The
knowledge argument has two parts. One says that physical knowledge is
not sufficient for phenomenal knowledge. Call this the
knowledge intuition (Stoljar
and Nagasawa, 2004). The other says that the knowledge intuition
entails the falsity of physicalism.
Thus
described, the knowledge argument is not new with Jackson. Locke and
other 18th Century British empiricists discussed the knowledge
intuition. C. D. Broad gave a version of the knowledge argument in
1925. And other versions appear in more recent writings, such as
Thomas Nagel’s 1974 “What is it Like to be a Bat?” What is
distinctive about Jackson’s contribution?
Daniel
Stoljar and Yujin Nagasawa (2004) answer this question in their
introduction to a volume of essays on the knowledge argument. As they
say, Jackson contributes at least two main ideas: his Mary example
illustrates the knowledge intuition better than previous attempts;
and he provides distinctive reasons for inferring physicalism’s
falsity from the intuition. Let us take these points in order.
The
Mary case divides the knowledge intuition into three claims:
- The complete-knowledge claim: before leaving the room, Mary knows everything physical.
- The learning claim: upon leaving, she learns something.
- The non-deducibility claim: if the complete-knowledge claim and the learning claim are true, then what Mary learns when she leaves the room cannot be a priori deduced (deduced by reason alone, without empirical investigation) from the complete physical truth.
Physicalists
may deny the knowledge intuition. But the Mary case suggests that
doing so requires rejecting the complete-knowledge claim, the
learning claim, or the non-deducibility claim.
The
cases discussed by Broad, Nagel, and others do not deliver this
result. Consider, for example, Broad’s “mathematical archangel,”
a logically omniscient creature who knows all the physical truths
about various chemical compounds. Broad calls these truths
“mechanistic” instead of “physical,” but the point is the
same. On his view, the archangel would know all such truths but still
lack phenomenal knowledge concerning, for example, “the peculiar
smell of ammonia.” And Broad infers that physicalism (“mechanism”)
is false. But what if the physicalist denies that the archangel would
lack the relevant phenomenal knowledge? We appear to be at an
impasse. By contrast, if the physicalist claims that, while in the
room, Mary knows what it’s like to see colors, he must explain why
she seems to
acquire this knowledge when she leaves. The Mary case breaks the
deadlock in favor of the knowledge intuition. Other illustrations of
the intuition that precede Jackson’s have further drawbacks. For
example, Nagel’s claim that humans cannot imagine what it’s like
to be a bat raises distracting issues about the limits of human
imagination, about which physicalism carries no obvious commitments.
Mary’s fame is just.
To
explain the second of Jackson’s distinctive contributions, it will
be useful to explain some terminology and abbreviations. First, there
is the distinction between the a
priori and
the a
posteriori.
A priori truths are those that are justifiable by reason alone,
without empirical investigation. Logical truths provide clear
examples. For example, one can figure out without empirical
investigation that the following claim is true: if Socrates is
mortal, then either Socrates is mortal or Socrates is fat. Compare
the claim that Socrates is mortal. While we believe the latter claim
to be true, reason alone does not justify this belief. Instead, we
rely on experience—empirical investigation. So, while it is a
priori that
if Socrates is mortal, then either Socrates is mortal or Socrates is
fat, it is a
posteriori that
Socrates is mortal. We may also speak of truths that are a
priori deducible
from other truths. For example, although “Socrates is mortal”
is a
posteriori,
that same truth is a
priori deducible
from two other truths: “All men are mortal” and “Socrates is a
man.” In other words, the latter two truths, taken together, a
priori entail
that Socrates is mortal.
Second,
there is the notion of metaphysically
necessary truths.
A necessary truth
is a truth that could not have failed to be the case. Logical truths
again provide clear examples: “Either Socrates is mortal or it is
not the case that Socrates is moral” is usually regarded as
necessary. Contrast that truth with “Socrates is mortal.” The
latter is not necessary. Truths that are not necessary are also known
as contingent. Philosophers
often distinguish between different strengths or kinds of necessity.
For example, there is arguably a sense in which it is a necessary
truth that pigs cannot fly like birds. But if the laws of nature were
different, then perhaps pigs would be able to fly like birds. So,
perhaps it is not metaphysically impossible that pigs should be able
to fly like birds. A metaphysically necessary
truth is a truth that is necessary in the strictest possible sense: a
truth that holds not just because of contingent laws of nature. Saul
Kripke (1972) famously argues that there are metaphysically necessary
truths that are not truths of pure logic. Indeed, he argues that
there are metaphysically necessary truths that are not a
priori.
For example, on his view, that
water is H2O is
metaphysically necessary but a
posteriori. He
recognizes that there could have been substances
that resemble water—substances
that share water’s superficial qualities, such as its taste and
visual appearance—but with a different molecular structure. But, he
argues, these substances would not be water.
Third,
let us introduce some abbreviations. On Jackson’s version of the
knowledge argument, the assumption that Mary knows the
complete physical truth
about the world does not guarantee that she will be able to figure
out the complete truth about human color vision. His reasoning
involves the idea of the complete physical truth. Call the complete
physical truth P.
P can be seen as a long conjunction of all the particular physical
truths, which, according to Jackson, Mary learns from watching
science lectures. What about the truths that, according to Jackson,
Mary does not learn until she leaves the room? Those would be
included in the psychological truths about the world. Call the
complete psychological truth Q.
Finally, consider what Stoljar and Nagasawa call “the
psychophysical conditional”: if
P then Q,
where P is the complete physical truth and Q is the complete
psychological truth. As we will see, part of Jackson’s reasoning
can be understood in terms of his view about the psychophysical
conditional.
We
are now in a position to state the second of Jackson’s distinctive
contributions to the discussion of the knowledge argument. This
contribution concerns his inference from the knowledge intuition to
physicalism’s falsity. His inference assumes that if physicalism is
true then the complete truth about human color vision is a
priori deducible
from the complete physical truth. But here a problem arises: why
accept this assumption? Consider the psychophysical conditional, if
P then Q(again,
P is the complete physical truth and Q is the complete psychological
truth). As Jackson conceives of physicalism, physicalism entails that
the psychophysical conditional is a
priori.
If he is right, then all truths about color vision would be deducible
from P (the complete physical truth). But here physicalists have a
natural, obvious response: why not instead characterize physicalism
as a Kripkean a
posteriori necessity,
akin to water
is H2O?
On this characterization, the psychophysical conditional is
metaphysically necessary but not a
priori.
In
later work, Jackson criticizes this response. His argument is
complex, but the basic idea is simple enough. In a 1995 “Postscript,”
he reasons as follows. Consider the argument:
H2O covers most of the planet.
Therefore, water covers most of the planet.
The
premise necessitates, but does not a
priori entail,
the conclusion. But, Jackson asks, why is there no a
priori entailment?
On his view, there is no such entailment because the argument’s
premise gives us only part of the physical story. It is also part of
the physical story that H2O does the other things that water does,
that is, that H2O plays
the water role.
Playing the water role includes such things as being a substance that
occupies oceans and lakes, looks clear to us, has little or no taste,
is referred to as “water”, etc. So, let us add the following
premise to the argument displayed above:
H2O plays the water role.
Now,
says Jackson, the premises do a
priori entail
the conclusion. Moral: “a rich
enough story
about the H2O way things are does enable the a
priori deduction
of the water way things are” (Jackson 1995, p. 413). Likewise,
physicalism entails that “knowing a rich enough story about the
physical nature of our world is tantamount to knowing the
psychological story about our world” (Jackson 1995, p. 414). But if
physicalism is true, P should provide just that: a rich enough story.
Thus, Jackson concludes, physicalism entails the apriority of the
psychophysical conditional after all.
Jackson’s
argument is controversial. But in developing it, he fills an
important lacuna in the knowledge argument and thereby improves on
earlier versions. Others, too, have attempted to fill this lacuna.
Most notably, David Chalmers (1996, 2003, 2004, and 2006a) has given
sophisticated arguments to this end, which are partly inspired by
Jackson’s argument.
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