation of classical social theorists as well as the philosophy of Searle’s Speech Acts theory. Within this work, it also became evident how the large amount of empirical analysis conducted by Habermas’ research team on topics concerning pathologies of society, moral development and so on was elevated to a functionalistic model of society oriented to an emancipatory purpose. The assumption was that language itself embedded a normative force capable of realizing action co-ordination within society. In this respect, Habermas defined these as the “unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions of mutual understanding”. Social action whose coordination-function relies on the same pragmatic presuppositions was seen as connected to a justification discourse based on the satisfaction of specific validity-claims.
Habermas described discourse theory as relying on three types of validity-claims raised by communicative action. He claimed that it was only when the conditions of truth, rightness and sincerity were raised by speech-acts that social coordination could be obtained. As noticed in the opening sections, differently from the first generation of Frankfurt School intellectuals, Habermas contributed greatly to bridging the continental and analytical traditions, integrating aspects belonging to American Pragmatism, Anthropology and Semiotics with Marxism and Critical Social Theory.
Just one year before Habermas’ retirement in 1994, the directorship of the Institut für Sozialforschung was assumed by Honneth. This inaugurated a new phase of research in Critical Theory. Honneth, indeed, revisited the Hegelian notion of recognition (Anerkennung) in terms of a new prolific paradigm in social and political enquiry. Honneth began his collaboration with Habermas in 1984, when he was hired as an assistant professor. After a period of academic appointments in Berlin and Konstanz, in 1996 he took Habermas’ chair in Frankfurt.
Honneth’s central tenet, the struggle for recognition, represents a leitmotiv in his research and preeminently in one of his most important books, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts ([1986]). This work represents a mature expansion of what was partially addressed in his dissertation, a work published under the title of Critique of Power: Stages of Reflection of a Critical Social Theory (1991 [1985]). One of the core themes addressed by Honneth consisted in the claim that, contrary to what Critical Theory initially emphasized, more attention should have been paid to the notion of conflict in society and among societal groups. Conflict represents the internal movement of historical advancement and human emancipation, falling therefore within the core theme of critical social theory. The so-called “struggle for recognition” is what best characterizes the fight for emancipation by social groups. This fight represents a subjective negative experience of domination—a form of domination attached to misrecognitions. To come to terms with negations of subjective forms of self-realization means to be able to transform social reality. Normatively, though, acts of social struggle activated by forms of misrecognition point to the role that recognition plays as a crucial criterion for grounding intersubjectivity.
Honneth inaugurated a new research phase in Critical Theory. Indeed, his communitarian turn has been paralleled by the work of some of his fellow scholars. Brunkhorst, for instance, in his Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community (2005 [2002]), canvasses a line of thought springing from the French Revolution of 1789 to contemporary times: the notion of fraternity. By the use of historical conceptual reconstruction and normative speculation, Brunkhorst presented the pathologies of the contemporary globalized world and the function that solidarity would play.
The confrontation with American debate, initiated systematically by the work of Habermas, became soon an obsolete issue in the third generation of critical theorists—not only because the group was truly international, merging European and American scholars. The work of Forst testifies, indeed, of the synthesis between analytical methodological rigor and classical themes of the Frankfurt School. Thanks to Habermas’ intellectual opening, the third generation of critical theorists engaged into dialogue with French post-modern philosophers like Derrida, Baudrillard, Lyotard and so forth, which according to Foucault are the legitimate interpreters of some central aspects of the Frankfurt School.
What is Critical Theory?
“What is ‘theory’?” asked Horkheimer in the opening of his essay Traditional and Critical Theory[1937]. The discussion about method has been always a constant topic for those critical theorists who have attempted since the beginning to clarify the specificity of what it means to be “critical”. A primary broad distinction that Horkheimer drew was that of the difference in method between social theories, scientific theories and critical social theories. While the first two categories had been treated as instances of traditional theories, the latter connoted the methodology the Frankfurt School adopted.
Traditional theory, whether deductive or analytical, has always focused on coherency and on the strict distinction between theory and praxis. Along Cartesian lines, knowledge has been treated as grounded upon self-evident propositions or, at least, upon propositions based on self-evident truths. Accordingly, traditional theory has proceeded to explain facts by application of universal laws, that is, by subsumption of a particular to a universal in order to either confirm or disconfirm this. A verificationist procedure of this kind was what positivism considered to be the best explicatory account for the notion of praxis in scientific investigation. If one were to defend the view according to which scientific truths should pass the test of empirical confirmation, then one would commit oneself to the idea of an objective world. Knowledge would be simply a mirror of reality. This view is firmly rejected by critical theorists.
Under several aspects, what Critical Theory wants to reject in traditional theory is precisely this “picture theory” of language and knowledge as that defined by “the first” Wittgenstein in his Tractatus. According to such a view, later abandoned by “the second” Wittgenstein, the logical form of propositions consists in showing a possible fact and in saying whether this is true or false. For example, the proposition “it rains today” shows both the possibility of the fact that “it rains today” and it affirms that it is the case that “it rains today.” In order to check whether something is or is not the case, one must verify empirically whether the stated fact occurs or not. This implies that the condition of truth and falsehood presupposes an objective structure of the world.
Horkheimer and his followers rejected the notion of objectivity in knowledge by pointing, among other things, to the fact that the object of knowledge is itself embedded into a historical and social process: “The facts which our senses present to us are socially preformed in two ways: through the historical character of the object perceived and through the historical character of the perceiving organ” (Horkheimer [1937] in Ingram and Simon-Ingram 1992, p. 242). Further, with a rather Marxist twist, Horkheimer noticed also that phenomenological objectivity is a myth because it is dependent upon “technological conditions” and the latter are sensitive to the material conditions of production. Critical Theory aims thus to abandon naïve conceptions of knowledge-impartiality. Since intellectuals themselves are not disembodied entities observing from a God’s viewpoint, knowledge can be obtained only from a societal embedded perspective of interdependent individuals.
If traditional theory is evaluated by considering its practical implications, then no practical consequences can be actually inferred. Indeed, the finality of knowledge as a mirror of reality is mainly a theoretically-oriented tool aimed at separating knowledge from action, speculation from social transformative enterprise. Critical Theory, instead, characterizes itself as a method contrary to the “fetishization” of knowledge, one which considers knowledge as something rather functional to ideology critique and social emancipation. In the light of such finalities, knowledge becomes social criticism and the latter translates itself into social action, that is, into the transformation of reality.
Critical Theory has been strongly influenced by Hegel’s notion of dialectics for the conciliation of socio-historical oppositions as well as by Marx’s theory of economy and society and the limits of Hegel’s “bourgeois philosophy”. Critical Theory, indeed, has expanded Marxian criticisms of capitalist society by formulating patterns of social emancipatory strategies. Whereas Hegel found that Rationality had finally come to terms with Reality with the birth of the modern nation state (which in his eyes was the Prussian state), Marx insisted on the necessity of reading the development of rationality through history in terms of a class struggle. The final stage of this struggle would have seen the political and economic empowerment of the proletariat. Critical theorists, in their turn, rejected both the metaphysical apparatus of Hegel and the eschatological aspects connected to Marx’s theory. On the contrary, Critical Theory analyses were oriented to the understanding of society and pointed rather to the necessity of establishing open systems based on immanent forms of social criticism. The starting point was the Marxian view on the relation between a system of production paralleled by a system of beliefs. Ideology, which according to Marx was totally explicable through an underlying system of production, for critical theorists had to be analyzed in its own respect and as a non-economically reducible form of expression of human rationality. Such a revision of Marxian categories became extremely crucial, then, in the reinterpretation of the notion of dialectics for the analysis of capitalism. Dialectics, as a method of social criticism, was interpreted as following from the contradictory nature of capitalism as a system of exploitation. Indeed, it was on the basis of such inherent contradictions that capitalism was seen to open up to a collective form of ownership of the means of production, namely, socialism.
Traditional and Critical Theory: Ideology and Critique
From these conceptually rich implications one can observe some of the constant topics which have characterized critical social theory, that is, the normativity of social philosophy as something distinct from classical descriptive sociology, the everlasting crux on the theory/practice relation and, finally, ideology critique. These are the primary tasks that a critical social theory must accomplish in order to be defined as “critical”. Crucial in this sense is the understanding and the criticism of the notion of “ideology”.
In defining the senses to be assigned to the notion of ideology, within its descriptive-empirical sense “one might study the biological and quasi-biological properties of the group” or, alternatively, “the cultural or socio-cultural features of the group” (Geuss 1981, p. 4 ff). Ideology, in the descriptive sense, incorporates both “discursive” and “non-discursive” elements. That is, in addition to propositional contents or performatives, it includes gestures, ceremonies and so forth (Geuss 1981, pp. 6-8); also, it shows a systematic set of beliefs—a world-view—characterized by conceptual schemes. A variant of the descriptive sense is the “pejorative” version where a form of ideology is judged negatively in view of its epistemic, functional or genetic properties (Geuss 1981, p. 13). On the other hand, if one takes “ideology” according to a positive sense, then, reference is not with something empirically given, but rather with a “desideratum”, a “verité a faire” (Geuss 1981, p. 23). Critical Theory, distances itself from scientific theories because, while the latter understands knowledge as an objectified product, the former serves the purpose of human emancipation through consciousness and self-reflection.
If the task of critical social theory is to evaluate the degree of rationality of any system of social domination in accordance to standards of justice, then ideological criticism has the function of unmasking wrong rationalizations of present or past injustices—that is, ideology in the factual and negative sense—such as in the case of the belief that “women are inferior to men, or blacks to whites…”. Thus ideological criticism aims at proposing alternative practicable ways for constructing social bounds. Critical Theory moves precisely in between the contingency of objectified non-critical factual reality and the normativity of utopian idealizations, that is, in between the so-called “theory/practice” problem (see Ingram 1990, p. xxiii). Marcuse, for instance, in the essay Philosophie und Kritische Theorie (1937), defends the view that Critical Theory characterizes itself as being neither philosophy tout court nor pure science, as it claims to be instead an overly simplistic approach to Marxism. Critical Theory has the following tasks: to clarify the sociopolitical determinants that explain the limits of analysis of a certain philosophical view as well as to transcend the use of imagination—the actual limits of imagination. From all this, two notions of rationality result: the first attached to the dominant form of power and deprived of any normative force; the second characterized, on the contrary, by a liberating force based on a yet-to-come scenario. This difference in forms of rationality is what Habermas has later presented, mutatis mutandis, in terms of the distinction between instrumental and communicative rationality. While the first form of rationality is oriented to a means-ends understanding of human and environmental relations, the second form is oriented to subordinating human action to the respect of certain normative criteria of action validity. This latter point echoes quite distinctively Kant’s principle of morality according to which human beings must be always treated as “ends in themselves” and never as mere “means”. Critical Theory and Habermas, in particular, are no exception to these view on rationality, since they both see Ideologiekritik not just as a form of “moralizing criticism”, but as a form of knowledge, that is, as a cognitive operation for disclosing the falsity of conscience (Geuss 1981, p. 26).
This point is strictly connected to another conceptual category playing a great role within Critical Theory, the concept of interest and in particular the distinction between “true interests” and “false interests”. As Geuss has suggested, there are two possible ways to propose such separation: “the perfect-knowledge approach” and “the optimal conditions approach” (1981, p. 48). Were one to follow the first option, the outcome would be one of falling into the side of acritical utopianism. On the contrary, “the optimal conditions approach” is reinterpreted, at least for Habermas, in terms of an “ideal speech situation” that by virtually granting an all-encompassing exchange of arguments, it assumes the function of providing a counterfactual normative check on actual discursive contexts. Within such a model, epistemic knowledge and social critical reflection are attached to unavoidable pragmatic-transcendental conditions that are universally the same for all.
The universality of such epistemological status differs profoundly from Adorno’s contextualism where individual epistemic principles grounding cultural criticism and self-reflection are recognized to be legitimately different along time and history. Both versions are critical in that they remain faithful to the objective of clearing false consciousness from ignorance and domination; but whereas Habermas sets a high standard of validity/non-validity for discourse theory, Adorno’s historicism remains sensitive to degrees of rationality that are context-dependent. In one of his later writings of 1969 (republished in Adorno 2003, pp. 292 ff.), Adorno provides a short but dense interpretation in eight theses on the significance and the mission of Critical Theory. The central message is that Critical Theory, while drawing from Marxism, must avoid hypostatization and closure into a single Weltanschauung on the pain of losing its “critical” capacity. By interpreting rationality as a form of self-reflective activity, Critical Theory represents a particular form of rational enquiry that must remain capable of distinguishing, immanently, ideology from a Hegelian “Spirit”. The mission of Critical Theory, therefore, is not exhausted by a theoretical understanding of social reality; as a matter of fact, there is a strict interconnection between critical understanding and transformative action: theory and practice are interconnected.