a. The Main Divisions
Several
contemporary varieties of hedonism have been defended, although
usually by just a handful of philosophers or less at any one time.
Other varieties of hedonism are also theoretically available but have
received little or no discussion. Contemporary varieties of
Prudential Hedonism can be grouped based on how they define pleasure
and pain, as is done below. In addition to providing different
notions of what pleasure and pain are, contemporary varieties of
Prudential Hedonism also disagree about what aspect or aspects of
pleasure are valuable for well-being (and the opposite for pain).
The
most well-known disagreement about what aspects of pleasure are
valuable occurs between Quantitative and Qualitative Hedonists.
Quantitative Hedonists argue that how valuable pleasure is for
well-being depends on only the amount of
pleasure, and so they are only concerned with dimensions of pleasure
such as duration and intensity. Quantitative Hedonism is often
accused of over-valuing animalistic, simple, and debauched pleasures.
Qualitative
Hedonists argue that, in addition to the dimensions related to the
amount of pleasure, one or more dimensions of quality can have an
impact on how pleasure affects well-being. The quality dimensions
might be based on how cognitive or bodily the pleasure is (as it was
for Mill), the moral status of the source of the pleasure, or some
other non-amount-related dimension. Qualitative Hedonism is
criticised by some for smuggling values other than pleasure into
well-being by misleadingly labelling them as dimensions of pleasure.
How these qualities are chosen for inclusion is also criticised for
being arbitrary or ad hoc by some because inclusion of these
dimensions of pleasure is often in direct response to objections that
Quantitative Hedonism cannot easily deal with. That is to say, the
inclusion of these dimensions is often accused of being an exercise
in plastering over holes, rather than deducing corollary conclusions
from existing theoretical premises. Others have argued that any
dimensions of quality can be better explained in terms of dimensions
of quantity. For example, they might claim that moral pleasures are
no higher in quality than immoral pleasures, but that moral pleasures
are instrumentally more valuable because they are likely to lead to
more moments of pleasure or less moments of pain in the future.
Hedonists
also have differing views about how the value of pleasure compares
with the value of pain. This is not a practical disagreement about
how best to measure pleasure and pain, but rather a theoretical
disagreement about comparative value, such as whether pain is worse
for us than an equivalent amount of pleasure is good for us. The
default position is that one unit of pleasure (sometimes referred to
as a Hedon) is equivalent but opposite in value to one unit of pain
(sometimes referred to as a Dolor). Several Hedonistic Utilitarians
have argued that reduction of pain should be seen as more important
than increasing pleasure, sometimes for the Epicurean reason that
pain seems worse for us than an equivalent amount of pleasure is good
for us. Imagine that a magical genie offered for you to play a game
with him. The game consists of you flipping a fair coin. If the coin
lands on heads, then you immediately feel a burst of very intense
pleasure and if it lands on tails, then you immediately feel a burst
of very intense pain. Is it in your best interests to play the game?
Another
area of disagreement between some Hedonists is whether pleasure is
entirely internal to a person or if it includes external elements.
Internalism about pleasure is the thesis that, whatever pleasure is,
it is always and only inside a person. Externalism about pleasure, on
the other hand, is the thesis that, pleasure is more than just a
state of an individual (that is, that a necessary component of
pleasure lies outside of the individual). Externalists about pleasure
might, for example, describe pleasure as a function that mediates
between our minds and the environment, such that every instance of
pleasure has one or more integral environmental components. The vast
majority of historic and contemporary versions of Prudential Hedonism
consider pleasure to be an internal mental state.
Perhaps
the least known disagreement about what aspects of pleasure make it
valuable is the debate about whether we have to be conscious of
pleasure for it to be valuable. The standard position is that
pleasure is a conscious mental state, or at least that any pleasure a
person is not conscious of does not intrinsically improve their
well-being.
b. Pleasure as Sensation
The
most common definition of pleasure is that it is a sensation,
something that we identify through our senses or that we feel.
Psychologists claim that we have at least ten senses, including the
familiar, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, but also,
movement, balance, and several sub-senses of touch, including heat,
cold, pressure, and pain. New senses get added to the list when it is
understood that some independent physical process underpins their
functioning. The most widely-used examples of pleasurable sensations
are the pleasures of eating, drinking, listening to music, and having
sex. Use of these examples has done little to help Hedonism avoid its
debauched reputation.
It
is also commonly recognised that our senses are physical processes
that usually involve a mental component, such as the tickling feeling
when someone blows gently on the back of your neck. If a sensation is
something we identify through our sense organs, however, it is not
entirely clear how to account for abstract pleasures. This is because
abstract pleasures, such as a feeling of accomplishment for a job
well done, do not seem to be experienced through any of the senses in
the standard lists. Some Hedonists have attempted to resolve this
problem by arguing for the existence of an independent pleasure sense
and by defining sensation as something that we feel (regardless of
whether it has been mediated by sense organs).
Most
Hedonists who describe pleasure as a sensation will be Quantitative
Hedonists and will argue that the pleasure from the different senses
is the same. Qualitative Hedonists, in comparison, can use the
framework of the senses to help differentiate between qualities of
pleasure. For example, a Qualitative Hedonist might argue that
pleasurable sensations from touch and movement are always lower
quality than the others.
c. Pleasure as Intrinsically Valuable Experience
Hedonists
have also defined pleasure as intrinsically valuable experience, that
is to say any experiences that we find intrinsically valuable either
are, or include, instances of pleasure. According to this definition,
the reason that listening to music and eating a fine meal are both
intrinsically pleasurable is because those experiences include an
element of pleasure (along with the other elements specific to each
activity, such as the experience of the texture of the food and the
melody of the music). By itself, this definition enables Hedonists to
make an argument that is close to perfectly circular. Defining
pleasure as intrinsically valuable experience and well-being as all
and only experiences that are intrinsically valuable allows a
Hedonist to all but stipulate that Prudential Hedonism is the correct
theory of well-being. Where defining pleasure as intrinsically
valuable experience is not circular is in its stipulation that only
experiences matter for well-being. Some well-known objections to this
idea are discussed below.
Another
problem with defining pleasure as intrinsically valuable experience
is that the definition does not tell us very much about what pleasure
is or how it can be identified. For example, knowing that pleasure is
intrinsically valuable experience would not help someone to work out
if a particular experience was intrinsically or just instrumentally
valuable. Hedonists have attempted to respond to this problem by
explaining how to find out whether an experience is intrinsically
valuable.
One
method is to ask yourself if you would like the experience to
continue for its own sake (rather than because of what it might lead
to). Wanting an experience to continue for its own sake reveals that
you find it to be intrinsically valuable. While still making a
coherent theory of well-being, defining intrinsically valuable
experiences as those you want to perpetuate makes the theory much
less hedonistic. The fact that what a person wants is the main
criterion for something having intrinsic value, makes this kind of
theory more in line with preference satisfaction theories of
well-being. The central claim of preference satisfaction theories of
well-being is that some variant of getting what one wants, or should
want, under certain conditions is the only thing that intrinsically
improves one’s well-being.
Another
method of fleshing out the definition of pleasure as intrinsically
valuable experience is to describe how intrinsically valuable
experiences feel. This method remains a hedonistic one, but seems to
fall back into defining pleasure as a sensation.
It
has also been argued that what makes an experience intrinsically
valuable is that you like or enjoy it for its own sake. Hedonists
arguing for this definition of pleasure usually take pains to
position their definition in between the realms of sensation and
preference satisfaction. They argue that since we can like or enjoy
some experiences without concurrently wanting them or feeling any
particular sensation, then liking is distinct from both sensation and
preference satisfaction. Liking and enjoyment are also difficult
terms to define in more detail, but they are certainly easier to
recognise than the rather opaque "intrinsically valuable
experience."
Merely
defining pleasure as intrinsically valuable experience and
intrinsically valuable experiences as those that we like or enjoy
still lacks enough detail to be very useful for contemplating
well-being. A potential method for making this theory more useful
would be to draw on the cognitive sciences to investigate if there is
a specific neurological function for liking or enjoying. Cognitive
science has not reached the point where anything definitive can be
said about this, but a few neuroscientists have experimental evidence
that liking and wanting (at least in regards to food) are
neurologically distinct processes in rats and have argued that it
should be the same for humans. The same scientists have wondered if
the same processes govern all of our liking and wanting, but this
question remains unresolved.
Most
Hedonists who describe pleasure as intrinsically valuable experience
believe that pleasure is internal and conscious. Hedonists who define
pleasure in this way may be either Quantitative or Qualitative
Hedonists, depending on whether they think that quality is a relevant
dimension of how intrinsically valuable we find certain experiences.
d. Pleasure as Pro-Attitude
One
of the most recent developments in modern hedonism is the rise of
defining pleasure as a pro-attitude – a positive psychological
stance toward some object. Any account of Prudential Hedonism that
defines pleasure as a pro-attitude is referred to as Attitudinal
Hedonism because it is a person’s attitude that dictates whether
anything has intrinsic value. Positive psychological stances include
approving of something, thinking it is good, and being pleased about
it. The object of the positive psychological stance could be a
physical object, such as a painting one is observing, but it could
also be a thought, such as "my country is not at war," or
even a sensation. An example of a pro-attitude towards a sensation
could be being pleased about the fact that an ice cream tastes so
delicious.
Fred
Feldman, the leading proponent of Attitudinal Hedonism, argues that
the sensation of pleasure only has instrumental value – it only
brings about value if you also have a positive psychological stance
toward that sensation. In addition to his basic Intrinsic Attitudinal
Hedonism, which is a form of Quantitative Hedonism, Feldman has also
developed many variants that are types of Qualitative Hedonism. For
example, Desert-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism, which
reduces the intrinsic value a pro-attitude has for our well-being
based on the quality of deservedness (that is, on the extent to which
the particular object deserves a pro-attitude or not). For example,
Desert-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism might stipulate that
sensations of pleasure arising from adulterous behavior do not
deserve approval, and so assign them no value.
Defining
pleasure as a pro-attitude, while maintaining that all sensations of
pleasure have no intrinsic value, makes Attitudinal Hedonism less
obviously hedonistic as the versions that define pleasure as a
sensation. Indeed, defining pleasure as a pro-attitude runs the risk
of creating a preference satisfaction account of well-being because
being pleased about something without feeling any pleasure seems hard
to distinguish from having a preference for that thing.
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