The surviving works of Aristotle include three treatises on moral
philosophy: the Nicomachean Ethics in 10 books, the Eudemian Ethics in 7 books,
and the Magna moralia (Latin: “Great Ethics”). The Nicomachean Ethics is
generally regarded as the most important of the three; it consists of a series
of short treatises, possibly brought together by Aristotle’s son Nicomachus. In
the 19th century the Eudemian Ethics was often suspected of being the work of
Aristotle’s pupil Eudemus of Rhodes, but there is no good reason to doubt its
authenticity. Interestingly, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics
have three books in common: books V, VI, and VII of the former are the same as
books IV, V, and VI of the latter. Although the question has been disputed for
centuries, it is most likely that the original home of the common books was the
Eudemian Ethics; it is also probable that Aristotle used this work for a course
on ethics that he taught at the Lyceum during his mature period. The Magna
moralia probably consists of notes taken by an unknown student of such a
course.
Happiness
Aristotle’s approach to ethics is teleological. If life is to be worth
living, he argues, it must surely be for the sake of something that is an end
in itself—i.e., desirable for its own sake. If there is any single thing that
is the highest human good, therefore, it must be desirable for its own sake,
and all other goods must be desirable for the sake of it. One popular
conception of the highest human good is pleasure—the pleasures of food, drink,
and sex, combined with aesthetic and intellectual pleasures. Other people
prefer a life of virtuous action in the political sphere. A third possible
candidate for the highest human good is scientific or philosophical contemplation.
Aristotle thus reduces the answers to the question “What is a good life?” to a
short list of three: the philosophical life, the political life, and the
voluptuary life. This triad provides the key to his ethical inquiry.
“Happiness,” the term that Aristotle uses to designate the highest human
good, is the usual translation of the Greek eudaimonia. Although it is
impossible to abandon the English term at this stage of history, it should be
borne in mind that what Aristotle means by eudaimonia is something more like
well-being or flourishing than any feeling of contentment. Aristotle argues, in
fact, that happiness is activity of the rational soul in accordance with
virtue. Human beings must have a function, because particular types of humans (e.g.,
sculptors) do, as do the parts and organs of individual human beings. This
function must be unique to humans; thus, it cannot consist of growth and
nourishment, for this is shared by plants, or the life of the senses, for this
is shared by animals. It must therefore involve the peculiarly human faculty of
reason. The highest human good is the same as good human functioning, and good
human functioning is the same as the good exercise of the faculty of
reason—that is to say, the activity of rational soul in accordance with virtue.
There are two kinds of virtue: moral and intellectual. Moral virtues are
exemplified by courage, temperance, and liberality; the key intellectual
virtues are wisdom, which governs ethical behaviour, and understanding, which is
expressed in scientific endeavour and contemplation.
Virtue
People’s virtues are a subset of their good qualities. They are not
innate, like eyesight, but are acquired by practice and lost by disuse. They
are abiding states, and they thus differ from momentary passions such as anger
and pity. Virtues are states of character that find expression both in purpose
and in action. Moral virtue is expressed in good purpose—that is to say, in
prescriptions for action in accordance with a good plan of life. It is expressed
also in actions that avoid both excess and defect. A temperate person, for
example, will avoid eating or drinking too much, but he will also avoid eating
or drinking too little. Virtue chooses the mean, or middle ground, between
excess and defect. Besides purpose and action, virtue is also concerned with
feeling. One may, for example, be excessively concerned with sex or
insufficiently interested in it; the temperate person will take the appropriate
degree of interest and be neither lustful nor frigid.
While all the moral virtues are means of action and passion, it is not
the case that every kind of action and passion is capable of a virtuous mean.
There are some actions of which there is no right amount, because any amount of
them is too much; Aristotle gives murder and adultery as examples. The virtues,
besides being concerned with means of action and passion, are themselves means
in the sense that they occupy a middle ground between two contrary vices. Thus,
the virtue of courage is flanked on one side by foolhardiness and on the other
by cowardice.
Aristotle’s account of virtue as a mean is no truism. It is a
distinctive ethical theory that contrasts with other influential systems of
various kinds. It contrasts, on the one hand, with religious systems that give
a central role to the concept of a moral law, concentrating on the prohibitive
aspects of morality. It also differs from moral systems such as utilitarianism
that judge the rightness and wrongness of actions in terms of their consequences.
Unlike the utilitarian, Aristotle believes that there are some kinds of action
that are morally wrong in principle.
The mean that is the mark of moral virtue is determined by the
intellectual virtue of wisdom. Wisdom is characteristically expressed in the
formulation of prescriptions for action—“practical syllogisms,” as Aristotle
calls them. A practical syllogism consists of a general recipe for a good life,
followed by an accurate description of the agent’s actual circumstances and
concluding with a decision about the appropriate action to be carried out.
Wisdom, the intellectual virtue that is proper to practical reason, is
inseparably linked with the moral virtues of the affective part of the soul.
Only if an agent possesses moral virtue will he endorse an appropriate recipe
for a good life. Only if he is gifted with intelligence will he make an
accurate assessment of the circumstances in which his decision is to be made.
It is impossible, Aristotle says, to be really good without wisdom or to be really
wise without moral virtue. Only when correct reasoning and right desire come
together does truly virtuous action result.
Virtuous action, then, is always the result of successful practical
reasoning. But practical reasoning may be defective in various ways. Someone
may operate from a vicious choice of lifestyle; a glutton, for example, may
plan his life around the project of always maximizing the present pleasure.
Aristotle calls such a person “intemperate.” Even people who do not endorse
such a hedonistic premise may, once in a while, overindulge. This failure to
apply to a particular occasion a generally sound plan of life Aristotle calls
“incontinence.”
Action and
contemplation
The pleasures that are the domain of temperance, intemperance, and
incontinence are the familiar bodily pleasures of food, drink, and sex. In
treating of pleasure, however, Aristotle explores a much wider field. There are
two classes of aesthetic pleasures: the pleasures of the inferior senses of
touch and taste, and the pleasures of the superior senses of sight, hearing,
and smell. Finally, at the top of the scale, there are the pleasures of the
mind.
Plato had posed the question of whether the best life consists in the
pursuit of pleasure or the exercise of the intellectual virtues. Aristotle’s
answer is that, properly understood, the two are not in competition with each
other. The exercise of the highest form of virtue is the very same thing as the
truest form of pleasure; each is identical with the other and with happiness. The
highest virtues are the intellectual ones, and among them Aristotle
distinguished between wisdom and understanding. To the question of whether
happiness is to be identified with the pleasure of wisdom or with the pleasure
of understanding, Aristotle gives different answers in his main ethical
treatises. In the Nicomachean Ethics perfect happiness, though it presupposes
the moral virtues, is constituted solely by the activity of philosophical
contemplation, whereas in the Eudemian Ethics it consists in the harmonious
exercise of all the virtues, intellectual and moral.
The Eudemian ideal of happiness, given the role it assigns to
contemplation, to the moral virtues, and to pleasure, can claim to combine the
features of the traditional three lives—the life of the philosopher, the life
of the politician, and the life of the pleasure seeker. The happy person will
value contemplation above all, but part of his happy life will consist in the
exercise of moral virtues in the political sphere and the enjoyment in
moderation of the natural human pleasures of body as well as of soul. But even
in the Eudemian Ethics it is “the service and contemplation of God” that sets
the standard for the appropriate exercise of the moral virtues, and in the
Nicomachean Ethics this contemplation is described as a superhuman activity of
a divine part of human nature. Aristotle’s final word on ethics is that,
despite being mortal, human beings must strive to make themselves immortal as
far as they can.
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