The
philosophy of social science can be described broadly as having two
aims. First, it seeks to produce a rational reconstruction of social
science. This entails describing the philosophical assumptions that
underpin the practice of social inquiry, just as the philosophy of
natural science seeks to lay bare the methodological and ontological
assumptions that guide scientific investigation of natural phenomena.
Second, the philosophy of social science seeks to critique the social
sciences with the aim of enhancing their ability to explain the
social world or otherwise improve our understanding of it. Thus
philosophy of social science is both descriptive and prescriptive. As
such, it concerns a number of interrelated questions. These include:
What is the method (or methods) of social science? Does social
science use the same methods as natural science? If not, should it
aspire to? Or are the methods appropriate to social inquiry
fundamentally different from those of natural science? Is scientific
investigation of the social world even possible – or desirable?
What type of knowledge does social inquiry produce? Can the social
sciences be objective and value neutral? Should they strive to be?
Does the social world represent a unique realm of inquiry with its
own properties and laws? Or can the regularities and other properties
of the social world be reduced to facts about individuals?
The
following article will survey how philosophers of social science have
addressed and debated these questions. It will begin by examining the
question of whether social inquiry can – or should – have the
same aims and use the same methods as the natural sciences. This is
perhaps the most central and enduring issue in the philosophy of
social science. Addressing it inevitably leads to discussion of other
key controversies in the field, such as the nature of explanation of
social phenomena and the possibility of value-free social science.
Following examination of the views of proponents and critics of
social inquiry modeled on the natural sciences will be a discussion
of the debate between methodological individualists and
methodological holists. This issue concerns whether social phenomena
can be reduced to facts about individuals. The penultimate section of
the article asks the question: How does social science as currently
practiced enhance our understanding of the social world? Even if
social science falls short of the goals of natural science, such as
uncovering lawlike regularities and predicting phenomena, it
nonetheless may still produce valuable knowledge. The article closes
with a brief discussion of methodological pluralism. No single
approach to social inquiry seems capable of capturing all aspects of
social reality. But a kind of unification of the social sciences can
be posited by envisioning the various methods as participating in an
on-going dialogue with each other.
Naturalism and the Unity of Scientific Method
The
achievements of the natural sciences in the wake of the scientific
revolution of the seventeenth century have been most impressive.
Their investigation of nature has produced elegant and powerful
theories that have not only greatly enhanced understanding of the
natural world, but also increased human power and control over it.
Modern physics, for instance, has shed light on such mysteries as the
origin of the universe and the source of the sun’s energy, and it
has also spawned technology that has led to supercomputers, nuclear
energy (and bombs), and space exploration. Natural science is
manifestly progressive, insofar as over time its theories tend to
increase in depth, range and predictive power. It is also consensual.
That is, there is general agreement among natural scientists
regarding what the aims of science are and how to conduct it,
including how to evaluate theories. At least in the long run, natural
science tends to produce consent regarding which theories are valid.
Given this evident success, many philosophers and social theorists
have been eager to import the methods of natural science to the study
of the social world. If social science were to achieve the
explanatory and predictive power of natural science, it could help
solve vexing social problems, such as violence and poverty, improve
the performance of institutions and generally foster human
well-being. Those who believe that adapting the aims and methods of
natural science to social inquiry is both possible and desirable
support the unity
of scientific method. Such
advocacy in this context is also referred to as naturalism
Of
course, the effort to unify social and natural science requires
reaching some agreement on what the aims and methods of science are
(or should be). A school of thought, broadly known as
positivism, has been particularly important here. An analysis of
positivism’s key doctrines is well beyond the scope of this
article. However, brief mention of some of its key ideas is
warranted, given their substantial influence on contemporary
advocates of naturalism. The genesis of positivism can be traced to
the ideas of the British empiricists of the seventeenth and
eighteenth century, including most notably , John Locke,
Berkely and David Hume. As an epistemological
doctrine, empiricism in
essence holds that genuine knowledge of the external world must be
grounded in experience and observation. In the nineteenth century,
Auguste Comte, who coined the term “positivism,” argued that all
theories, concepts or entities that are incapable of being verified
empirically must be purged from scientific explanations. The aim of
scientific explanation is prediction, he argued, rather than trying
to understand a noumenal realm that lies beyond our senses and is
thus unknowable. To generate predictions, science seeks to uncover
laws of succession governing relations between observed phenomena, of
which gravity and Newton’s laws of motion were exemplars. Comte
also advocated the unity of scientific method, arguing that the
natural and social sciences should both adopt a positivist approach.
(Comte was a founder of sociology, which he also called “social
physics.”) In the middle third of the twentieth century an
influential version of positivism, known as logical positivism,
emphasized and refined the logical and linguistic implications of
Comte’s empiricism, holding that meaningful statements about the
world are limited to those that can be tested through direct
observation.
For
a variety of reasons, positivism began to fall out of favor among
philosophers of science beginning in the latter half of the twentieth
century. Perhaps its most problematic feature was the logical
positivists’ commitment to the verifiability criterion of meaning.
Not only did this implausibly relegate a slew of traditional
philosophical questions to the category of meaningless, it also
called into question the validity of employing unobservable
theoretical entities, processes and forces in natural science
theories. Logical positivists held that in principle the properties
of unobservables, such as electrons, quarks or genes, could be
translated into observable effects. In practice, however, such
derivations generally proved impossible, and ridding unobservable
entities of their explanatory role would require dispensing with the
most successful science of the twentieth century.
Despite
the collapse of positivism as a philosophical movement, it continues
to exercise influence on contemporary advocates of the unity of
scientific method. Though there are important disagreements among
naturalists about the proper methodology of science, three core
tenets that trace their origin to positivism can be identified.
First, advocates of naturalism remain wedded to the view that science
is a fundamentally empirical enterprise. Second, most naturalists
hold that the primary aim of science is to produce causal
explanations grounded in lawlike regularities. And, finally,
naturalists typically support value neutrality – the view that the
role of science is to describe and explain the world, not to make
value judgments.
At
a minimum, an empirical approach for the social sciences requires
producing theories about the social world that can be tested via
observation and experimentation. Indeed, many naturalists support the
view, first proposed by Karl Popper, that the line demarcating
science from non-science is empirical falsifiability. According to
this view, if there is no imaginable empirical test that could show a
theory to be false, then it cannot be called a scientific theory.
Producing empirically falsifiable theories in turn necessitates
creating techniques for systematically and precisely measuring the
social world. Much of twentieth century social science involved the
formation of such tools, including figuring out ways to
operationalize social phenomena – that is, conceptualize them in
such a way that they can be measured. The data produced by operations
in turn provide the raw, empirical material to construct and test
theories. At the practical level, ensuring that scientific theories
are subject to proper empirical rigor requires establishing an
institutional framework through which a community of social
scientists can try to test each others’ theories.
The
purpose of a theory, according to naturalists, is to produce causal
explanations of events or regularities found in the natural and
social worlds. Indeed, this is the primary aim of science. For
instance, astronomers may wish to explain the appearance of Haley’s
comment at regular intervals of seventy-five years, or they might
want to explain a particular event, such as the collision of the
comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 with Jupiter in July 1994. Scientific
explanations of such regularities or events in turn require
identification of lawlike regularities that govern such phenomena. An
event or regularity is formally explained when its occurrence is
shown to be logically necessary, given certain causal laws and
boundary conditions. This so-called covering law model
thus views explanation as adhering to the structure of a deductive
argument, with the laws and boundary conditions serving as premises
in a syllogism. Underpinning the explanations of the periodic
return of Haley’s comment or the impact of Shoemaker-Levy 9 in
astronomy, for instance, would be certain casual laws of physics,
namely gravity and Newton’s laws of motion. These laws may be
invoked to produce causal explanations of a variety of other events
and regularities, such as the orbit of the planets in our solar
system, the trajectory of projectiles, the collapse of stars, and so
forth. Thus the discovery of lawlike regularities offers the power to
produce parsimonious explanations of a wide variety of phenomena.
Proponents of the unity of scientific method therefore hold that
uncovering laws of social phenomena should be a primary goal of
social inquiry, and indeed represents the sine
qua non for
achieving genuinely scientific social investigation.
The
doctrine of value neutrality is grounded in the so-called fact/value
distinction, which traces its origins to David Hume’s claim that
an ought cannot
be derived from an is. That
is, factual statements about the world can never logically compel a
particular moral evaluation. For instance, based on scientific
evidence, biologists might conclude that violence and competition are
natural human traits. But such a factual claim itself does not tell
us whether violence and competition are good or bad. According to
advocates of naturalism, the same holds true for claims about the
social world. For example, political scientists might be able to tell
us which social, political and material conditions are conducive to
the development of democracy. But, according to this view, a
scientific explanation of the causes of democracy cannot tell us
whether we ought to strive to bring about democracy or whether
democracy itself is a good thing. Science can help us better
understand how to manipulate the social world to help us achieve our
goals, but it cannot tell us what those goals ought to be. To believe
otherwise is to fall prey to the so-called naturalistic falacy.
However, value neutrality does not bar social scientists from
providing an account of the values that individuals hold, nor does it
prevent them from trying to discern the effects that values might
have on individuals’ behavior or social phenomena. Indeed, Max
Weber, a central figure in late nineteenth and early twentieth
century sociology and a defender of value neutrality, insisted that
providing a rich account of individuals’ values is a key task for
social scientists. But he maintained that social scientists can and
should keep their ethical judgment of people’s values separate from
their scientific analysis of the nature and effects of those values.
No comments:
Post a Comment