(1433—1499)
Marsilio
Ficino was a Florentine philosopher, translator, and commentator,
largely responsible for the revival of Plato and Platonism in the
Renaissance. He has been widely recognized by historians of
philosophy for his defense of the immortality of the soul, as well as
for his translations of Plato, Plotinus, and the Hermetic corpus from
Greek to Latin. Ficino is considered the most important advocate of
Platonism in the Renaissance, and his philosophical writings and
translations are thought to have made a significant contribution to
the development of early modern philosophies.
The
Platonic Theology is Ficino’s most original and systematic
philosophical treatise. It is a lengthy and encyclopedic defense of
the immortality of the soul against what he considered the growing
threats of Epicureanism and Averroism. While arguing for immortality,
Ficino articulates those positions that are most characteristic of
his philosophy. He first provides his own restructuring of the
Neoplatonic hierarchy of being. This metaphysical structure is used
to ensure the dignity and immortality of the soul by situating it at
a privileged midpoint between God and prime matter. However, this
hierarchy also has negative consequences for the qualitative
character of human existence on account of the soul’s proximity to
matter. Finally, the Platonic Theology lays down the basic principles
of Ficino’s animistic natural philosophy, according to which a
World Soul is imminent in the material world, imparting motion, life,
and order.
In
addition to the Platonic Theology, Ficino also composed extensive
commentaries on Plato and Plotinus, wrote a practical medical
treatise, and carried on a voluminous correspondence with
contemporaries across Europe. There are noteworthy elements in his
writings that are less traditional and orthodox by some contemporary
philosophical standards. For example, he was deeply influenced by the
Hermetic tradition, and describes a species of knowledge, or natural
magic, that draws down the intellectual and moral virtues of the
heavens to the terrestrial world. Ficino also endorses an ancient
theological tradition that included, to name a few, Hermes
Trismegistus, Pythagoras, and Orpheus among its ranks. He held that
this pagan tradition espoused a pious philosophy that in fact
presaged and confirmed Christianity.
Biography
Marsilio
Ficino was born in Figline, not far from Florence, in 1433. He was
the son of a physician, and Cosimo de’Medici—one of the richest
and most powerful patrons of the fifteenth century—was among his
father’s patients. While the precise details of his early life and
education remain largely unclear to us today, it can safely be said
that he studied Scholastic philosophy and medicine at the University
of Florence, and that he was exposed to the burgeoning educational
movement of Italian Humanism. Ficino’s earliest philosophical
writings are largely Scholastic in their consideration of
metaphysical, logical, and natural philosophical questions. In
particular, Thomas Aquinas had a strong influence on significant
aspects of his early thought, and this influence is thought to have
persisted in his later philosophical writings.
The
biographical contours of Ficino’s early life become clearer in the
1450s. He lectured on Plato’s Philebus; he also taught for a short
time at the university in Florence, and privately as a tutor. As a
young man Ficino fell under the influence of the Roman poet
Lucretius. A manuscript copy of his didactic Epicurean poem, On the
Nature of Things, was rediscovered in a monastery in 1417. After its
recovery the poem was copied, disseminated, and eventually found its
way into print and vernacular languages. Ficino was among the first
generation of philosophers with direct access to the actual text of
On the Nature of Things, which is thought to have played an important
role in the development of early modern philosophy and science.
During the late 1450s, Ficino composed a short commentary on
Lucretius, the first since antiquity, as well as a treatise on
pleasure. In this treatise he praises the Epicurean definition of
pleasure as the removal of pain from the body and disturbance from
the soul, and argues that Epicureanism is superior to the vulgar
hedonism of someone like Aristippus. Ficino suggests that he
experienced an intellectual or spiritual crisis during this time, and
as a result ultimately rejected Epicurus and Lucretius as
incompatible with deeply held philosophical and religious
commitments. In a letter, Ficino reports that he burned his youthful
commentary on Lucretius. Despite this Epicurus and Lucretius left an
enduring stamp on Ficino’s thought that is visible in the mature
philosophical writings, and historians of Renaissance philosophy are
still assessing this influence today.
During
the 1450s Ficino began to study Greek. In time, his knowledge of
classical Greek culminated in one of his most lasting philosophical
and scholarly achievements and contributions—his translation of
Plato’s complete works into Latin. In 1462, Cosimo de’Medici
commissioned Ficino to translate a manuscript copy of Plato’s
extant writings. Around the same time, Cosimo also gave him the
proceeds from a small property, as well as a villa in Careggi, not
far from Florence. The conditions of the 1460s provided Ficino with
the perfect opportunity to fully dedicate himself to translating
Plato’s complete writings into Latin. His edition marked the first
time that Plato’s extant corpus was translated into a Western
language. Ficino’s work on Plato, however, was quickly interrupted
when Cosimo requested that he also translate the Corpus Hermeticum
into Latin. At the time, the Hermetic corpus was believed by many to
be an ancient collection of theological writings that contained
sacred wisdom. It was, however, written in the early years of
Christianity. In 1464, Ficino read his translations of Plato’s
dialogues to Cosimo as the aging patron lay dying.
In
the late 1460s, after completing his translation of Plato, Ficino
started working on his Platonic Theology: On the Immortality of the
Soul. This book was finished in 1474, but it did not find its way
into print until 1482. The Platonic Theology is Ficino’s longest
and most systematic philosophical work. In 1473, he was ordained a
priest, and after completing his Platonic Theology, dedicated himself
primarily to translation, commentary, and correspondence. During this
time Ficino also wrote the bulk of his commentaries on Plato’s
dialogues. The last two decades of Ficino’s life were especially
productive. In the 1480s, he translated the Enneads of the
second-century Neoplatonist Plotinus, and also wrote commentaries on
them. An edition of Plotinus was published in 1492. During this time
Ficino completed his Three Books on Life, a medical and astrological
treatise. After its 1489 publication it became one of his most
popular and influential books. The third book presents Ficino’s
theory of natural magic, which has since become the definitive
Renaissance consideration of the subject.
Throughout
his life Ficino carried on a steady correspondence with philosophers,
poets, and politicians across Europe. This choice of philosophical
expression shows the influence that Humanism had on him. In many
letters, Ficino clarifies his understanding of certain Platonic
concepts, such as poetic furor; but on a whole his correspondence is
not strictly philosophical in nature, at least not by academic
standards today. Even so, it contains information that is central to
an accurate appreciation of his thought. Ficino conceived of
philosophy as a way of life that purified and prepared those who
practice it correctly for a life well lived. Ficino’s
correspondence contains a good deal of practical advice, and he is
often found giving counsel on how to cope with the deaths of
children, spouses, and friends, or on how to extend one’s life; he
also lends sundry medical advice, and even discusses the astrological
placement of planets that contribute to one’s character traits. The
letters serve both to clarify the content of his philosophy, as well
as to shed a different light on what he perceived his role to be as a
philosopher and an advocate of Platonism. These sources teach us that
Ficino did not define philosophy narrowly. Instead, he saw himself as
a doctor of sorts that was concerned with questions that concerned
the health of bodies, minds, and souls. This practical concern is
clearly displayed in his correspondence, and his Three Books on Life.
Ficino edited and published his correspondence in 1494. He died in
1499.
The
Platonic Academy of Florence
In
the fourteenth century, the poet and Humanist Francesco Petrarch
praised Plato as the prince of philosophers. In so doing, Petrarch
turned to Plato as an antidote to Scholastic Aristotelianism, which
at the time dominated the medieval university curriculum. During the
Middle Ages the bulk of Plato’s dialogues—except for the Phaedo,
Meno, and parts of the Parmenides and Timaeus—were inaccessible to
Western philosophers because they were not available in Latin.
Consequently, knowledge of Plato’s philosophy at this time was
largely indirect and incomplete. Following Petrarch’s lead, early
fifteenth-century Humanists (such as Leonardo Bruni) saw the
importance of studying classical Greek, and they translated, among
other things, a handful of Plato’s dialogues into Latin.
Ficino’s
translation represents the fulfillment of these early Humanist
aspirations for a Latin edition of Plato. It is difficult to
overstate the significance of this achievement, or the impact that it
had on the development of early modern philosophies. His Latin
translation of Plato enriched the sources available to philosophers
in the West, and thereby changed the form and content of philosophy.
Ficino largely finished his translation of Plato’s complete works
in the 1460s, but they did not appear in print until 1484. The first
edition included Ficino’s short descriptions or summaries of what
he considered the key arguments of the dialogues; a 1494 edition was
expanded to include his lengthy commentaries on Plato’s Symposium,
Philebus, Phaedrus, Timaeus, Parmenides, Sophist, and Republic Book
VIII. Eventually Ficino’s commentary on the Symposium—an
unorthodox dialogue itself loosely inspired by the original—became
one of his most popular and influential treatments of Plato. In it he
identified Plato’s theory of love with Christian love, and argued
that the proper love of another person is in fact preparation for the
love of God. He invented the phrase Platonic love, and his
interpretation was especially influential in the sixteenth century.
His Timaeus commentary is significant because it represents the first
consideration of the dialogue in its entirety since antiquity;
medieval philosophers only had access to roughly half of the
dialogue, and Calcidius’ commentary was necessarily truncated.
Ficino’s translations of Plato’s complete works went through many
printings and were used by philosophers and scholars for centuries.
They continue to be recognized for their precision and fidelity to
the original Greek.
Through
his translations and commentaries, as well as his Platonic Theology,
Ficino played a central role in the Renaissance revival of Platonism.
In the second half of the fifteenth century, he stood at the center
of a group of intellectuals that were drawn specifically to Plato and
Platonism, and more generally to classical antiquity. As a result of
his advocacy, historians of Renaissance philosophy for a long time
thought that Ficino founded and headed a formal Platonic Academy in
Florence that was inspired by Plato’s school in ancient Athens.
However, the precise nature of Florence’s Academy remains unclear
today, and some are skeptical that any such academy ever really
existed. It seems unlikely that Ficino headed a formal educational
institution in any real sense. More plausible is the hypothesis that
Ficino’s occasional reference to the revival of Plato’s academy
in Florence actually designated the presence of a manuscript copy of
Plato’s dialogues in Florence, to Plato’s teachings and
philosophy, and his own efforts to revive Plato in Florence through
his translations and commentaries. Whether or not Ficino actually
headed a Platonic Academy in Florence, he was nonetheless
instrumental as an advocate of Platonism during the Renaissance.
The
Ancient Theology and Pious Philosophy
Ficino’s
philosophy is indebted to a wide variety of philosophical sources and
traditions. Although his thought is eclectic, he does not generally
seek to bring distinct and apparently incompatible views into accord
or harmony with one another. His work is generally a blend of
traditional philosophies, both ancient and medieval, and ideas that
are drawn from the less-orthodox Neoplatonic and Hermetic traditions.
The influences of Platonism, Neoplatonism, and Scholasticism are
particularly prominent.
Like
many of his contemporaries, Ficino believed that Hermes Trismegistus
was an ancient Egyptian theologian and philosopher of sacred and
divine wisdom. In the preface to his translation of the Corpus
Hermeticum, Ficino explains that Hermes “foresaw the ruin of the
old religion, the rise of the new faith, [and] the coming of Christ.”
In fact, Ficino believed in a single ancient theological tradition
(prisca theologia) that stretched back to Hermes in ancient Egypt and
included Pythagoras, Orpheus, Philolaus, and Plato, to name a few,
among its ranks. This ancient tradition, he argues, espoused a pious
philosophy (pia philosophia) in which religious and philosophical
truths coincide. The advent of Christianity brought about the fullest
and clearest expression of this pious philosophy, though vestiges of
it can be found much earlier. Over the course of the history of
philosophy, according to Ficino, the fortune of the pious philosophy
has waxed and waned, and there are periods during which it is hardly
present at all. He considered Plato an especially effective advocate
of the pious philosophy; in the preface to the Platonic Theology, he
explains that no matter what subject Plato discusses “he quickly
brings it round, and in a spirit of utmost piety, to the
contemplation and worship of God.”
Platonic
Theology
The
Platonic Theology is Marsilio Ficino’s philosophical magnum opus.
Its overall aim is to defend the immortality of the soul, and to this
end Ficino avails himself of a wide variety of arguments. For Ficino,
this question is at the heart of human self-interest and well-being.
In the first chapter, he argues that if human beings were merely
mortal, then there would be “no animal more miserable than man.”
Ficino’s core argument is that the natural human desire for
immortality must be vindicated by an afterlife. Were it not, this
desire would be empty, vain, and this would call into question both
the perfection of nature and God’s wisdom and goodness.
While
arguing for the soul’s immortality Ficino elaborates on many of
those positions and arguments that are distinctive of his philosophy.
He presents and defends the basic principles of his metaphysics.
While he is deeply indebted to earlier metaphysical traditions,
especially the Neoplatonic and Scholastic traditions, elements of
these traditions are generally adapted to his own philosophical aims
and purposes. Ficino also presents his case for the inherent dignity
of humanity. This defense depends in large part on his own
restructuring of the Neoplatonic hierarchy of being, according to
which the soul is located centrally between God and matter. The
soul’s metaphysical position also ensures its immortality. Ficino
argues that the soul’s troubled psychological condition is an
unfortunate side effect of this hierarchy. He detects a disconnect
between the soul’s divinity and the sundry demands and problems
that the body causes for it. While the soul is immortal and occupied
a privileged place on the great chain of being, its psychological
condition is one of exile, longing, and confusion regarding its own
nature. Finally, Ficino argues for his vitalistic natural philosophy
according to which matter requires the presence of something
incorporeal—namely soul—for it to be substantial and real.
The
Platonic Theology is a rich and challenging book. Its structure and
content may produce confusion and frustration in some contemporary
readers. There is an overarching logical structure to the book, but
Ficino chooses not to clearly state many of his central assumptions
and themes, and the route he takes to his conclusions can often
appear circuitous. Ficino frequently utilizes metaphysical and
epistemological assumptions, but he does not in every case define or
defend them. This is not to say, however, that his views are merely
asserted or that his reasoning is flawed in some significant way.
Many of his assumptions are generally embedded in earlier
philosophical traditions, and thus his views and arguments have to be
placed in the proper historical context in order to be appreciated
for their rigor and coherence. Ficino thought that philosophy done
properly required an ongoing conversation with ancient philosophies.
A familiarity with earlier philosophies is therefore necessary in
order to fully appreciate and assess the arguments of the Platonic
Theology.
Metaphysics
Ficino’s
metaphysics is a blend of elements drawn from Platonism,
Neoplatonism, and medieval Scholasticism. Broadly speaking, he
maintains a Platonic division between the intelligible and sensible
realms or between being and becoming. Throughout the Platonic
Theology, he is found employing the hylomorphic terminology of the
Scholastics in his detailed analysis of the nature of things. Ficino
embraces and uses the metaphysical hierarchy developed by the
Neoplatonist Plotinus, according to which the progressive levels of
being emanate from a single source.
In
the preface, Ficino explains that a central aim of the Platonic
Theology is to demonstrate to materialist philosophers that matter is
less real than those incorporeal entities (such as souls and forms)
that transcend the senses. To accomplish this aim Ficino relies
primarily on Plato’s dialogues, because in his estimation they most
successfully demote the reality of the material world, while at the
same time grounding and elevating the metaphysical priority of souls
and forms. Furthermore, he believes that Platonism provides the most
solid philosophical foundation for Christianity. Throughout the
Platonic Theology, Ficino embraces the metaphysical distinction,
prominent in Plato’s dialogues, between being and becoming or
between the intelligible and sensible realms. He argues that the
former is more real than the latter, and is therefore more worthy of
our enduring attention, devotion, and study. Along these lines he
maintains that forms are the perfect archetypes of all material
things and exist unchangeably in the divine mind. They are in fact
the genuine cause of the sensible qualities and properties of the
material world. By contrast, the world of matter is shadowy and
deceptive. It engenders confusion and imprisons the minds of many
people.
Ficino’s
metaphysics is overwhelmingly Platonic. But his theory of material
substances is indebted to Scholasticism for many of its most salient
features. While Ficino’s philosophy is clearly otherworldly—in
the sense that he maintains the existence and metaphysical priority
of realities apart from the material world—this does not prevent
him from speculating about the metaphysics of matter and body in the
early books of the Platonic Theology. In fact, he believes that doing
so is in keeping with the broader aims of the book. By and large,
Ficino analyzes material substances along traditional hylomorphic
lines, according to which they are constituted by three principles:
matter, form, and privation. Matter functions as the passive
substrate of the forms that are active in making something what it
is, and privation is what a substance can potentially become. The
matter of a thing is relative to the level of organization under
consideration; the matter of a statue is marble, but the marble
itself is not without its own form and matter. When all qualities,
both substantial and accidental, are stripped from a substance there
is at bottom a single formless prime matter that is one and the same
for all things. He holds that prime matter exists in a chaotic and
confused state of potency. For Ficino, it is something that is
ontologically basic and epistemically impenetrable. It is therefore
difficult, if not impossible, to say anything directly about it other
than that it must exist as the substratum of form. Here Ficino is
echoing Plotinus who compared understanding matter to the eye seeing
darkness.
Even
though Ficino employs the basic terms of the Scholastics, he makes
significant modifications to this framework. These changes are
consistent with his broader philosophical commitments and the overall
objectives of the Platonic Theology. First, it is noteworthy that he
embraces a theory of seminal reasons, according to which seeds are
spread throughout matter, and are the cause of things coming to be at
appointed times. Unlike the Scholastics, Ficino judges that the
qualities or properties of material things are protean, not
self-sufficient, unstable, and parasitic on incorporeal forms for any
reality and causal efficacy in the world of matter. Here his
underlying Platonism becomes apparent. Ficino says that material
forms are corrupted and contaminated when they are embedded in the
“bosom” of matter. He poetically describes material qualities as
“mere shadows that come and go like the reflections of lofty trees
in a rushing stream” (I.III.15). Ficino sees the basic elements of
the world as existing in a constant and chaotic state of change, and
he holds that whatever stability they exhibit is on account of their
cause, that is, their incorporeal archetypes. According to Ficino,
this is not merely true of the elements, but of all qualities of
material things across the board, both those that are substantial and
those that are accidental. In this way, Ficino traces back all of the
qualities of this world to something eternal and incorporeal as their
cause, and this is the basic unit of reality for him. He accepts a
metaphysical principle that there is a first in each genus (primum)
that is the fullest and most perfect expression of any particular
species quality. It does not include anything that does not properly
belong to that genus. The first in each genus is ultimately the cause
of every particular expression of that quality. Ficino, therefore,
demotes the reality of material forms or qualities while at the same
time buttressing the reality of incorporeal forms. Although he
analyzes material substances along hylomorphic lines, he at the same
time alters this framework in an effort to ground his Platonic
metaphysics, and ultimately the immortality of the soul.
There
are prominent Neoplatonic elements at the core of Ficino’s
metaphysics. He inherited from Plotinus a particular approach to
metaphysics that is a hierarchical superstructure, with distinct
levels or hypostases, all of which draw their being from an
overflowing singular source. The source of all being is the One for
Plotinus and God for Ficino. He considers all being to be a
progressive emanation from the divine, and although each hypostasis
is distinct, what is above serves as a dynamic bridge to what is
below. Everything in Ficino’s cosmos has its own unique place and
degree of perfection, beginning with God at the summit and descending
through the celestial spheres, angels, and souls, all the way down to
the elements of the terrestrial sphere. In it there is nothing that
is vain or superfluous, and Ficino thinks that everything is drawn to
its good or end by a natural appetite.
Ficino
generally recognizes five distinct levels of reality. But he at times
changes the precise arrangement and structure of the hypostases of
this hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy is God, which is the
source of all being and perfection. The first hypostasis that God
produces is angelic mind. It contains the archetypes and forms of all
things in a timeless and immutable state. These forms are the
essences of all possible entities, and they are responsible for the
qualities and properties of material things. Next in this progression
comes the rational soul, which imparts motion and vitality to the
cosmos. Ficino posits a World Soul (anima mundi) that is immanent in
all of nature, and individual souls that animate sundry entities in
the world, including the celestial spheres, living creatures, and
even the elements. Mind is eternal and unmoving; soul is likewise
eternal, but differs because it is in a perpetual state of motion.
Soul stands at the metaphysical node or bond between what is above
and below; while it is drawn to forms and the divine above, it is
responsible for the governance of what comes below. Beneath rational
soul is the hypostasis of quality, which is representative of the
material forms found in nature. The patterns of qualities are
grounded in the second hypostasis, mind; the source of its motion and
alteration comes from soul. Finally, the hierarchy of being is
extinguished with the lowest level of reality—body or corporeal
matter. Ficino defines body as matter that is extended in length,
breadth, and depth. It functions as the bearer of qualities, but
contributes nothing of its own to the nature of things.
Even
though Ficino generally marks a distinction between being and
becoming, or between the incorporeal and corporeal, he is no simple
dualist. His view of soul, and the role that it plays in the material
world, is fundamentally different from, for example, the strict
dualism of the seventeenth-century philosopher René Descartes.
Matter and soul are entirely distinct from one another, according to
Descartes, and these two basic substances share no qualities in
common. In his treatise on physics, The World, Descartes
distinguishes himself from earlier approaches to natural philosophy
when he explains that he uses the word “nature” to “signify
matter itself,” and not “some goddess or any other sort of
imaginary power” (AT XI 37). According to Descartes, a natural
philosopher does not need to appeal to anything other than matter in
order to properly explain the natural world. On the contrary,
according to Ficino, the material world is not something that can be
adequately explained by turning to matter and motion alone; nature is
an active power that suffuses matter and provides it with its life,
activity, and order. On this account, nature is a dynamic force
operating on material things from within, and this is the proper or
genuine cause of things changing, as well as their generation and
corruption. Soul, therefore, has a paramount role to play in Ficino’s
natural philosophy.
Like
Plato and his Neoplatonic interpreters, Ficino makes competing claims
about the relative goodness of the material world. In his Timaeus,
Plato argues that the sensible world is on a whole good and beautiful
because it is modeled on eternal forms. In other dialogues, such as
the Phaedo and Republic, the sensible world is a shadowy and
deceptive prison. Plotinus recognizes this tension in Plato and
comments on it in his Enneads. Ficino inherits this ambiguity about
the goodness of the world, even if negative appraisals are more
frequent and prominent in the Platonic Theology than positive ones.
Like Plato, Ficino asserts that the creator is a benevolent and wise
architect, and that these qualities are reflected in God’s
creation; however, he also maintains that the world of matter is
shadowy, evil, and to some degree unreal. Furthermore, Ficino blames
matter and body for the mind’s tendency to be confused and deceived
about what is real and good. On a whole, therefore, Ficino’s
overall assessment of the material world—at least as far as the
human condition is concerned—is negative.
In
his metaphysics, Ficino is not drawn to austere and desert-like
frameworks, and he was not reductionistic in his thinking. As such,
he belongs to a tradition of metaphysicians, including the
seventeenth-century Platonist G. W. Leibniz, that embrace a rich and
expansive ontology. Ficino lays out a tapestry of entities that
comprise the world. In nature alone he countenances the existence of
matter, qualities, and a cavalcade of souls, including a World Soul,
that impart motion and vital powers to all aspects of the material
world. Ficino claims that nature is in fact replete with souls; there
are souls that belong to the elements, to non-human animals, as well
as a soul that is responsible for the growth of rocks and trees from
the earth’s surface.
Epistemology
In
the Platonic Theology, Ficino does not address epistemological issues
as directly or with the same degree of frequency as he does
metaphysical ones. Nonetheless, the broad contours of a view can be
sketched by paying close attention to the occasional discussion of
the origin, nature, and value of knowledge. Throughout this work
Ficino makes scattered remarks about the mind’s capabilities, what
exactly it apprehends when it knows, and the effect that knowledge
has on those who possess it. Generally these comments arise when
Ficino is either discussing the nature and powers of the human mind
and distinguishing them from the body, or when he speculates about
the divine mind and draws a comparison with finite minds.
Ficino
holds that knowledge is rooted in forms, not matter. However, the
metaphysics of matter described above has certain implications for
what exactly stands as the object of knowledge. He argues that the
degradation of forms in matter requires that the mind grasps
something other than sensible forms when it knows. If it did not, he
argues, then knowledge would not be stable and fixed; instead, it
would vary and change as the qualities of material things do. Rather,
when the mind knows it apprehends intelligible forms, and not the
sensible forms that include the individual traits that are
distinctive of particular objects. These forms are stable and
unchanging, and as such Ficino claims that they produce stable and
unchanging knowledge.
Knowledge
does not, according to Ficino, come about in stages, or as a result
of a gradual process. The mind does not take gradual steps and build
upon its experiences to arrive at universals. On the contrary, he
describes knowledge as coming about in an instantaneous flash, and
not in a progressive or abstractive manner. Ficino claims that
philosophical reflection on the nature of things prepares and
purifies the mind of falsehood until it is ready to receive the
clarity of truth. This arrival is simple and immediate. Ficino
explains that “speculative virtue does not proceed stage by stage
from one part of itself to another, but blazes forth wholly and
suddenly” (VIII.III.6). Ficino even holds that intelligible forms
are distinct from, and discontinuous with, sensible forms, even if
our experience of particular material things can be the root cause of
the mind’s coming to know something. Furthermore, he makes some
interesting suggestions about the existence of primary truths that
contain other truths within them, and he claims that the knowledge of
one primary truth can elicit knowledge of others. While Ficino
mentions that such primary truths exist, he does not elaborate as to
what exactly these truths are or what one would look like.
There
are several Platonic epistemic themes that are prominent in the
Platonic Theology. Ficino maintains that the mind is nourished by
truth, and he sees it as edifying of the overall condition of the
human soul. He also claims that there is much to recommend the
Platonic doctrine of reminiscence, even if he rejects the
transmigration of souls as heretical. Also, his description of
learning calls to mind Plato’s Theaetetus, where Socrates describes
himself as a midwife of sorts. In this vein, Ficino holds that the
mind already has within itself the intelligible forms that it will,
if it is diligent, come to know, or remember. These forms exist
latently in the mind, and learning is a process of drawing out from
the mind what is, in a certain sense, already there.
The
Dignity of Humanity and the Human Condition
The
metaphysical hierarchy outlined in the above section on metaphysics
has significant philosophical consequences for both the dignity of
the rational soul, and the qualitative character of the human
condition. Ficino argues that the soul’s location on the chain of
being lends to it a privileged position on the hierarchy of being,
and is therefore responsible for its dignity and uniqueness. In
different contexts Ficino changes the precise structure of this
pentadic hierarchy, but the soul’s centrality is a consistent
theme. This is an alteration of Plotinus’ original hierarchy and
ensures the soul’s dignity and immortality. The soul is situated at
the precise center of the hierarchy standing midway between God above
and matter below. Ficino explains the structure of his metaphysics in
the following way:
We
would do well to call soul the third and middle essence, as the
Platonists do, because it is the mean for all and the third from both
directions. If you descend from God, you will find soul at the third
level down; or at the third level up, if you ascend from body.
In
the same chapter he continues:
“ But
the third essence set between them is such that it cleaves to the
higher while not abandoning the lower; and in it, therefore the
higher and the lower are linked together… So by a natural instinct
it ascends to the higher and descends to the lower. In ascending it
does not abandon the things below it; in descending, it does not
relinquish the things above it” (III.II.1-2)
The
soul is the “fitting knot” or “node” that binds the upper
half of the hierarchy with the lower. On account of its place in the
hierarchy, Ficino explains that the soul is at one and the same time
drawn to what is above, as well as responsible for the governance of
nature below. Further, Ficino thinks that it shares some properties
in common with what is above and below, and as a result it is
perfectly well-suited to serve as the bridge between the upper and
the lower halves of the hierarchy. The soul is eternal and immortal
because it shares in divinity above. It also suffuses all of nature
and lends to its motion and vitality. Ficino sees the soul as charged
with the governance of the material world, and is intimately
responsible for its potential well-being. This is a unique and
privileged metaphysical role for it. He argues that the soul is not
connected to any distinct part of the body, but communicates its
life-giving power throughout.
The
soul’s centrality in the great chain of being ensures its dignity
and immortality. However, it is also responsible for its wretchedness
and depravity. The soul’s proximity to the body has a negative
effect on its ability to truly appreciate its own nature and
immortality. Individual souls are by and large overwhelmed with the
governance of their bodies, and the material world assaults them with
violent motions and sensations. As a result the soul may fail to
recognize its own nature and divinity. The conditions of embodiment
also frustrate its search for truth. Metaphysically speaking, it
functions as the node between the upper and the lower, but in
practice it is wedded so tightly with matter that it naturally,
Ficino believes, comes to the conclusion that it is not distinct from
it. This is the cause of the common sense materialism that most
people uncritically accept, and that says something is not real
unless it is a body. A pivotal consequence of this situation is that
the soul forgets its own privileged nature and divinity, and in many
cases concludes that it is nothing distinct from matter. Thus, there
is a disconnect in Ficino’s philosophy between the metaphysical
nature of the soul, and its subjective experience when joined with
matter. This is the cause, according to Ficino, of the wretchedness
of the human condition, which is characterized by a certain confusion
regarding what is real and worthy of its pursuit.
The
Immortality of the Soul
The
primary aim of the Platonic Theology is of course to demonstrate the
immortality of the soul. Ficino provides a plurality of arguments
across the eighteen books of this work. He argues that the soul’s
immortality is a consequence of its position on the metaphysical
hierarchy. He also provides arguments that rest upon the metaphysical
and epistemological foundations of the Platonic Theology. Still other
arguments are polemical and aim at refuting relevant and uneliminated
alternatives, such as the positions of Epicurus and Averroes.
Epicurus and Averroes—with the former denying immortality, and the
latter claiming that it was one and the same for all—were growing
in popularity in some academic circles in fifteenth-century Italy.
First
and foremost, Ficino argues that the natural appetite for immortality
entails post-mortem existence for the soul. He starts with the
assumption that our primary goal is to ascend to a spiritual union
with God, and he holds that this is a basic and natural desire shared
and acted on by most human beings. If these efforts were to go
unfulfilled, Ficino concludes that they would be otiose, vain, and
even perverse. Perhaps more importantly, this would stand in direct
violation of the perfection of nature and the wisdom of God. Thus,
Ficino concludes that the natural desire for immortality must be
vindicated in an actual afterlife.
In
addition, in the Platonic Theology Ficino puts forward two prominent
argument types that draw upon the nature and powers of the human
mind, and on his theory of matter and body. He aims to show that the
rational powers of the soul all support immortality and that these
essential functions are in no way dependent upon matter and body. He
argues that there is a correspondence or likeness between incorporeal
entities and the soul. The intellect knows best when it does not
depend upon the body or the senses whatsoever, and instead
experiences an immediate union with forms. Ficino says that “when
the soul despises corporeals and when the senses have been allayed
and the clouds of phantasmata dissipated … then the intellect
discerns truly and is at its brightest” (IX.II.2). Ficino takes
this as evidence that the soul did not originate with the body.
Instead, he argues that the soul is ineluctably drawn to things
divine, and its union with incorporeals comes most naturally to it.
He says that the soul was born for the contemplation of things
divine, and through them it is enriched and perfected. Both the
soul’s correspondence to incorporeals and the pull that they have
on it are indicative of its underlying nature—like things
incorporeal, it is immortal.
Ficino
also aims to show that there are dissimilarities between the soul and
matter. He argues that the essential functions of the mind are
distinct from the body, and further that body cannot in any way give
rise to them. These arguments aim to refute materialists who think
that matter can give rise to the soul’s essential functions. Ficino
argues that the soul’s most important operations are inconsistent
with the basic conditions of corporeality. In fact, the body, the
senses, and the passions all conspire to impede and frustrate the
soul in its search for knowledge and goodness. Much like Plato in the
Phaedo, Ficino argues that the soul’s overall condition improves
the farther it is removed from the material world, and the soul knows
best when it does not draw upon the senses. These dissimilarities
establish, Ficino thinks, the soul’s essential otherness from
matter and body. Ficino’s metaphysics of matter is also tailored to
provide support for immortality. He provides what he calls a
“Platonic” definition of body, according to which it is composed
of matter and extension. Both matter and extension are passive and
inert, and cannot give rise in any way to the essential functions of
the soul. Therefore, Ficino concludes that it is only on account of
the presence of something incorporeal, namely forms and souls, that
material things are at all substantial.
Ethics
and Love
Ficino
did not compose a systematic treatise on ethics. Nonetheless, his
familiarity with classical Greek philosophy means that ethical
considerations are central to many of his philosophical works, and he
often comes around to discussing human virtues and well-being. Ficino
does not generally place an emphasis on the rightness of actions, or
on duties or obligations for that matter. Instead, he focuses on the
health and development of the whole person, which is consistent with
what is today called virtue ethics. Ficino marks the traditional
distinction between intellectual and moral virtues. The speculative
virtues concern, for instance, the understanding of things divine,
the knowledge of nature, and the craftsman’s ability to produce
artifacts. This species of virtue is acquired through learning and
speculation, and it is characterized by an intellectual state of
clarity. The moral virtues come about through custom and habit, and
their domain is human desires and appetites. Ficino holds that the
end of moral virtues is to purify the soul and to ultimately release
it from the sometimes overwhelming demands made by the body. Thus,
moral virtue produces a state of soul that governs desires and
appetites so that they do not take control of the soul, thereby
leading to an incontinent or intemperate character. In the end, both
the speculative and moral virtues are consistent with Ficino’s
broader aspirations as a Christian Platonist. For him the virtues are
prerequisites that prepare the soul for its inner ascent up the
hierarchy of being, ultimately uniting it with God.
Ficino’s
theory of love plays a central role in his ethics. He defines love as
the desire for beauty. Love originates with God, and it is the link
or bond that all things share in common. Here Ficino follows the
patterns left by Plato and Plotinus. Beautiful things ignite or
inspire the soul with love. When an individual thing is loved
properly, the soul ascends progressively from love of the particular
to the universal. The lover, therefore, turns inwardly to the soul
from the corporeal world, and thus ultimately finds its end in God.
However, it is possible for the soul to love improperly and become
fixated on beautiful objects. This results in a life of confusion and
wretchedness. Thus, for Ficino, the proper application of love lies
at the heart of human happiness.
Legacy
Ficino
left an enduring impression on the history of Western philosophy. His
philosophical writings, and his translations of Platonic and Hermetic
texts, exercised both a direct and indirect influence on the form and
content of philosophy in subsequent centuries. The Platonic Theology
was instrumental in elevating the defense of the immortality of the
soul to philosophical prominence in the early modern period. It
contributed to the Lateran Council of 1512 requiring philosophers to
defend the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. In the
letter of dedication to his Meditations on First Philosophy,
Descartes refers to the Lateran Council to explain, in part, the
proofs of God’s existence and immortality found therein. Ficino’s
influence can also be seen in many of the most noteworthy
philosophers of the sixteenth century, most notably Giordano Bruno,
and Francesco Patrizi da Cherso, who held a chair of Platonic
philosophy at the University of Ferrara. He indirectly influenced
generations of philosophers who encountered Platonism and Hermeticism
through his translations and commentaries.
The
fortune of Ficino’s philosophical legacy has waxed and waned over
the centuries. His influence on intellectual life in the sixteenth
century was especially strong, but his brand of Christian Platonism
was certainly not without its critics in subsequent centuries. The
sixteenth-century theologian and historian Johannes Serranus
criticized Ficino’s mode of translating and commenting on Plato’s
dialogues, which he thought lacked clarity, brevity, and precision.
The self-proclaimed Platonist G. W. Leibniz complains that Ficino’s
definitions lack the rigor of Plato’s, and he says that his
Neoplatonism incorporates too many pagan elements and is therefore
prone to heresy. In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, G. W.
F. Hegel gives Ficino a minor and subordinate role to play in the
development of modern philosophy. Hegel argues that Ficino’s
revival of Platonic philosophy was ultimately a misguided and
childish fascination with a dead philosophy. Perhaps more
importantly, however, is the fact that Ficino’s philosophy stands
in stark contrast to the methods and explanations employed by the new
science in the seventeenth century. Hobbes and Descartes, for
example, wanted to explain nature in purely materialistic and
mechanical terms. The new philosophy and science, therefore,
repudiates the vital core of Ficino’s metaphysics, especially his
belief in a World Soul and his vitalistic natural philosophy. Hobbes
outright rejects an incorporeal soul, and Descartes completely expels
it from nature. Both philosophers, therefore, aspired to explain
nature in such a way that it did not include many of the core
features of the Ficino’s thought.
For
a longtime Ficino remained a marginal figure and a footnote in
histories of philosophy. It was not until nearly the middle of the
twentieth century, when Paul Oskar Kristeller published his seminal
book, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, that historians of
philosophy started to re-examine and reconsider Ficino’s importance
to the history of Renaissance and early modern philosophies.
Kristeller’s book examined the formal structure of Ficino’s
philosophy, and he painted a picture of a sophisticated and
systematic metaphysician. More recently a number of articles and
books have been published on other aspects of Ficino’s thought.
Since Kristeller, later scholars—such as D. P. Walker, Frances
Yates, and Michael J. B. Allen—have focused less on the systematic
and formal philosophy, and more on the magical and creative elements
of Ficino’s thought. The critical examination of Ficino, and an
assessment of his influence, continues today.
