Philosophy
of language covers a variety of activities:
Philosophers interested in in
problems, for example, about mind and knowledge, may frame their questions in
various ways. They may ask directly about mind or knowledge; they may talk
about the concept of mind or knowldge; or they may begin by asking ho the words
‘mind’ and ‘knowledge’ are used. The belief that philosophical questions may be
approached by asking questions about the use of words underlies what is
sometimes called linguistic philosophy. Those who practice linguistic
philosophy are sometimes said to be be practising the philosophy of language.
The procedure of investigating
philosophical questions by reflecting on the uses of words generates another
meaning of ‘philosophy of language’. Here there are two questions. First is a
general question about the justifiability of approaching philosophical
questions via a study of how words are used (see Austin and Wittgenstein).
Second, philosophers who study the used of words use such key terms as
‘meaning’, ‘reference’, ‘thruth’ and ‘use’. It is possible to make these terms,
used by philosophers and others in talking about language, on this
interpretationn then becomes a higher level study of ‘linguistic philosophy’
and of its terms of art.
Although an interest in such
terms as ‘meaning’ or ‘truth’ and the like can arise as philosophers deliberate
on their methods, it can also arise because philosophers become interested in a
study of the nature ans workings of language as a subject in its own right,
rather than as a means to the solution of futher philosophical problems.
Philosophy of language become
the search for an understanding of the nature and functioning of language. This
may lead, as in the later Wittgenstein, to the consideration of the sorts of
conditions that have to be met for language to be possible at all. In this kind
of philosophy of language we can detect a difference: between those, such as
Austin and Wittgenstein, who are happy to study the actual workings of natural
languages, and those who believe natural languages to be overly vuage,
confused, or imprecise and in need of tidying up. Some of the latter believe
the workings of language are best explored through the construction of more
precise artificial languages.
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