The
Character of Republican Leaders
Machiavelli's
arguments in favor of republican regimes also appeal to his skeptical
stance toward the acquisition of virtù by any single individual, and
hence the implication that a truly stable principality may never be
attainable. The effect of the Machiavellian dichotomy between the
need for flexibility and the inescapable constancy of character is to
demonstrate an inherent practical limitation in single-ruler regimes.
For the reader is readily led to the conclusion that, just because
human conduct is rooted in a firm and invariant character, the rule
of a single man is intrinsically unstable and precarious. In the
Discourses, Machiavelli provides a psychological case that the
realities of human character tends to favor a republic over a
principality, since the former “is better able to adapt itself to
diverse circumstances than a prince owing to the diversity found
among its citizens” (Machiavelli 1965, 253).
Machiavelli
illustrates this claim by reference to the evolution of Roman
military strategy against Hannibal. After the first flush of the
Carthaginian general's victories in Italy, the circumstances of the
Roman required a circumspect and cautious leader who would not commit
the legions to aggressive military action for which they were not
prepared. Such leadership emerged in the person of Fabius Maximus, “a
general who by his slowness and his caution held the enemy at bay.
Nor could he have met with circumstances more suited to his ways”
(Machiavelli 1965, 452). Yet when a more offensive stance was
demanded to defeat Hannibal, the Roman Republic was able to turn to
the leadership of Scipio, whose personal qualities were more fitted
to the times. Neither Fabius nor Scipio was able to escape “his
ways and habits” (Machiavelli 1965, 452), but the fact that Rome
could call on each at the appropriate moment suggests to Machiavelli
an inherent strength of the republican system.
“If
Fabius had been king of Rome, he might easily have lost this war,
since he was incapable of altering his methods according as
circumstance changed. Since, however, he was born in a republic where
there were diverse citizens with diverse dispositions, it came about
that, just as it had a Fabius, who was the best man to keep the war
going when circumstances required it, so later it had a Scipio at a
time suited to its victorious consummation “(Machiavelli 1965,
452).
Changing
events require flexibility of response, and since it is
psychologically implausible for human character to change with the
times, the republic offers a viable alternative: people of different
qualities fit different exigencies. The diversity characteristic of
civic regimes, which was so reviled by Machiavelli's predecessors,
proves to be an abiding advantage of republics over principalities.
This
does not mean that Machiavelli's confidence in the capacity of
republican government to redress the political shortcomings of human
character was unbridled. After all, he gives us no real indication of
how republics manage to identify and authorize the leaders whose
qualities are suited to the circumstances. It is one thing to observe
that such variability has occurred within republics, quite another to
demonstrate that this is a necessary or essential feature of the
republican system. At best, then, Machiavelli offers us a kind of
empirical generalization, the theoretical foundations of which he
leaves unexplored. And the Discourses points out that republics have
their own intrinsic limitation in regard to the flexibility of
response needed to conquer fortune. For just as with individual human
beings, it is difficult (if not impossible) to change their personal
characteristics, so “institutions in republics do not change with
the times … but change very slowly because it is more painful to
change them since it is necessary to wait until the whole republic is
in a state of upheaval; and for this it is not enough that one man
alone should change his own procedure” (Machiavelli 1965, 453). If
the downfall of principalities is the fixed structure of human
character, then the failing of republics is a devotion to the
perpetuation of institutional arrangements whose time has passed.
Whether it is any more plausible to hold out hope for the creation of
more responsive republican institutions than to demand flexibility in
the personal qualities of princes is not directly examined by the
Discourses.
Machiavelli
thus seems to adhere to a genuinely republican position. But how are
we to square this with his statements in The Prince? It is tempting
to dismiss The Prince as an inauthentic expression of Machiavelli's
“real” views and preferences, written over a short period in
order to prove his political value to the returned Medici masters of
Florence. (This is contrasted with the lengthy composition process of
the Discourses.) Yet Machiavelli never repudiated The Prince, and
indeed refers to it in the Discourses in a way that suggests he
viewed the former as a companion to the latter. Although there has
been much debate about whether Machiavelli was truly a friend of
princes and tyrants or of republics, and hence whether we should
dismiss one or another facet of his writing as ancillary or
peripheral, the questions seems irresolvable. Mark Hulliung's
suggestion that “both” Machiavellis need to be lent equal weight
thus enjoys a certain plausibility (Hulliung 1983).
Machiavelli's
Place in Western Thought
What
is “modern” or “original” in Machiavelli's thought? What is
Machiavelli's “place” in the history of Western ideas? The body
of literature debating this question, especially in connection with
The Prince and Discourses, has grown to truly staggering proportions.
John Pocock (1975), for example, has traced the diffusion of
Machiavelli's republican thought throughout the so-called Atlantic
world and, specifically, into the ideas that guided the framers of
the American constitution. Paul Rahe (2008) argues for a similar set
of influences, but with an intellectual substance and significance
different than Pocock. For Pocock, Machiavelli's republicanism is of
a civic humanist variety whose roots are to be found in classical
antiquity; for Rahe, Machiavelli's republicanism is entirely novel
and modern. Likewise, cases have been made for Machiavelli's
political morality, his conception of the state, his religious views,
and many other features of his work as the distinctive basis for the
originality of his contribution.
Yet
few firm conclusions have emerged within scholarship. One plausible
explanation for the inability to resolve these issues of “modernity”
and “originality” is that Machiavelli was in a sense trapped
between innovation and tradition, between via antiqua and via moderna
(to adopt the usage of Janet Coleman 1995), in a way that generated
internal conceptual tensions within his thought as a whole and even
within individual texts. This historical ambiguity permits scholars
to make equally convincing cases for contradictory claims about his
fundamental stance without appearing to commit egregious violence to
his doctrines. This point differs from the accusation made by certain
scholars that Machiavelli was fundamentally “inconsistent” (see
Skinner 1978). Rather, salient features of the distinctively
Machiavellian approach to politics should be credited to an
incongruity between historical circumstance and intellectual
possibility. What makes Machiavelli a troubling yet stimulating
thinker is that, in his attempt to draw different conclusions from
the commonplace expectations of his audience, he still incorporated
important features of precisely the conventions he was challenging.
In spite of his repeated assertion of his own originality (for
instance, Machiavelli 1965, 10, 57–58), his careful attention to
preexisting traditions meant that he was never fully able to escape
his intellectual confines. Thus, Machiavelli ought not really to be
classified as either purely an “ancient” or a “modern,” but
instead deserves to be located in the interstices between the two.
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