The concept of history plays a fundamental role in human thought. It
invokes notions of human agency, change, the role of material circumstances in
human affairs, and the supposed meaning of historical events. It raises the
possibility of “learning from history.” And it suggests the possibility of
better understanding ourselves in the present, by understanding the forces,
choices, and circumstances that brought us to our current situation. It is
therefore unsurprising that philosophers have sometimes turned their attention
to efforts to examine history itself and the nature of historical knowledge.
These reflections can be grouped together into a body of work called
“philosophy of history.” This work is heterogeneous, comprising analyses and
arguments of idealists, positivists, logicians, theologians, and others, and
moving back and forth over the divides between European and Anglo-American
philosophy, and between hermeneutics and positivism.
Given the plurality of voices within the “philosophy of history,” it is
impossible to give one definition of the field that suits all these approaches.
In fact, it is misleading to imagine that we refer to a single philosophical
tradition when we invoke the phrase, “philosophy of history,” because the
strands of research characterized here rarely engage in dialogue with each
other. Still, we can usefully think of philosophers' writings about history as
clustering around several large questions, involving metaphysics, hermeneutics,
epistemology, and historicism: What does history consist of—individual actions,
social structures, periods and regions, civilizations, large causal processes,
divine intervention? Does history as a whole have meaning, structure, or
direction, beyond the individual events and actions that make it up? What is
involved in our knowing, representing, and explaining history? To what extent is human history constitutive
of the human present?
History and its
representation
What are the intellectual tasks that define the historian's work? In a
sense, this question is best answered on the basis of a careful reading of some
good historians. But it will be useful to offer several simple answers to this
foundational question as a sort of conceptual map of the nature of historical
knowing.
First, historians are interested in providing conceptualizations and
factual descriptions of events and circumstances in the past. This effort is an
answer to questions like these: “What happened? What was it like? What were
some of the circumstances and happenings that took place during this period in
the past?” Sometimes this means simply reconstructing a complicated story from
scattered historical sources—for example, in constructing a narrative of the
Spanish Civil War or attempting to sort out the series of events that culminated
in May 1968. But sometimes it means engaging in substantial conceptual work in
order to arrive at a vocabulary in terms of which to characterize “what
happened.” Concerning the disorders of May 1968: was this a riot or an
uprising? How did participants and contemporaries think about it?
Second, historians often want to answer “why” questions: “Why did this
event occur? What were the conditions and forces that brought it about?” This
body of questions invites the historian to provide an explanation of the event
or pattern he or she describes: the rise of fascism in Spain, the collapse of
the Ottoman Empire, the great global financial crisis of 2008. And providing an
explanation requires, most basically, an account of the causal mechanisms,
background circumstances, and human choices that brought the outcome about. We
explain an historical outcome when we identify the social causes, forces, and
actions that brought it about, or made it more likely.
Third, and related to the previous point, historians are sometimes
interested in answering a “how” question: “How did this outcome come to pass?
What were the processes through which the outcome occurred?” How did the
Prussian Army succeed in defeating the superior French Army in 1870? How did
Truman manage to defeat Dewey in the 1948 US election? Here the pragmatic
interest of the historian's account derives from the antecedent unlikelihood of
the event in question: how was this outcome possible? This too is an
explanation; but it is an answer to a “how possible” question rather than a
“why necessary” question.
Fourth, often historians are interested in piecing together the human
meanings and intentions that underlie a given complex series of historical
actions. They want to help the reader make sense of the historical events and
actions, in terms of the thoughts, motives, and states of mind of the
participants. For example: Why did Napoleon III carelessly provoke Prussia into
war in 1870? Why has the Burmese junta dictatorship been so intransigent in its
treatment of democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi? Answers to questions like
these require interpretation of actions, meanings, and intentions—of individual
actors and of cultures that characterize whole populations. This aspect of
historical thinking is “hermeneutic,” interpretive, and ethnographic.
And, of course, the historian faces an even more basic intellectual
task: that of discovering and making sense of the archival information that
exists about a given event or time in the past. Historical data do not speak
for themselves; archives are incomplete, ambiguous, contradictory, and
confusing. The historian needs to interpret individual pieces of evidence; and
he or she needs to be able to somehow fit the mass of evidence into a coherent
and truthful story. So complex events like the Spanish Civil War present the
historian with an ocean of historical traces in repositories and archives all
over the world; these collections sometimes reflect specific efforts at
concealment by the powerful (for example, Franco's efforts to conceal all
evidence of mass killings of Republicans after the end of fighting); and the
historian's task is to find ways of using this body of evidence to discern some
of the truth about the past.
In short, historians conceptualize, describe, contextualize, explain,
and interpret events and circumstances of the past. They sketch out ways of
representing the complex activities and events of the past; they explain and
interpret significant outcomes; and they base their findings on evidence in the
present that bears upon facts about the past. Their accounts need to be
grounded on the evidence of the available historical record; and their
explanations and interpretations require that the historian arrive at
hypotheses about social causes and cultural meanings. Historians can turn to
the best available theories in the social and behavioral sciences to arrive at
theories about causal mechanisms and human behavior; so historical statements
depend ultimately upon factual inquiry and theoretical reasoning. Ultimately,
the historian's task is to shed light on the what, why, and how of the past,
based on inferences from the evidence of the present.
Two preliminary issues are relevant to almost all discussions of history
and the philosophy of history. These are issues having to do with the
constitution of history and the levels at which we choose to characterize
historical events and processes. The first issue concerns the relationship
between actors and causes in history: is history a sequence of causal
relations, or is it the outcome of an interlocking series of human actions? The
second issue concerns the question of scale of historical processes in space
and time: how should historians seek to reconcile micro-, meso-, and
macro-perspectives on history? Both issues can be illustrated in the history of
France. Should we imagine that twentieth-century France is the end result of a
number of major causes in its past—the collapse of the Roman order in the
territory, the military successes of Charlemagne, the occurrence of the French
Revolution, and defeat in the Franco-Prussian War? Or should we acknowledge
that France at any point in time was the object of action and contest among
individuals, groups, and organizations, and that the interplay of strategic actors
is a more fertile way of thinking about French history than the idea of a
series of causal events? Scale is equally controversial. Should we think of
France as a single comprehensive region, or as the agglomeration of separate
regions and cultures with their own historical dynamics (Alsace, Brittany,
Burgundy)? Further, is it useful to consider the long expanse of human activity
in the territory of what is now France, or are historians better advised to
focus their attention on shorter periods of time?
Actors and causes in history
An important problem for the philosophy of history is how to
conceptualize “history” itself. Is history largely of interest because of the
objective causal relations that exist among historical events and structures
like the absolutist state or the Roman Empire? Or is history an agglomeration
of the actions and mental frameworks of myriad individuals, high and low?
Historians often pose questions like these: “What were some of the
causes of the fall of Rome?”, “what were the causes of the rise of fascism?”,
or “what were the causes of the Industrial Revolution?”. But what if the
reality of history is significantly different from what is implied by this
approach? What if the causes of some very large and significant historical
events are themselves small, granular, gradual, and cumulative? What if there
is no satisfyingly simple and high-level answer to the question, why did Rome
fall? What if, instead, the best we can do in some of these cases is to
identify a swarm of independent, small-scale processes and contingencies that
eventually produced the large outcome of interest?
More radically, it is worth considering whether this way of thinking
about history as a series of causes and effects is even remotely suited to its
subject matter. What if we think that the language of static causes does not
work particularly well in the context of history? What if we take seriously the
idea that history is the result of the actions and thoughts of vast numbers of
actors, so history is a flow of action and knowledge rather than a sequence of
causes and effects? What if we believe that there is an overwhelming amount of
contingency and path dependency in history? Do these alternative conceptions of
history suggest that we need to ask different questions about large historical
changes?
Here is an alternative way of thinking of history: we might focus on
history as a set of social conditions and processes that constrain and propel
actions, rather than as a discrete set of causes and effects. We might couch
historical explanations in terms of how individual actors (low and high) acted
in the context of these conditions; and we might interpret the large outcomes
as no more than the aggregation of these countless actors and their actions.
Such an approach would help to inoculate us against the error of reification of
historical structures, periods, or forces, in favor of a more disaggregated
conception of multiple actors and shifting conditions of action.
This orientation brings along with it the importance of analyzing
closely the social and natural environment in which actors frame their choices.
Our account of the flow of human action eventuating in historical change
unavoidably needs to take into account the institutional and situational environment
in which these actions take place. Part of the topography of a period of
historical change is the ensemble of institutions that exist more or less
stably in the period: property relations, political institutions, family
structures, educational practices, religious and moral values. So historical
explanations need to be sophisticated in their treatment of institutions and
practices. This approach gives a basis for judging that such-and-so
circumstance “caused” a given historical change; but it also provides an
understanding of the way in which this kind of historical cause is embodied and
conveyed—through the actions and thoughts of individuals in response to given
natural and social circumstances.
Social circumstances can be both inhibiting and enabling; they
constitute the environment within which individuals plan and act. It is an
important circumstance that a given period in time possesses a fund of
scientific and technical knowledge, a set of social relationships of power, and
a level of material productivity. It is also an important circumstance that
knowledge is limited; that coercion exists; and that resources for action are
limited. Within these opportunities and limitations, individuals, from leaders
to ordinary people, make out their lives and ambitions through action.
What all of this suggests is an alternative way of thinking about
history that has a different structure from the idea of history as a stream of
causes and effects, structures and events. This approach might be called
“actor-centered history”: we explain an epoch when we have an account of what
people thought and believed; what they wanted; and what social and
environmental conditions framed their choices. It is a view of history that
gives close attention to states of knowledge, ideology, and agency, as well as
institutions, organizations, and structures, and that gives less priority to
the framework of cause and effect.
Scale in history
Doing history forces us to make choices about the scale of the history
with which we are concerned. Suppose we are interested in Asian history. Are we
concerned with Asia as a continent, or China, or Shandong Province? Or in
historical terms, are we concerned with the whole of the Chinese Revolution,
the base area of Yenan, or the specific experience of a handful of villages in
Shandong during the 1940s? And given the fundamental heterogeneity of social
life, the choice of scale makes a big difference to the findings.
Historians differ fundamentally around the decisions they make about
scale. William Hinton provides what is almost a month-to-month description of
the Chinese Revolution in Fanshen village—a collection of a few hundred
families. The book covers a few years and the events of a few hundred people.
Likewise, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie offers a deep treatment of the villagers of
Montaillou; once again, a single village. These histories are limited in time
and space, and they can appropriately be called “micro-history.”
At the other end of the scale spectrum, William McNeill provides a
history of the world's diseases ;
Massimo Livi-Bacci offers a history of the world's population ; and De Vries
and Goudsblom provide an environmental history of the world. In each of these
cases, the historian has chosen a scale that encompasses virtually the whole of
the globe, over millennia of time. These histories can certainly be called
“macro-history.”
Both micro- and macro-histories have important shortcomings. Micro-history
leaves us with the question, “how does this particular village shed light on
anything larger?”. And macro-history leaves us with the question, “how do these
large assertions about causality really work out in the context of Canada or
Sichuan?”. The first threatens to be so particular as to lose all interest,
whereas the second threatens to be so general as to lose all empirical
relevance to real historical processes.
There is a third choice available to the historian that addresses both
points. This is to choose a scale that encompasses enough time and space to be
genuinely interesting and important, but not so much as to defy valid analysis.
This level of scale might be regional-for example, G. William Skinner's
analysis of the macro-regions of China. It might be national—for example, a
social and political history of Indonesia. And it might be supra-national—for
example, an economic history of Western Europe or comparative treatment of
Eurasian history. The key point is that historians in this middle range are
free to choose the scale of analysis that seems to permit the best level of
conceptualization of history, given the evidence that is available and the
social processes that appear to be at work. And this mid-level scale permits
the historian to make substantive judgments about the “reach” of social
processes that are likely to play a causal role in the story that needs
telling. This level of analysis can be referred to as “meso-history,” and it
appears to offer an ideal mix of specificity and generality.
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