Refutation of the thesis "Being is one" by Aristotle.

Reading of Aristotle, in Physics, chapter 3: Refutation of the thesis "Being is one".

If we proceed in this way, it seems impossible that all entities are one, and the arguments used to prove it are not difficult to refute. Because both Parmenides and Melisso make eristic reasoning (since they start from false premises and their conclusions are not followed; Melisso's is rather crude and presents no problems, but if one absurdity is allowed to pass, one reaches others without difficulty).

 

The multiple being of Aristotle. It is clear that Melisso commits a fallacy, since he thinks that if "everything that has come to be had a beginning", then "what has not come to be does not". And it is also absurd to suppose that everything has a beginning, not of time, but of the thing, and that there must be a beginning not only of an absolute generation, but also of the generation of a quality, as if there could be no instantaneous changes. . Furthermore, why does the All, if it is one, have to be immobile? If a part of the Whole that is one, like this part of water, can move in itself, why shouldn't the Whole be able to do it? And why can there be no alteration? On the other hand, the Being cannot be one in terms of form, but only in terms of matter —some physicists speak of this unity, but not of the other—; for a man and a horse are different in form, and so are the opposites of each other. The same objections can be made to Parmenides, although there are also others that can be applied more appropriately. He is refuted by showing that his premises are false and his conclusions do not follow. His premises are false because he supposes that "being" is only said in an absolute sense, since it has many senses. And his conclusions do not follow, because if there were only white things, and if "white" had only one meaning, what is white would nevertheless be multiple and not one. What is white would not be one either by continuity or by definition. Because the being of the white is different from the being of that which receives it, even though the white does not exist separately, outside of what is white; for the white and that to which it belongs are not distinguished by being separate but by their being34. This is what Parmenides did not see. Indeed, Parmenides is necessarily assuming not only that "is" has a single meaning, whatever it is attributed to, but also that it means "what properly is", and "is one" > "what properly is". one», because an attribute is that which is predicated of a subject; therefore, if "being" were an attribute, that to which it is attributed would not be, since it would be something other than what it is; then something that is not. Therefore, "what properly is" cannot be predicated of something, since that of which it is predicated would not be an entity, unless it is admitted that "is" has more than one meaning, in such a way that each thing is a certain thing. be. But it has been assumed that "is" has only one meaning. But, on the other hand, if "what properly is" is not an attribute of something, but something else is attributed to it, why should "what properly is" mean "is" rather than "not"? is"? Because on the assumption that "what properly is" not only "is" but is also "white", what is white would not be "what properly is" (since being cannot belong to it, because what is not it is "that which properly is", is not); therefore white is not, and it is not that it is not in a particular sense, but that it is not at all. Therefore "what properly is" is not, because if one truly says that it is white, this means saying that it is not. Consequently, also "white" will have to mean "what properly is"; but then "is" would have more than one meaning. Furthermore, if being is "what it properly is", then it will not have magnitude, because in such a case the being of each of its parts would be different.

 

On the other hand, that "what properly is" is divisible into others that "properly are" is also evident from the point of view of definition. For example, if "man" were "what it properly is", "animal" and "biped" would also have to be "what it properly is". Because, if they were not, then they would be attributes of man or of some other subject. But both alternatives are impossible. By attribute is understood: either what may or may not belong <to a subject>, or that in whose definition it is present of which it is an attribute or that to which the definition of the subject of which it is an attribute belongs. For example, "to be sitting" is a separable attribute, but "flat" cannot be defined without the definition of "nose," to which we say it belongs as an attribute. Furthermore, the definition of the whole is not present in the definition of each of the parts or elements of what is defined; for example, the definition of "man" is not included in that of "biped," nor that of "white man" in that of "white." If this is so, and if "biped" is the attribute of "man", then either "biped" will have to be separable from "man", so that there could be men who are not bipedal, or else the definition of "man" will have to be present in the definition of "biped"; but this is impossible, because "biped" is contained in the definition of "man." And if "biped" and "animal" were attributes of something else, and if neither were "what it properly is", then "man" would also be an attribute of something else. But "what properly is" cannot be an attribute of anything, and that of which both and each one in particular are predicated ("biped" and "animal") must also be that of which the compound is predicated (" bipedal animal"). Will we have to say, then, that the Whole is made up of indivisibles? Some have transmitted both arguments to us: a) the one that affirms that all things are one, because "being" only means one thing, which means that non-being is, and b) the dichotomy argument, which supposes indivisible magnitudes . But obviously it is not true that if "being" only means one thing and contradiction is not possible at the same time, then non-being is not. Because nothing prevents there being, not absolute non-being, but a certain non-being. On the other hand, it is absurd to say that All is one because there can be nothing outside of Being itself. For what is to be understood by Being itself if not "what properly is"? But if this is so, nothing prevents things from being multiple. It is evident, then, that the being cannot be one in this sense.