Geopolitics of the 21st century and almost a year of war in Ukraine

The global geopolitical phenomenon of the early 21st century is the end of the dominance of the Western world. The West began its global expansion at the end of the 15th century, when the Spanish arrived in America in 1492 and the Portuguese in India in 1498. Since then, the expansion of the European empires in America, Asia, Africa and Oceania has been the axis of development. geopolitical during the second half of the second millennium. Western dominance not only implied geographic and economic supremacy, but also practical scientific-technological capacity. Paper, gunpowder and printing originate from the East, but in the hands of the West they became instruments of its global expansion. The Spanish and Portuguese empires first; English and French later; and the German and Italian third, were different instruments of Western global dominance.

 

The decolonization that takes place after the Second World War is probably the dominant political event of the beginning of the global hegemony of the West, and perhaps the return of Hong Kong to China by Great Britain and that of Boa by Portugal to India symbolize , at the end of the 20th century, the meaning of this geopolitical change. The independence of India in the middle of the 20th century is also a fact in that direction.

 

In the geopolitical vision of the United States at the beginning of the 21st century, its dominant idea is to continue being the power in the Pacific, and for China and Russia the expansion of their influence in the immediate environment. This was expressed verbatim by Biden, who as Obama's Vice President 10 years ago said in Beijing: “The United States is and will continue to be the power of the Pacific”, taking hegemony in the Atlantic for granted. His intention to continue being the bioceanic power par excellence is reflected in his 11 aircraft carriers that sail the world's waters.

Regarding China, its central geopolitical idea is the New Silk Road. It sinks its roots in the passage from the first to the second millennium. It is a fundamentally terrestrial axis, which goes from the coasts of the Far East and the Pacific, to the Baltic in the Atlantic, passing through the Mediterranean. Just as Anglo-Saxon geopolitics has had a maritime vision, China's has been terrestrial. While the United States has borders with only two countries, Canada to the north and Mexico to the south, the Asian power has them with eighteen countries. The New Silk Road is a historical and geographical project that has three chapters arising from geopolitical ambitions: expansion to Southeast Asia, Africa and South America.

 

Russia is the largest country in the world, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific and is the dominant power in the Arctic. Its geopolitical project is very clear and it began to develop at the beginning of the 18th century by Tsar Pedro I, who defeated Sweden and reached the Baltic. For this Tsar, Russia was the "Power of the Five Seas": Black, Azov, Caspian, Baltic and Arctic (Putin in July, when presenting the new naval strategy, added a sixth: the Oj, where he has islands in dispute with Japan ). The Russian geopolitical project in the 21st century is the reconstitution of the Soviet Union, dismantled after the dissolution of communism. Europe has been the center of Western global dominance and perhaps for this reason it is the continent that faces the greatest relative setback. Its central challenge is to maintain the cohesion achieved through the European Union and its key debate is whether to continue as a subordinate ally to the United States or try to play a balanced policy between this country and China, from which today it seems far removed.

 

In the first decades of the 21st century, the NATO conflicts that are simultaneously developing with Russia and China are actually the struggle between Washington and Beijing for global hegemony. In the long term, the cohesion of the European Union and NATO is a question mark, although it is not in the short or medium term, and the ideological division of the United States is possibly, together with the questioning of the functioning of democracy in the West, its most important ideological threat. Thirty years ago, geopolitics was out of fashion. The idea that the national state was disappearing due to economic globalization and political multilateralism dominated. The new technologies made the territory lose meaning and in which natural resources lose value compared to the possession of knowledge. Nationalism was a receding value. Today the vision is different. New technologies have not only been nationalized, but are a central battleground between the United States and China for global hegemony. The multilateral has weakened and the regional powers have more gravitation. Social networks, which were believed to impose a universal culture, today are more instruments that reinforce identity conflicts. Wars, which thirty years ago were considered a thing of the past, today have once again become a dramatic present, in which diplomats speak like warriors and military exercises are central instruments of foreign policy.

 

Geopolitics is closely linked to history and at the Davos Forum, Henry Kissinger pointed out that it was a mistake to expel Russia from Europe, because that would make the continent more insecure. It should be remembered that Great Britain and Russia were military allies in the three modern world wars: the Napoleonic ones, as well as the First and Second. He also said that it was a mistake to push Russia into a military alliance with China, something that has happened in recent weeks. He also added on that occasion that Ukraine was going to have to accept territorial concessions. It should be remembered that Khrushchev handed over Crimea to Ukraine on the 300th anniversary of this country agreeing to submit to the Russian Empire. Crimea was, in the middle of the 19th century, the reason for the war that Russia waged with Great Britain, France, Turkey and Sardinia.

 

Linking the concepts of geopolitics and geoeconomics, the UK's strategic vision for 2030 presented last year points to three prevailing trends: the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific, a more assertive and threatening China, and a greater role for what it calls the “middle powers”. The latter has been corroborated in the almost six months of war between Russia and Ukraine. It should be remembered that countries like Mexico, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America; Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria in Africa; Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam in Asia; and Saudi Arabia and the Emirates in the Arab world, coincided, without prior coordination, in condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine because it affected the principle of sovereignty, and they did not join the economic sanctions against Russia carried out by Europe and the United States at the same time. for the same reason, because it affects the principle of sovereignty. That is, they have maintained an independent position in the conflict. Moving forward, a geopolitical axis is drawn between the northern hemisphere and the southern hemisphere. But the first will continue to be in the coming centuries, the one that concentrates population and resources. Historically, the geopolitical has been linked to the military capacity of the powers to achieve their strategic interests.

 

Almost a year into the Ukraine war, Russia's determination to recruit 137,000 men for its Armed Forces ; the decision by NATO and its allies announced on August 23 that they will maintain support for Ukraine "for years"; and the geopolitical conflicts that are developing simultaneously between the Western alliance and its allies around Ukraine and Taiwan, show a dangerous and uncertain global geopolitical situation.

 

Geopolitics of the 21st century and almost a year of war in Ukraine

The global geopolitical phenomenon of the early 21st century is the end of the dominance of the Western world. The West began its global expansion at the end of the 15th century, when the Spanish arrived in America in 1492 and the Portuguese in India in 1498. Since then, the expansion of the European empires in America, Asia, Africa and Oceania has been the axis of development. geopolitical during the second half of the second millennium. Western dominance not only implied geographic and economic supremacy, but also practical scientific-technological capacity. Paper, gunpowder and printing originate from the East, but in the hands of the West they became instruments of its global expansion. The Spanish and Portuguese empires first; English and French later; and the German and Italian third, were different instruments of Western global dominance.

 

The decolonization that takes place after the Second World War is probably the dominant political event of the beginning of the global hegemony of the West, and perhaps the return of Hong Kong to China by Great Britain and that of Boa by Portugal to India symbolize , at the end of the 20th century, the meaning of this geopolitical change. The independence of India in the middle of the 20th century is also a fact in that direction.

 

In the geopolitical vision of the United States at the beginning of the 21st century, its dominant idea is to continue being the power in the Pacific, and for China and Russia the expansion of their influence in the immediate environment. This was expressed verbatim by Biden, who as Obama's Vice President 10 years ago said in Beijing: “The United States is and will continue to be the power of the Pacific”, taking hegemony in the Atlantic for granted. His intention to continue being the bioceanic power par excellence is reflected in his 11 aircraft carriers that sail the world's waters.

Regarding China, its central geopolitical idea is the New Silk Road. It sinks its roots in the passage from the first to the second millennium. It is a fundamentally terrestrial axis, which goes from the coasts of the Far East and the Pacific, to the Baltic in the Atlantic, passing through the Mediterranean. Just as Anglo-Saxon geopolitics has had a maritime vision, China's has been terrestrial. While the United States has borders with only two countries, Canada to the north and Mexico to the south, the Asian power has them with eighteen countries. The New Silk Road is a historical and geographical project that has three chapters arising from geopolitical ambitions: expansion to Southeast Asia, Africa and South America.

 

Russia is the largest country in the world, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific and is the dominant power in the Arctic. Its geopolitical project is very clear and it began to develop at the beginning of the 18th century by Tsar Pedro I, who defeated Sweden and reached the Baltic. For this Tsar, Russia was the "Power of the Five Seas": Black, Azov, Caspian, Baltic and Arctic (Putin in July, when presenting the new naval strategy, added a sixth: the Oj, where he has islands in dispute with Japan ). The Russian geopolitical project in the 21st century is the reconstitution of the Soviet Union, dismantled after the dissolution of communism. Europe has been the center of Western global dominance and perhaps for this reason it is the continent that faces the greatest relative setback. Its central challenge is to maintain the cohesion achieved through the European Union and its key debate is whether to continue as a subordinate ally to the United States or try to play a balanced policy between this country and China, from which today it seems far removed.

 

In the first decades of the 21st century, the NATO conflicts that are simultaneously developing with Russia and China are actually the struggle between Washington and Beijing for global hegemony. In the long term, the cohesion of the European Union and NATO is a question mark, although it is not in the short or medium term, and the ideological division of the United States is possibly, together with the questioning of the functioning of democracy in the West, its most important ideological threat. Thirty years ago, geopolitics was out of fashion. The idea that the national state was disappearing due to economic globalization and political multilateralism dominated. The new technologies made the territory lose meaning and in which natural resources lose value compared to the possession of knowledge. Nationalism was a receding value. Today the vision is different. New technologies have not only been nationalized, but are a central battleground between the United States and China for global hegemony. The multilateral has weakened and the regional powers have more gravitation. Social networks, which were believed to impose a universal culture, today are more instruments that reinforce identity conflicts. Wars, which thirty years ago were considered a thing of the past, today have once again become a dramatic present, in which diplomats speak like warriors and military exercises are central instruments of foreign policy.

 

Geopolitics is closely linked to history and at the Davos Forum, Henry Kissinger pointed out that it was a mistake to expel Russia from Europe, because that would make the continent more insecure. It should be remembered that Great Britain and Russia were military allies in the three modern world wars: the Napoleonic ones, as well as the First and Second. He also said that it was a mistake to push Russia into a military alliance with China, something that has happened in recent weeks. He also added on that occasion that Ukraine was going to have to accept territorial concessions. It should be remembered that Khrushchev handed over Crimea to Ukraine on the 300th anniversary of this country agreeing to submit to the Russian Empire. Crimea was, in the middle of the 19th century, the reason for the war that Russia waged with Great Britain, France, Turkey and Sardinia.

 

Linking the concepts of geopolitics and geoeconomics, the UK's strategic vision for 2030 presented last year points to three prevailing trends: the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific, a more assertive and threatening China, and a greater role for what it calls the “middle powers”. The latter has been corroborated in the almost six months of war between Russia and Ukraine. It should be remembered that countries like Mexico, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America; Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria in Africa; Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam in Asia; and Saudi Arabia and the Emirates in the Arab world, coincided, without prior coordination, in condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine because it affected the principle of sovereignty, and they did not join the economic sanctions against Russia carried out by Europe and the United States at the same time. for the same reason, because it affects the principle of sovereignty. That is, they have maintained an independent position in the conflict. Moving forward, a geopolitical axis is drawn between the northern hemisphere and the southern hemisphere. But the first will continue to be in the coming centuries, the one that concentrates population and resources. Historically, the geopolitical has been linked to the military capacity of the powers to achieve their strategic interests.

 

Almost a year into the Ukraine war, Russia's determination to recruit 137,000 men for its Armed Forces ; the decision by NATO and its allies announced on August 23 that they will maintain support for Ukraine "for years"; and the geopolitical conflicts that are developing simultaneously between the Western alliance and its allies around Ukraine and Taiwan, show a dangerous and uncertain global geopolitical situation.

A prospect of geopolitical stability for Okinawa and Japan

Okinawa and Japan Odyssey

In its historical development, Okinawa has been under the influence of great powers such as Japan, China or the United States, but the most marked changes in direction have been caused by Japan at a time when, having overcome the internal division and concentrated its forces, it has energetically thrown outwards. The first such moment came in 1609, when the feudal Satsuma clan invaded the then independent kingdom of Ryūkyū. After unifying Japan under his rule, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598), who had in mind to conquer the entire Ming empire, had launched two attacks against the Korean peninsula at the end of the 16th century. The Satsuma Offensive, which put Ryūkyū into its orbit, falls within that historical cycle.

 

Among the reforms implemented as a result of the Meiji Restoration in the second half of the 19th century, was the abolition of the country's fiefs or lordships, establishing a system of prefectures (provinces) and strengthening the central power, which since then would try to create a sphere of influence that included the Korean peninsula, being the final dismantling of the kingdom of Ryūkyū and the establishment, in its place, of the prefecture of Okinawa, part of that process.

 

At the end of the Pacific War, when, in full retreat, Japan realized that it would be forced to fight in its own territory in the face of the unstoppable US advance and the people were harangued to sacrifice themselves for the country, the US army set its sights on on the main island of Okinawa as a bridgehead for the final takeover of Japan. The landing began at the end of March 1945. The fierce land battle that the Japanese and the Americans fought on the island caused enormous damage to the civilian population, of which one in four inhabitants perished, bringing disasters to the last corners of the island. of the "total war".

 

Okinawa after its return to Japan

Even after Japan regained its sovereignty after the war, Okinawa, a major fulcrum for US military strategy in the Far East, continued to remain under Washington's control and only came under Japanese administration in 1972, exactly half a century ago.

 

In Okinawa, those born that year are nicknamed fukkikko, or "return children," who are now turning 50.  At that time, many other adaptation measures were still being taken, similar to the 730 campaign, to the new “Japanese” reality. At the same time, the provision of infrastructures was faced, a field in which, during the years of US administration, Okinawa had lagged far behind Japan.

 

 

The biggest claim, however, was the rebuilding of Shuri Castle, which had been reduced to rubble during the war. This budding reporter was tasked with going the streets collecting any information related to the historic castle. On the ruins of the castle, the Ryūkyū University had been built under the US military command, in the image and likeness of many other public universities in that country. Once inaugurated, it received the support of Michigan State University. The construction of Ryūkyū University is said to have been an American attempt to curry favor with Okinawans as part of Cold War strategy.

 

Once the university was transferred to another place, the castle began to be rebuilt. If the first was part of the North American strategy, now, on those same lands, the reconstruction of the symbol of the kingdom of Ryūkyū began to materialize with the support of the Government of Japan, leaving the surroundings converted into a state park. Shuri Hill is a magnificent example of the diversity of elements that make up the history of Okinawa.

 

1995, turning point

That year markeda before and after in the political environment. from Okinawa. That fall, three members of the US military kidnapped and raped a girl returning from shopping, sparking an explosion of outrage on the islands.

 

Similar crimes had already occurred in the pre-refoulement era, and in many of those cases Okinawans had to swallow their rage because of the preponderant role given to the armed forces under US administration.

 

“The governments of Tokyo and Washington take this fact as an unfortunate event perpetrated by some heartless members of the US military, but the people of Okinawa take it as one more tragedy of the many that have happened in these 50 years that have passed since the war. , and that will continue to happen as long as there are US military bases on the islands. There is a big difference between the degree of indignation caused in one case and the other, and in the very way of understanding the event”. These lines, a good testimony to the clear estrangement between Okinawans and the Government of Japan, appeared in the September 29, 1995 issue of the Okinawan newspaper Ryūkyū Shimpō.

 

For the protest acts on October 21 of that year, the organizers hoped to have the participation of about 50,000 people. 85,000 gathered (data from the organization). Thus, one in every 15 inhabitants of the Okinawa prefecture attended, in the largest concentration of protest held since the return to Japan

The fear of the perpetuation of the bases

The problem of the Okinawan bases became an important issue in Japanese national politics as a result of this crime, although the refusal of the then Okinawan governor, Ōta Masahide, to affix his signature on the document of renewal of the rental contracts for the land for the bases. Ōta feared the continuation of that situation, as the bases continued to occupy a large part of the island even after the end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

 

Many of the bases are on land requisitioned from their owners and, in order to avoid legal problems, a mechanism was established whereby, in the event that any of the owners of the land that was forcibly occupied refused to sign the rental contract, they would do so. in his place the governor (a later legal reform deprived the governor of this power). The refusal to sign implied that the contracts could not be renewed, thus opening the door to the possibility that the occupation of the land by the bases would be declared illegal. The governments of Japan and the United States were forced to react quickly to the emergency. But the problem was a sample of the progressive lack of interest that was felt towards Okinawa once its return had been achieved, and of the few efforts that had been made to reduce the military bases and to alleviate the burden that they implied for the settlers. The lack of interest took its toll that way.

 

From the agreement on the return of Futenma to the confrontation with the Government

In this situation, in April 1996, it was suddenly reported that the then Prime Minister of Japan, Hashimoto Ryūtarō, had reached an agreement with the United States Government for the return of the Futenma military base. The news also caused great surprise in Okinawa, since until now the possibility of returning said installation had never been discussed. It even gave the impression that both governments had finally put their hands to work to proceed with a serious reduction of the US military presence on the islands.

However, the agreement reached did not include concrete provisions on how Futenma's functions were to be replaced. At first it was assumed that the loss of these functions could be compensated for by heliports located within the existing bases in the prefecture. But soon there began to be talk of new temporary installations on new land reclaimed from the sea, and after plans to build a new military base on the coast of Henoko (Nago city, north of the island) which, in addition to being large, would be a permanent installation.

 

Verifying that the vaunted "return" of Futenma was actually going to consist of replacing it with a new military base that would also be located in Okinawa caused a reaction as strong as it was logical.

 

In 2009 the so-called Democratic Party managed to wrest the Government of Japan from Hashimoto's Liberal Democratic Party and the new prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio, announced his intention to get the new replacement base to be located "at least in another prefecture of Japan ”. But his intention could not materialize due to disagreements within his executive, for which he was forced to rectify.

 

Then, during the second term of Abe Shinzō, without Okinawa's approval, work began at sea, in a rarefied climate in which those who continued to oppose the government's plans were unfairly branded as "anti-Japanese". .

 

A mirror of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region

If we look back and look at Japan after the end of the Cold War, we see that the international environment in which it is framed presents more and more instability. On the one hand, there is the grave danger of a nuclearized North Korea. On the other, the tensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands. In recent years we must also add the increasingly feared possibility of armed clashes between China and Taiwan.

For Japan to take a strong position to respond to all these challenges is, to some extent, perfectly logical. But it is very worrying that, while voices crying out for diplomacy, for efforts in favor of détente and dialogue, which is the true function that politics should have, are increasingly missing, it is precisely the politicians who to raise voices as "martial" as those who equate an attack on Taiwan's security with an attack on Japan.

 

If the country allowed itself to be carried away by the logic of national security and, under that banner, came to a situation in which unity and cohesion were demanded of the Japanese, there is no doubt that the most extreme consequences would be experienced in Okinawa. An emergency in the military field will not occur in the place where political decisions are cooked, Tokyo, but, in all probability, in Okinawa, which is the closest part to the Taiwan-China zone, and where the bases are concentrated. US military.

 

Although in Northeast Asia the existing mistrust between countries could cause friction at any time and trigger an arms race, this region of the world will be affected by demographic phenomena such as aging and the decrease in the productive part of the population, which suggests that the center of growth will move to South and Southeast Asia, that is, towards young Asia. No one would like future historians to say of the East Asian countries that they squandered the peak of their growth on fighting and on armaments.

 

Okinawa is a mirror reflecting the order of the Asia-Pacific region. He has suffered in the past. The antagonisms and wars between the great powers have inflicted great suffering on it, but in times of peace and prosperity it has also shown that it has much to offer and that it is an attractive place for its landscapes, culture and traditions. Hopefully we will be able to create, in these years that follow the 50th anniversary of its return to Japan and that are already leading us to the middle of the 21st century, a future for our region that allows Okinawa to shine with all its originality and character. And that we can say that Okinawa is a mirror, yes, but a mirror that reflects the stability and prosperity of an entire region.

 

Kant: From common knowledge to philosophy.

 Before a break of 10 years, Kant would feel energetic when essaying on the morality of men, surely he still needed time to break down his "critique of pure reason", and much more to expose the "practice... From now on it will be presented a reading of Kant in "Foundation of the metaphysics of ethics".

 In reality, we find that the more a cultivated reason is concerned with the purpose of enjoying life and achieving happiness, the more man moves away from true satisfaction; which is why many, and precisely the most experienced in the use of reason, end up feeling - be sincere enough to admit it - a certain degree of misology or hatred of reason, because, computing all the advantages they get, I am not saying anymore of the invention of the arts, all of them vulgar luxury, but even of the sciences -which, after all, appear to them as a luxury of understanding-, they find, however, that they have brought more sorrows and pains than happiness they have been able to gain and they rather envy than despise the vulgar man, who is more propitious to the direction of mere natural instinct and does not allow his reason to exercise great influence in his doing and omitting. And up to this point it must be confessed that the judgment of those who greatly reduce and even declare the bombastic praise of the great benefits that reason has to provide us for the business of happiness and satisfaction in life inferior to zero, is not a judgment of saddened or ungrateful men to the benefits of the government of the universe; that in these judgments there is implicit the idea of another and much more worthy purpose and end of existence, for which, not for happiness, reason is properly destined; and before that end, as the supreme condition, almost all the peculiar ends of man must bow.

 

Since reason is not sufficiently apt to direct the will with certainty, as regards its objects and the satisfaction of our needs - which reason itself multiplies in part - to which end a inborn natural instinct; Since, however, on the other hand, reason has been granted to us as a practical faculty, that is, as a faculty that must have an influence on the will, it follows that the true destiny of reason must be to produce a good will. , not in this or that respect, as a means, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary, if it is so that nature in the distribution of dispositions has proceeded everywhere with a sense of finality.

 

This will must not be all good, nor the only good; but it must be the supreme good and the condition of any other, including the desire for happiness, in which case it can very well be made compatible with the wisdom of nature, if it is noted that the cultivation of reason, necessary for that end first and unconditioned, restricts in many ways, at least in this life, the achievement of the second end, always conditioned, namely: happiness, without thereby leading nature contrary to its finalist sense, because reason, which recognizes its supreme practical destiny in the foundation of a good will, can only feel in the fulfillment of such a purpose a satisfaction of a peculiar kind, namely, that which arises from the realization of an end that only reason determines, although this have to be linked to some break for the purposes of the inclination.

 

To develop the concept of a will worthy of being estimated by itself, of a good will without any ulterior purpose, as it is already found in the healthy natural understanding, without needing to be taught, but rather explained, to develop that concept that is always at the top of all the estimation that we make of our actions and that is the condition of everything else, we are going to consider the concept of duty, which contains that of a good will, although under certain restrictions and obstacles subjective, which, however, far from hiding it and making it unknowable, rather by contrast make it stand out and appear more clearly.

 

I dispense here with all those actions already known as contrary to duty, although in this or that sense they may be useful; in fact, in them the question of whether they can happen out of duty is not even raised, since they occur against it. I will also leave aside actions which, being really in conformity with duty, are not of those towards which a man is immediately inclined; but, nevertheless, he carries them out because another inclination pushes him to do so. Indeed; in these cases it can be distinguished very easily if the action in accordance with duty has happened out of duty or for a selfish intention. This difference is much more difficult to notice when the action is in accordance with duty and the subject also has an immediate inclination towards it. For example: it is, of course, in accordance with duty that the merchant does not charge more than an inexperienced buyer; and in places where there is much commerce, the wise and prudent merchant does not do so, in effect, but maintains a fixed price for everyone in general, so that a child can buy at home as well as any other. Thus, one is served honestly. But this is by no means enough to believe that the merchant acted like this out of duty, out of honesty: his profit demanded it; but it is not possible to admit, furthermore, that the merchant has an immediate inclination towards buyers, so that out of love for them, so to speak, he does not make any difference in price. Thus, the action has not happened out of duty or immediate inclination, but simply with a selfish intention.

 

On the other hand, it is a duty for everyone to preserve his life, and besides, we all have an immediate inclination to do so. But, for this very reason, the anguished care that most men put into it does not have an interior value, and the maxim that governs that care lacks a moral content. They keep their lives according to duty, yes; but not out of duty. On the other hand, when adversities and inconsolable grief have robbed a man of all his zest for life, if this unhappy man, with full spirit and feeling more indignation than dejection or discouragement, and even wishing for death, preserves his life, without love her, only out of duty and not out of inclination or fear, then her maxim does have a moral content.

 

Being beneficial as far as possible is a duty; but, in addition, there are many souls so full of pity that they find an intimate pleasure in distributing joy around them, without being prompted by any movement of vanity or self-interest, and who can rejoice in the contentment of others. insofar as it is his work. But I maintain that, in such a case, such acts, however conformable they may be to duty, however worthy of love, nevertheless have no true moral value and go hand in hand with other inclinations; for example, with the desire for honor, which, when, fortunately, refers to things that are actually of general benefit, in accordance with duty and, therefore, honorable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem; for the maxim lacks moral content, that is, that such actions are done, not out of inclination, but out of duty.