Before a break of 10 years, Kant would feel energetic when essaying on the morality of men, surely he still needed time to break down his "critique of pure reason", and much more to expose the "practice... From now on it will be presented a reading of Kant in "Foundation of the metaphysics of ethics".
In reality, we find that the more a cultivated reason is concerned with the purpose of enjoying life and achieving happiness, the more man moves away from true satisfaction; which is why many, and precisely the most experienced in the use of reason, end up feeling - be sincere enough to admit it - a certain degree of misology or hatred of reason, because, computing all the advantages they get, I am not saying anymore of the invention of the arts, all of them vulgar luxury, but even of the sciences -which, after all, appear to them as a luxury of understanding-, they find, however, that they have brought more sorrows and pains than happiness they have been able to gain and they rather envy than despise the vulgar man, who is more propitious to the direction of mere natural instinct and does not allow his reason to exercise great influence in his doing and omitting. And up to this point it must be confessed that the judgment of those who greatly reduce and even declare the bombastic praise of the great benefits that reason has to provide us for the business of happiness and satisfaction in life inferior to zero, is not a judgment of saddened or ungrateful men to the benefits of the government of the universe; that in these judgments there is implicit the idea of another and much more worthy purpose and end of existence, for which, not for happiness, reason is properly destined; and before that end, as the supreme condition, almost all the peculiar ends of man must bow.
Since reason is not sufficiently apt to direct the will with certainty, as regards its objects and the satisfaction of our needs - which reason itself multiplies in part - to which end a inborn natural instinct; Since, however, on the other hand, reason has been granted to us as a practical faculty, that is, as a faculty that must have an influence on the will, it follows that the true destiny of reason must be to produce a good will. , not in this or that respect, as a means, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary, if it is so that nature in the distribution of dispositions has proceeded everywhere with a sense of finality.
This will must not be all good, nor the only good; but it must be the supreme good and the condition of any other, including the desire for happiness, in which case it can very well be made compatible with the wisdom of nature, if it is noted that the cultivation of reason, necessary for that end first and unconditioned, restricts in many ways, at least in this life, the achievement of the second end, always conditioned, namely: happiness, without thereby leading nature contrary to its finalist sense, because reason, which recognizes its supreme practical destiny in the foundation of a good will, can only feel in the fulfillment of such a purpose a satisfaction of a peculiar kind, namely, that which arises from the realization of an end that only reason determines, although this have to be linked to some break for the purposes of the inclination.
To develop the concept of a will worthy of being estimated by itself, of a good will without any ulterior purpose, as it is already found in the healthy natural understanding, without needing to be taught, but rather explained, to develop that concept that is always at the top of all the estimation that we make of our actions and that is the condition of everything else, we are going to consider the concept of duty, which contains that of a good will, although under certain restrictions and obstacles subjective, which, however, far from hiding it and making it unknowable, rather by contrast make it stand out and appear more clearly.
I dispense here with all those actions already known as contrary to duty, although in this or that sense they may be useful; in fact, in them the question of whether they can happen out of duty is not even raised, since they occur against it. I will also leave aside actions which, being really in conformity with duty, are not of those towards which a man is immediately inclined; but, nevertheless, he carries them out because another inclination pushes him to do so. Indeed; in these cases it can be distinguished very easily if the action in accordance with duty has happened out of duty or for a selfish intention. This difference is much more difficult to notice when the action is in accordance with duty and the subject also has an immediate inclination towards it. For example: it is, of course, in accordance with duty that the merchant does not charge more than an inexperienced buyer; and in places where there is much commerce, the wise and prudent merchant does not do so, in effect, but maintains a fixed price for everyone in general, so that a child can buy at home as well as any other. Thus, one is served honestly. But this is by no means enough to believe that the merchant acted like this out of duty, out of honesty: his profit demanded it; but it is not possible to admit, furthermore, that the merchant has an immediate inclination towards buyers, so that out of love for them, so to speak, he does not make any difference in price. Thus, the action has not happened out of duty or immediate inclination, but simply with a selfish intention.
On the other hand, it is a duty for everyone to preserve his life, and besides, we all have an immediate inclination to do so. But, for this very reason, the anguished care that most men put into it does not have an interior value, and the maxim that governs that care lacks a moral content. They keep their lives according to duty, yes; but not out of duty. On the other hand, when adversities and inconsolable grief have robbed a man of all his zest for life, if this unhappy man, with full spirit and feeling more indignation than dejection or discouragement, and even wishing for death, preserves his life, without love her, only out of duty and not out of inclination or fear, then her maxim does have a moral content.
Being beneficial as far as possible is a duty; but, in addition, there are many souls so full of pity that they find an intimate pleasure in distributing joy around them, without being prompted by any movement of vanity or self-interest, and who can rejoice in the contentment of others. insofar as it is his work. But I maintain that, in such a case, such acts, however conformable they may be to duty, however worthy of love, nevertheless have no true moral value and go hand in hand with other inclinations; for example, with the desire for honor, which, when, fortunately, refers to things that are actually of general benefit, in accordance with duty and, therefore, honorable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem; for the maxim lacks moral content, that is, that such actions are done, not out of inclination, but out of duty.
No comments:
Post a Comment