Introduction
The Critique of Practical Reason (German: Kritik der praktischen
Vernunft, KpV) is the second of Immanuel Kant's three critiques, first
published in 1788. It follows on from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and deals
with his moral philosophy.
The second Critique exercised a decisive influence over the subsequent
development of the field of ethics and moral philosophy, beginning with Johann
Gottlieb Fichte's Doctrine of Science and becoming, during the 20th century,
the principal reference point for deontological moral philosophy.
The first Critique was a critique of the pretensions of pure theoretical
reason to attain metaphysical truths beyond the ken of applied theoretical
reason. The conclusion was that pure theoretical reason must be restrained,
because it produces confused arguments when applied outside of its appropriate
sphere. However, the Critique of Practical Reason is not a critique of pure
practical reason, but rather a defense of it as being capable of grounding
behavior superior to that grounded by desire-based practical reasoning. It is
actually a critique, then, of the pretensions of applied practical reason. Pure
practical reason must not be restrained, in fact, but cultivated.
Kant informs us that while the first Critique suggested that God,
freedom, and immortality are unknowable, the second Critique will mitigate this
claim. Freedom is indeed knowable because it is revealed by God. God and
immortality are also knowable, but practical reason now requires belief in
these postulates of reason. Kant once again invites his dissatisfied critics to
actually provide a proof of God's existence and shows that this is impossible
because the various arguments (ontological, cosmological and teleological) for
God's existence all depend essentially on the idea that existence is a
predicate inherent to the concepts to which it is applied.
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The Critique of Practical Reason contains two sections, the Doctrine of
Elements, containing the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason and the Dialectic of
Pure Practical Reason. These section headings are the same as those of the
Critique of Pure Reason. Overall, the Analytic contains the arguments for the
categorical imperative as the one true moral principle and for the identity of
morality and freedom, the Dialectic exposes the primary error of all previous
ethicists and proposes the postulates of pure practical reason, and the
Doctrine of Method proposes a new method for moral education.
The Analytic, which is set up like a geometric proof, takes several
steps to reach its primary conclusion, that the one ultimate moral principle is
to only act such that the maxim of your will could hold universally. A law,
Kant says, must be necessary and universal, for otherwise it is no law. If that
is so, though, its force cannot be dependent on any contingent feature of the
person following it. Next he argues that any law whose force was supposed to
depend on its content would run afoul of this—if we tried to say that obedience
to God was the ultimate moral law, we could not, for this law could only hold
for those who wanted to obey God. Furthermore, on the view of human psychology
Kant advances, to act on one's desire to be obedient to God would be to act to
satisfy one's contingent pleasure in such obedience. This leaves only the empty
form of universality to be the law-giving force of the law. So, for example, it
is forbidden to break one's promises, since it would be impossible for breaking
promises to be universalized.
The Analytic now goes on to argue that the free person and the moral
person are one and the same. The free person acts on a law, and not randomly,
but not an externally given law, for that would be a form of slavery. Only the
categorical imperative is found suitable. Conversely, the moral person is
following the practical law and is not bound by contingent desires, and so is
autonomous.
The Dialectic accuses all previous ethical writers of having made the
same mistake, the mistake of having regarded the morally worthy as aiming at
the highest good instead of seeing the highest good as that which is aimed at
by morality. These ethical systems were doomed to fail because the moral will
cannot be constrained by an independent highest good, since for it to seek
anything independent of itself would be to constrain its freedom. In this
phenomenal world, furthermore, the highest good is not to be found. However,
since following the practical law presupposes believing that its aim, the
highest good, will be then achieved, reason requires us to believe the highest
good is achievable. It turns out that this, in turn, requires belief in God and
immortality. Without God, there is nothing to guarantee that following the
moral law will produce the highest good of happiness proportional to morality,
and without immortality, there is not enough time for us to achieve perfect
morality.
We understand our freedom—which would otherwise be undetectable—while
following the moral law. This following of the moral law frees us from the
control of our desires. Our ability to feel the force of the practical law is
also how we come to know that there is such a law. Therefore, the conclusions
about this law, reached in the beginning of the Analytic, are not merely
hypothetical. In arguing thus for the reality of morality and freedom, Kant
reverses the order of evidence he had in his earlier Groundwork for the
Metaphysics of Morals, where he derived morality from freedom.
Finally, in the Doctrine of Method, Kant proposes a method for teaching
morality. It is essential to teach the student to act from duty, and not merely
outwardly, conforming to morality. Kant recommends that we enlist our pupil's
natural delight in arguing about ethical matters and allow him to develop his
judgment by asserting various purported moral actions. We are warned not to
either err by presenting examples of overblown heroism as paradigms of
morality—since these will not help the student deal with normal, non-
melodramatic moral dilemmas—or by presenting morality as prudent, since then
the student will never learn to properly love morality for its own sake. By
presenting examples of the moral law acting purely and without the help of
other incentives, the student then learns to understand how the moral law can
free him from slavery to his desires.
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