Cornelius Castoriadis was an important intellectual figure in France for
many decades, beginning in the late-1940s. Trained in philosophy, Castoriadis
also worked as a practicing economist and psychologist while authoring over
twenty major works and numerous articles spanning many traditional
philosophical subjects, including politics, economics, psychology,
anthropology, and ontology. His oeuvre can be understood broadly as a
reflection on the concept of creativity and its implications in various fields.
Perhaps most importantly he warned of the dangerous political and ethical
consequences of a contemporary world that has lost sight of autonomy, i.e. of
the need to set limits or laws for oneself.
Influenced by his understanding and criticism of traditional
philosophical figures such as the Ancient Greeks, German Idealists, Marx, and
Heidegger, Castoriadis was also influenced by thinkers as diverse as Sigmund
Freud, Max Weber, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Georg Cantor. He engaged in dynamic
intellectual relationships with his fellow members of Socialisme ou Barbarie
(including Claude Lefort and Jean-François Lyotard, among others) and later in
life with leading figures in mathematics, biology, and other fields. He is
remembered largely for his initial support for and subsequent break from
Marxism, for his call for Western thought to embrace the reality of creativity,
and finally for his defense of an ethics and politics based on “lucid”
deliberation and social and individual autonomy. For Castoriadis the central
question of philosophy and the source of philosophy’s importance is its
capacity to break through society’s closure and ask what the relevant questions
for humans ought to be.
1. Beginnings
a. Youth in Greece and Arrival in
France
Cornelius Castoriadis was born to an ethnically Greek family living in
Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1922. The year was one of the most tumultuous in
modern Greek history. Following the First World War, lands granted to Greece at
the expense of the Ottoman Empire by the victorious Entente powers were being
claimed militarily by Turkish nationalists. As the defeat of the Greek army in
the formerly Ottoman territories seemed imminent, Castoriadis’s father
relocated the family to Athens, the home of Castoriadis’s mother, when
Cornelius was a few months old. As a result, Castoriadis spent his youth in
Athens where he discovered philosophy at the age of twelve or thirteen. He
engaged in communist youth activities while in high school and later studied
economics, political science, and law while resisting the Axis occupation of
Greece during Second World War. His Trotskyist opposition group distanced
itself from the pro-Stalinist opposition. During this time Castoriadis
published his first academic writings on Max Weber’s methodology and led
seminars on philosophers including Kant and Hegel. In 1945 he won and accepted
a scholarship to write a philosophy dissertation at the Sorbonne in Paris, thus
starting a wholly new stage in his life.
In Paris Castoriadis planned to write his dissertation on the
impossibility of a closed, rationalist philosophical system. This plan took
second stage, however, to his critical-political activities. He became active
in the French branch of the Trotskyist party though he quickly criticized the
group’s failure to take a stronger stance against Stalin. By 1947 Castoriadis
developed his own criticism of the Soviets who, he argued, had only created a
new brand of exploitation in Russia, i.e. bureaucratic exploitation
(Castoriadis Reader 3). Discovering he shared similar views with recent
acquaintance Claude Lefort, the two began to distance themselves altogether
from the Trotskyist goal of party rule.
Castoriadis began two major vocations in 1948. First, he and Lefort
co-founded the journal and political group Socialisme ou Barbarie (Socialism or
Barbarism). They focused on criticizing both Soviet bureaucracy and capitalism
and on developing ideas for other possible organizations of society. The
group’s founding statement expressed an interest in a non-dogmatic yet still
Marxist social critique. On the one hand, the traditional questions Marx raised
about workers and social organization would remain important, while on the
other hand any commitment to specific Marxist positions would remain conditional.
Despite internal dissent and membership changes, the group remained partially
intact from 1948 to 1966 with a peak involvement of a few dozen members and
approximately 1,000 copies produced per issue of the group’s journal.
Castoriadis’s leadership and writings helped establish him as an important
figure in the political-intellectual field in Paris.
Second, in 1948 Castoriadis began working as an economist with the
international Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). He would remain
there until 1970, analyzing the short- and medium-term economic status of
developed nations. His work with OEEC not only allowed him an income and the
possibility of remaining in France until his eventual nationalization, but it
also permitted him great insights into the economies of capitalist countries
and into the functioning of a major bureaucratic organization. Following his
employment with OEEC, Castoriadis worked during the 1970s as a psychoanalyst.
He finally received an academic position at the École des Hautes Études en
Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris in 1979. He remained with EHESS until his
death following heart surgery in 1997.
b. The Concept of Self-Management
in the Early Writings
Reflecting on the Socialisme ou Barbarie group, Castoriadis considered
one of his and the journal’s most important contributions to be the concept of
workers’ self-management (Castoriadis Reader 1-17). While in his later writings
the concept would develop into a theory of autonomy standing independently of the
Marxist framework, during the journal years the theory of self-management
served as a modification of or an alternative to Marx’s theory of class
struggle.
In 1955’s “On the Content of Socialism” (Castoriadis Reader 40-105)
Castoriadis, writing under a pseudonym in order to protect himself from
deportation as an alien, defined the central conflict of society not in terms
of the classical dichotomy between owners and workers but in terms of a
conflict between directors and executants. (Notably, this distinction coincides
with Aristotle’s definitions of master and slave in the Politics and with
philosopher Simone Weil’s economic analysis from as early as 1933).
Contemporary society, he argued, is split between a stratum of managers who
direct workers, and a stratum of workers obedient to managers. Workers pass
real-world information up to the managers; but they must then carry out the
often nonsensical orders that are passed back down. For Castoriadis, in both
Western and so-called “communist” countries (i.e. countries Castoriadis would
have said embodied only a semblance of communism) managers are often uninformed
about subordinate tasks, know little about interrelated fields of work, and
nevertheless they still direct the immediate production process. Such a
managerial apparatus, argued Castoriadis, leads to inefficiency, waste, and
unnecessary conflict between aloof managers and servile workers.
The domination of society by the managerial apparatus can only be
surpassed, argued Castoriadis, when workers take responsibility for organizing
themselves. Workers must assume effective management of their own work
situation in “full knowledge of the relevant facts.” This emphasis on the
importance of knowledge implies that individuals should work cooperatively. They
should form workers councils consisting of conditionally elected members. Those
members, in a strict reversal of the bureaucratic managerial model, should
convene frequently not in order to make decisions for workers but in order to
express the decisions of the workers. They should then convey important
information back to the workers for the purpose of helping workers make their
own decisions. In this way, the workers’ council is not a managerial stratum.
Rather, it helps convey information to workers for their purposes. While
Castoriadis did support a centralized institution, or assembly of councils,
capable of making rapid decisions when needed, such decisions, he argued, would
be at all times reversible by the workers and their councils.
In the end, Castoriadis contrasted self-management with individualistic,
negative libertarian, or anarchic ideals, i.e. the ideals idolized in
capitalist countries. Such countries reject the role of workers councils but
they then become heavily bureaucratized anyway. Castoriadis also contrasted
self-management with the explicitly centralized, exploitative bureaucracies of
the so-called communist countries. In both cases what currently blocks the
emergence of self-management is the division between directors and executants.
While some specialization of labor will always be necessary, what is damaging
today is specifically the dominance of a class that is devoted only to the
management of other people’s work.
2. The Break From Marxism
Like many anti-totalitarian leftists, Castoriadis initially tried to
divorce the bad features of twentieth-century communism from the “true meaning”
of Marxism. However, by the mid- to late-1950s he came to argue that a profound
critique of existing communist countries also requires a critique of Marx’s
philosophy. Capitalism, Marxism, and the Soviet experiment were all based in a
common set of presuppositions.
Castoriadis’s analysis of the institutional structure of the Soviet
Union, collected later in La Société Bureaucratique (Bureaucratic Society),
suggested that the Soviet Union is dominated by a militaristic, bureaucratic
institution that Castoriadis called total bureaucratic capitalism (TBC). This
name implies that the principle of the social order in the USSR is truly an
analogue—albeit a more centralized analogue—of the Western capitalist order,
which Castoriadis called fragmented bureaucratic capitalism (FBC) (Castoriadis
Reader 218-238). Castoriadis then argued that both TBC and FBC were rooted in a
common “social imaginary.”
This social imaginary, common to TBC and FBC, was expressed as a desire
for rational mastery over self and nature. Both capitalist thought and Marx
assumed that capital has enormous, even total power over humanity. This
assumption led to an excessive desire on both sides to control its supposed
force. For this reason Marx’s followers aimed to create a totalitarian
bureaucratic system that could theoretically gain “mastery over the master”
(World in Fragments 32-43). Yet, according to Castoriadis’s analysis, the
exploitation found in Western society was not solved by this system of control;
it was instead rendered more total and crushing. The managerial, bureaucratic
class became a unified, oppressive force in itself, pursuing its own interests
against the people. Hence, Castoriadis concluded that the eventual efforts of
the communist countries to gain rational mastery were not truly separable from
Marx’s own, earlier philosophy. That philosophy itself had emerged from the
common social imaginary that FBC and TBC share, namely the desire to gain total
control of nature and history through controlling capital.
Castoriadis also developed more specific criticisms of Marx’s economic
assumptions. Indeed, as early as 1959’s “Modern Capitalism and Revolution”
(Political and Social Writings II 226-315) he attacked Marx’s method of
treating workers as though they were cogs in the machine of capitalism. Marx,
he argued, failed to consider the importance of the unplanned, contingent
actions of the proletariat, actions powerful enough to save a company from
mismanagement or to lead it into disaster. In other words, Marx’s analysis of
capitalism was too deterministic. The creative decisions of workers are not
strictly subject to capital’s laws. Rather, workers sustain or destroy
capitalism itself through their own actions. As such, workers’
actions—singularly and collectively—can lead to changes in the very laws of the
system.
As a result, Castoriadis found that Marx’s view of history was based in
flawed assumptions. The actions of workers cannot be sufficiently explained by
supposed laws of historical dialectic. Workers themselves could determine the
law of history rather than being merely determined by history’s law. As such,
the classical theory of capitalism’s inevitable collapse into socialism and
then communism could not be sustained. While Castoriadis agreed with Marx (and
praised Marx’s far-reaching analysis) that the history of capitalism is ridden
with crises and so-called contradictions, he disagreed with Marx’s deduction of
future historical developments from out of those events. The outcome of a
capitalist crisis is in truth determined by how individuals and society take up
those crises, not by any necessary, internal self-development of capitalism
“itself.”
From out of this engagement with Marx, Castoriadis began to develop his
own view of how autonomous society could arise. Autonomous society, he argued,
is a creation of the singular individual and the collectivity. It cannot be
sufficiently deduced or developed from tendencies, potentialities,
impossibilities, or necessities contained within the current system. Whereas
Marx interpreted the workers’ struggles for autonomy as part of the rational
self-development of capitalism itself, Castoriadis, by contrast, emphasized the
real contingency of the historical successes of democratic-emancipatory
struggles. These struggles had preceded capitalism, were subdued within
capitalism and the modern era of rational mastery, and are still present but
also largely subdued in the contemporary age of FBC and TBC (World in Fragments
32-43). Castoriadis’s break with Marx is therefore his break with the desire to
gain mastery over the supposedly all-powerful forces controlling humanity and
history.
3. Theoretical Developments
Between the end of Socialisme ou Barbarie in 1966 and the publication of
L’institution imaginaire de la société (The Imaginary Institution of Society)
in 1975 the tenor and explicit subject matter of Castoriadis’s work changed
noticeably. For the remainder of his life he engaged with a broader variety of
disciplines, including psychoanalysis, biology, sociology, ecology, and
mathematics. His specific views in each field were almost always linked to his
general theory of the creative imagination—operating at both singular and
collective levels—and to its implications for each discipline. Philosophy’s
role, he argued, is to break through the closure of any instituted social
imaginary in order to make possible a deliberative attitude about what humans
ought actively to institute, i.e. about the very goals, ends, and capacities of
society and individuals themselves. In this sense, Castoriadis’ ontology of
creation makes possible his ethics and politics of autonomy (Section 4). In
developing his theoretical concepts, Castoriadis never worked in a vacuum, as
he contributed to several intellectual groups during this time, including the
École Freudienne de Paris led by Jacques Lacan, the journal Textures (primarily
philosophical), and the journal Libre (primarily political) with Claude Lefort.
a. The Creative Imagination
While the first division of L’institution imaginaire de la société
offered a modified version of Castoriadis’ critique of Marx, the second
division contained his full-scale theory of the creative imagination. He argued
there that the imagination is not primarily a capacity to create visual images.
Rather, it is the singular or collective capacity to create forms, i.e. the
capacity to create the presentation or self-presentation of being itself. The
theory of the creative imagination developed over many years through essays
conversant with the Western intellectual tradition. In this section I will
present his views as a dialogue with the figures to whom Castoriadis
acknowledged a debt.
i. Philosophical Background:
Aristotle
In 1978’s “The Discovery of the Imagination” (World in Fragments
213-245) Castoriadis distinguished what he called the radical imagination from
the “traditional” view of the imagination. Aristotle’s traditional view, depicted
in De Anima, treated the imagination as a faculty generating an image that
accompanies sensations but typically distorts them. Since sensations themselves
are always true according to Aristotle, the extra imaginary capacity (primarily
serving to reproduce what the senses provided, to recombine past sensations
into new images, or to supplement sensation confusingly) was treated mainly as
an obfuscator of truth. Castoriadis argued that philosophy usually considered
this account of imagination to reveal its basic power. Regardless of whether
they attacked or praised it, philosophers tended to treat the imagination in
this way as something that creates a kind of fantastical non-reality.
Despite this picture of the imagination as “negative,” Castoriadis argued
that hidden deeper within the philosophical tradition was a discovery of a
primary imagination that is not simply negative. Indeed, in De Anima 3.7-3.9
Aristotle argued that the primary imagination is a “condition for all thought.”
For Castoriadis, this claim implies that there can be no grasp of reality
without the primary imagination. It should be interpreted, Castoriadis argued,
as a capacity for the very presentation of reality as such, a presentation
required for any further understanding. In this way, the primary imagination
precedes any re-presentation of reality.
Even so, Aristotle remained an ambiguous figure for Castoriadis. He had
raised difficult problems for any account of imagination as strictly negative
or re-presentational; but he also failed to draw out the full consequences of
his discovery of the primary imagination. Most of his writings and most of
traditional philosophy portray the imagination as mainly reproductive,
negative, or obfuscatory.
ii. Philosophical Background:
Kant
According to Castoriadis, Immanuel Kant rediscovered the importance of
the imagination and gave philosophy a new awareness of its role (World in
Fragments 246-272). In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had allowed that the
imagination is the capacity to present an object even without the presence of
that object in sensible intuition. As such, he freed the imagination from the
traditional role of merely following or accompanying the senses in an a
posteriori function. For Kant, the imagination was already involved in the
initial presentation of whatever may appear to the senses.
Like Aristotle, however, Kant was an ambiguous figure for Castoriadis.
While Kant was aware of the imagination’s creativity and its vital role in
presenting whatever can appear, he was also too quick to re-subordinate the
imagination to the task of offering presentations that remain within the a
priori, necessary, and stable structures (i.e. the categories and pure forms of
intuition) inherent in the knowing mind. For example, while Kant allowed the
imagination a role in a priori mathematical construction in intuition, he
allowed that it works in this way only within the framework of the
pre-established forms of intuitions themselves (that is, within the pre-set
structures of space and of time). In short, the imagination remained bound to
functioning in a pre-established field in Kant’s theoretical work (Castoriadis
Reader 319-337). The same tendency, argued Castoriadis, found expression in
Kant’s later work on the imagination in the Critique of Judgment (Philosophy,
Politics, Autonomy 81-123).
Nevertheless, Castoriadis in some sense followed the Kantian view that
an unknown X, other than the knowing subject, can “occasion” imaginary
presentations. Castoriadis preferred, however, to invoke Fichte’s term Anstoß
(shock) for the “encounter” with whatever occasions imaginary activity. With
this shock, the imagination goes into operation generates a presentation for
itself. It thereby brings something “other” into a relation with itself,
forming the presentation of the other as what it is. While Fichte had suggested
that the imagination in some sense gives itself this shock, Castoriadis denied
that the question of the internality or externality of the shock was decidable.
Thus he maintained that the imagination forms either itself or another
something into a presentation by “leaning on” (Freud’s term is anaclasis) what
is formable in whatever it forms. Something in what the imagination forms thus
lends itself to formation by the imagination. While there can be no account of
the nature of this formability without the imagination’s actual formation of
the formable X, Castoriadis argued that his fact does not prove that there is
nothing formable in itself, i.e. that there is nothing at all apart from the imagination’s
activity.
Finally, Castoriadis took his Kant-inspired account even further. He
argued that the imagination can in some cases create a presentation of reality
by starting without any shock whatsoever. The imagination can create a
presentation or form of reality without any conditioning shock (Castoriadis
Reader 323-6). Thus, while there are inevitably some shocks for any psyche, the
shock is not a necessary condition for the operation of the imagination.
Castoriadis argued that Kant had implicitly recognized the creativity of
the imagination. Kant, however, tried hard to chain down the imagination to
stable structures of thought and intuition. But Kant’s efforts in this
direction merely indicated that he was deeply aware of a creativity that is not
necessarily stable or bound to an a priori rule of operation. He recognized the
primary imagination. Hence Kant, like Aristotle, is an ambiguous friend for
Castoriadis.
iii. Philosophical Background:
Post-Kantian Philosophy
Castoriadis’s response to Kant’s philosophy, at least in its negative
aspects, is not entirely dissimilar to the responses given by post-Kantians
such as the German Idealists, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. However, it differs in
that it does not involve the monism implicit or explicit in modern idealism
(Hegel) and materialism (Nietzsche, Marx). Indeed, perhaps more than any other
thinker since Kant, and in opposition to the monistic tendencies of most of the
post-Kantians, Castoriadis embraced the inevitability of the encounter with an
“other.” There is no such thing as a singular substance existing radically
alone; for each substance interacts with others. While Castoriadis’s views do
at times overlap with the phenomenological tradition, his theory of radical
creativity puts him at odds with the Heideggerian tradition. Castoriadis also
diverged from the twentieth century “turn to language” in analytic philosophy
(though he did develop a theory of signification in The Imaginary Institution
of Society). More broadly, in contrast to prevalent cultural relativism of the
twentieth century West, he instead expressed an absolute support for the
project of moral and political autonomy (Section 4).
What is perhaps most vital for understanding Castoriadis’s creative
imagination—what makes his project unique in contemporary philosophy—is that
his analysis of creativity is not supposed to entail, by itself, a normative
claim. Castoriadis does not assign a positive value to creativity as such. In
fact, Castoriadis explicitly rejected the positive valuation of “the new for
the sake of the new” (Post-Script on Insignificance 93-107). The endless search
for the next thing or the newest idea in contemporary thought leads to a lack
of understanding of the already established norms, and therefore to an
unconscious redeployment of those norms. Even so, the radical creativity of the
imagination does, in a different way, lead to value-theoretic considerations
and, in particular, to a kind of politics. While value cannot be derived from
being or creation, the very fact that being is creation leads to another
question: What ought we create (or re-create), institute (or perpetuate), or
set for ourselves as a project? How can we provide limits and institutions for
ourselves so that we may effectively achieve and call into question what we
understand to be good? As such, Castoriadis’s radical imagination might be said
to “clear the way” for his politics and ethics (Section 4).
iv. Creation ex Nihilo
As the above dialogue with the philosophical tradition has already
suggested, Castoriadis argued that being is creation. He described creation as
an emergence of newness that, whether deliberate or unconscious, is itself not
sufficiently determined by preceding historical conditions. He thus described
creation as ex nihilo, or as stemming from nothing. Even so, he also insisted
that creation is neither in nihilo nor cum nihilo (Castoriadis Reader 321,
404). In other words, while creation must be understood to emerge out of
nothing, this creation always emerges within a set of historical or natural
conditions. However, these conditions are not sufficient to account for the
being of the new creation. Thus, even if there were (per impossible) a complete
and exhaustive account of the conditions contextualizing any occasion of
creation, neither the existence nor the specificity of the new creation could
be fully understood as derived from those conditions. For example, we miss the
radical, historical newness of the Greek social creation of “democracy” if we
attempt to explain it simply in terms of what already existed in Athens at the
time. The creation of democracy broke through the conditioning constraints of
the existing social state of affairs. In this sense, Greek democracy was
radically new.
Castoriadis repeatedly contrasted ex nihilo creation with production or
deduction of consequences. First, production entails that a set of elements or
materials is given, which givens are then molded or modified into a new
product. Even notions of self-differentiation are really just notions of
productivity in this sense, for they envision the new creation (call it
X-prime) as emerging from the original X merely as a self-modification of that
original X. Thus, the new “product” is treated not as an original itself but
rather as a modified “version” of an original. This is not what Castoriadis
means by a new creation. Second, in the case of deduction, he argued that a
deductive theory of newness would mean only that there is some new conclusion
that follows sufficiently from a set of factors as a result of there being a
determinate rule or law of the deduction process itself (laws of inference, and
so forth). Yet such deduction does not create or reveal something new qua new;
rather, it involves an inference from premises to something different that is
supposed to already exist because its existence follows from the premises.
Thus, he argued, both production and deduction are beholden to theories of
“difference” that really only explain the new as a derivative, a modified
sameness, or an already-existing thing. Castoriadis contrasted these concepts
sharply with creation ex nihilo.
Importantly, Castoriadis’s notion of creation is not equivalent to the
epistemic notion of unpredictability, as he clarified in 1983’s “Time and
Creation” (World in Fragments 374-401). A continuous emergence of something out
of something else can still be fully unpredictable. Unpredictability might, for
example, mean simply that not all of the relevant producers, factors, or laws
of inference are known or knowable: An unpredictable event or phenomenon could
still be determined by unknown factors. Unpredictability could be a function of
the limitations of knowledge. Thus unpredictability is not equivalent to
creation. While Castoriadis agreed that knowers are not, as far as we know,
omniscient, he argued that with each creation there emerges something
ontologically new, something that is not merely seemingly new “for us” due to
some subjective lack of knowledge. Separating radical creation from the merely
epistemic notion of unpredictability, Castoriadis defends the notion that
creation brings about something genuinely new.
Further, Castoriadis argued that creation does not prevent deterministic
accounts from, so to speak, sticking. Creation cannot be simply opposed to
determinism; rather creation only excludes the idea that there could be a total
inclusion of the various strata of beings (and creations) within “a single
ultimate and elementary level” of determination (World in Fragments 393). Thus,
Castoriadis did not deny that creations lend themselves to being understood in
terms of continuous difference (production, deduction) or determination.
Rather, a stratum of explicable difference always emerges as a result of the
relationship of a creation to those conditions in and with (but not from) which
it occurs. For example, while Greek democracy was a radically new social
creation in history, this creation also at once re-instituted many of the
conditions with and in which it emerged. Thus, resultant continuities and
(mere) differences are evident between Greek democracy and the world existing
prior to its emergence. This stratum of continuity and (mere) difference is
somewhat explicable in terms of what is producible or deducible from already
existing conditions or elements; but democracy is also something wholly
original, something lacking complete continuity with what precedes.
Finally, Castoriadis’s terminology of the ex nihilo should not be
confused with the theological sense of creation ex nihilo. Theological
creation, he argued, is usually treated as “production” by God according to
ideas or pre-existing potentialities, such as the nature or mind of God
(Fenêtre sur le Chaos 160-164). A God who looks to ideas that always exist, whether
those ideas are God’s own (Augustine) or eternal models not identical to god
(Plato), is not thought of as genuinely creative in Castoriadis’s sense.
Further, theology usually says the world’s creation is a completed affair. It
might play itself out in interesting ways; but this “playing out” does not
include the possibility of any radical newness. Thus, traditional solutions to
the theodicy problem—whether they involve a God who continually creates the
world according to general laws (Malebranche) or a God who creates pre-packaged
monads (Leibniz)—always posit that God has a plan established in advance when
he creates the world “once and for all.” At its most extreme point, therefore,
theological creation is in fact coincident with the most radical necessitarianism
(Spinoza). They both deny the radically new. Thus, Castoriadis joked that
“spiritualists are the worst materialists” (Fenêtre sur le Chaos 161).
b. Related Theoretical Concepts
i. The Monad and the
Social-Historical
In addition to the influence of philosophers, Castoriadis’s account of
the imagination was most deeply influenced by his reading of Freud and his
engagement with psychoanalysis. This interest became more marked during the
years following the end of Socialisme ou Barbarie. At that time he became
involved with the L’Ecole Freudienne de Paris (EFP) of Jacques Lacan and was
also married for a time to psychoanalyst Piera Aulagnier.
In his interpretation of Freud, Castoriadis focused on the concept of
Vorstellungen (representations), especially in the writings from 1915 (World in
Fragments 253). He believed Freud’s search for the origins of representations
led him closer to the idea of the primary imagination (Section 3.a.1) than did
his explorations of the more famous concept of Phantasie (imagination).
Castoriadis argued that Freud’s investigations led (implicitly but not
explicitly) to the conclusion that for the human psyche there is no strictly
mechanical apparatus converting bodily drives into psychical representations.
In Castoriadis’s view Vorstellungen are created originally and cannot be
accounted for strictly in terms of physical drives or states. Rather, there is
an irreducible source of representations, which Castoriadis came to call the
monad or the “monadic pole of the psyche.”
Castoriadis’s invocation of the term monad stems, first of all, from the
Greek term for unity or aloneness. The term was most famously re-employed by
Leibniz to describe the simple, invisible, and sole kind of metaphysical
constituent of reality. Leibniz argued that nothing enters or leaves a monad,
and yet monads have seemingly interactive experiences due to their
pre-established coordination, created by God (i.e. the best possible world).
For Leibniz, each monad reflects the state of the other monads and harmonizes
with them while remaining independent. Invoking Leibniz’s metaphysics,
Castoriadis retained the term but gave it a different sense and value. The
monad, for Castoriadis, is not the sole kind of metaphysical constituent but
neither is it unreal; rather, the monad is that aspect of the psyche that is
incapable of accepting that it itself is not the sole kind of metaphysical
constituent. As such, no monad actually remains entirely immanent to itself.
All monads are inevitably fractured when the psyche encounters a radical
otherness. Following the fragmentation the remnants of the monad desire to
recover themselves into a now-impossible state of total aloneness. This
“monadical” desire for aloneness has two effects. On the one hand, the monad’s
desire for total self-enclosure leads the psyche to disregard the non-psychical
sources of human function. The psyche begins to hate and despise the body,
sometimes detrimentally. On the other hand, the monad’s desire for unity is not
simply a negative thing since it leads the psyche to find unique ways to
individuate itself. This individuation often occurs through the psyche’s
adoption of social norms and identities. Adoption of norms or identities is not
necessarily a bad thing, especially insofar as it can bring a certain measure
of stability to the psyche. Castoriadis’s main point was rather that while the
monadic pole of the psyche always tends toward radical aloneness, the broader
psyche—of which the monad is only an aspect—is in fact capable of socialization,
of adopting shared identities, and of having productive relations to others.
The monadic pole, however, always fights against subsumption into social or
physical norms or identities.
Ultimately Castoriadis felt a need to account for the monadic aspect of
the psyche due to his experiences as an analyst interacting with patients. The
monad, he suggests, is a necessary hypothesis we must posit if we are to
describe the observable history of the patient subsequent to his or her
fragmentation (Figures of the Thinkable 168). What follows fragmentation is a
phase of life in which the psyche creates itself in relation to a specific
social-historical situation and the collective conditions it faces. These
collective conditions, or institutions, essentially “fabricate” the individual
from out of the psyche as the psyche adopts them into its own identity.
For this reason Castoriadis’s psychoanalytic work leads directly into
his political philosophy. For in the same way that psychical creativity as such
is broader than, and precedes, the social-historical individuation of the
psyche, so too is there a ground of any social formation. This ground,
irreducible to individual psychic creativity, Castoriadis calls the anonymous
collective. This trans-individual creativity yields as its effects the
imaginary formations falling into our typical, narrower categories of “culture”
or “society.” A psyche always forms itself through these instituted social
offerings; but the social instituting power itself is what accounts in the
first place for this instituted state of affairs. The instituted can always be
rewritten by the instituting power, and thus a truly autonomous society
explicitly acknowledges this instituting power and seeks lucidly to share in it
(Section 4).
In this sense, Castoriadis insisted that various strata of
creativity—for example, the psyche and the anonymous collective—are irreducible
to each other and yet they are importantly interactive. He thus understood that
psychoanalysis has a broader social role than is typically believed. In
particular it can help the psyche break consciously and lucidly with the
monadical desire for total self-enclosure. Castoriadis felt this task could
help bring about a world where the singular psyche and the collectivity begin
to acknowledge the duty to share in the deliberative activities of
distinctively autonomous self-creation (Section 4).
ii. The Living Being and Its
Proper World
In addition to his reflection on social and individual human creativity,
Castoriadis’s view of “being as creation” led him to develop theories about
non-human living beings. In “The State of the Subject Today” (World in
Fragments 137-171) he considered in turn the living being, the psyche, the
social individual, and finally human society, arguing that each is a distinct
but interactive “stratum” of being. While a living being (for example, a human)
is conditioned by its interaction with and dependency on other living beings
such as cells, nevertheless no stratum of living beings (such as humanity) is
reducible to any other stratum. Human life cannot be conceived accurately as
merely an “expression” of cell life, for example. Each stratum involves a
unique, original kind of living being, or “being for itself,” which leans on
but is by no means determined by the other strata with which it interacts.
Beginning at the cellular level then, Castoriadis described the living
being as creative of its own proper world as it leans on other beings and
worlds which lend themselves. Castoriadis suggested, for example, that an
individual dog is a participant in the species dog, in the sense that this dog
creates for itself a world in common with other dogs. Nevertheless, while the
“proper worlds” of the cells of this dog (or of other beings in its environment)
are a condition of this dog and of this dog’s creation of a proper world shared
with other dogs, these cells are not something out of which this dog
sufficiently emerges or with which this dog’s life is always entirely
consistent. Dog cells do not determine the proper world of a dog although they
are conditions leaned upon by this dog as it creates its own proper world.
While dog-life thus depends on cell-life, the stratum of life proper to dogs is
a creation of dogs as they live with their conditioning cells. And, of course,
cell life is also creative of a proper world for itself, i.e. a world only
partially analogical with the life of the dog. As a result, each stratum of
life is unique yet interactive.
On this level, Castoriadis conversed with Chilean biologist and
proponent of the theory of autopoiesis Francisco Varela (for example, see “Life
and Creation” in Post-Script on Insignificance). For Varela, and also for
Humberto Maturana, auto-creation means that each living being creates for
itself a world of closure. The living being is essentially dependent upon the
living beings which condition it. Higher beings are expressions of the
potentialities inherent in the lower constituents. Castoriadis followed Varela
with respect to the self-creation of the living being and its proper world,
arguing that nothing enters into the proper world of a living being without
being transformed by it. However, for Castoriadis, auto-creation did not have
to entail a kind of organizational closure. Some living beings are both
radically creative of new, irreducible strata of life and merely lean on others
for their creations; they are not simply expressions of those other strata. The
creativity of a dog, for example, is thus irreducible to being the expression
of the constituents of itself (e.g. cells) or the expression of its
environment. Even the most basic stratum of natural life (which Castoriadis
called the “first natural stratum”) is merely a condition for the emergence of
other living beings; it is not something that decides, determines, or produces
what those other strata are.
Thus, Castoriadis did not treat the creativity of the living being as
simply a larger or smaller scale version of other living beings. The human
creation of a proper world, for example, creatively breaks out of a closure
relative to its supporting conditions (internal or environmental) and breaks
continuity even with itself at times. Humans create a new stratum of being
irreducible to the others. We are always intra- and inter-active with other strata;
but the human psyche creates in ways that are not contained potentially in
anterior states of other living beings or in its inherited conditions. Humans
create a new, common, distinct stratum of life. Thus, Castoriadis argued from a
biological standpoint that it is quite possible to affirm truly that
“everything is interactive.” Yet he insisted that we cannot for that reason
“simply say that everything interacts with everything […]” (Post-Script on
Insignificance 67). All of what is proper to the human world interacts with
some other strata, but only some of what is proper to the human world shares
something in common with all other strata.
iii. Magmas and Ensembles
Castoriadis’s project has many aspects that allow it to be interpreted
as a “theory of being” in the traditional sense. He developed two important
theoretical concepts that underpin much of his ontological work beginning in
the 1970s: magmas and ensembles. The former term was Castoriadis’s preferred
name for indeterminate, or mixed, being. The latter, the French term for
“sets,” is his term for determinate being (where being refers to either the
singular or plural).
Castoriadis faced his greatest difficulties in describing magmas since
he argued magmas exist and yet they are not comprehensible by traditional
ontology because traditional ontology thinks that true being is strictly
determinate. Traditional ontology says that what is indeterminate (Greek
apeiron) is a more or less deficient being or a kind of non-being. That is,
indeterminate being is at best conceived as existing only insofar as it is
related to determinate being (Greek peras). Castoriadis’s task was to envision
indeterminate being without thinking of it as merely existing relative to, or
as a negation of, determinate being. As such, Castoriadis made a very cautious
effort to “define” magmas (although he did not consider his task to be possible
in this definitional form) in a way that did not define them as deficient modes
of determinate being. In the 1983 text, “The Logic of Magmas and the Question
of Autonomy” (Castoriadis Reader 290-318), he suggested several propositions:
M1: If M is a magma, one can mark, in M, an indefinite number of
ensembles.
M2: If M is a magma, one can mark, in M, magmas other than M.
M3: If M is a magma, M cannot be partitioned into magmas.
M4: If M is a magma, every decomposition of M into ensembles leaves a
magma as residue.
M5: What is not a magma is an ensemble or is nothing.
Here the central problem in thinking about magmas is the way that they
appear as a great nexus wherein any magma is inseparable from any other magma.
Magmas are thus something like mixtures of beings that involve no totally
separate or discrete elements. Even so, other magmas, different from any
particular magma that is being researched, can be “indicated” as existing
within the magma being researched. For this reason, magmas are also not simply
one sole entity. Yet they have no parts and always resist being confined to
sets. In short, magmas are inherently indeterminate; while they are
determinable in some ways, they are never wholly determinate.
As for his account of ensembles, or determinate being, Castoriadis
argued that all traditional ontology—including Platonic forms, Aristotelian
substance, Kantian categories, the Hegelian absolute, for example—assumes that
being is essentially determinate. Such an ontology is, in Castoriadis’s terms,
an ensemblist-identitarian, or ensidic, ontology. These ontologies always rely
on certain operators of thinking, including traditional logical and
mathematical principles such as the principle of identity, non-contradiction,
the excluded third, and so forth. They assume that being consists of entirely
discrete or separate elements neatly conforming to these principles. Ensidic
thought therefore cannot grasp the notion that there would be anything
genuinely other than determinate being.
As an example of ensidic thought, Castoriadis referred to set theory and
its development. Cantor’s naïve set theory described a set as “any collection
into a whole M of definite and separate objects m of our intuition or our
thought.” He thus expressed explicitly what all later (non-naive or axiomatic)
versions of set theory would maintain implicitly: the assumption that being is
wholly determinate or consists of wholly determinate elements. When Cantor’s
original set theory was shown to lead to paradoxes (such as Russell’s paradox),
later axiomatic set theory did not call into question Cantor’s core
pre-assumption that all being is determinate. Instead, it attempted to salvage
Cantor’s determinacy assumption by wagering on being’s “conformability” to the
determinacy assumption, all while searching for better ways to make that
assumption consistent. Axiomatic set theory thus unquestioningly accepted
Cantor’s original presupposition, even as it attempted to salvage set theory
through axiomatics. Thus, set theory is a paradigmatic case of ensidic thought.
Yet it is not unique in its assumption that being must be determinate. Everyday
language, for example, already implicitly posits the separation and
distinctness of beings. Set-theoretical ontology just re-confirms this bias of
everyday language when it presumes that all being is determinate.
The problem with the assumption that all being must be determinate, or
ensidic, Castoriadis argued, is not that there is in truth no stratum of determinate
being whatsoever. Rather, there is such a stratum of wholly determinate being.
The problem is that while this stratum is a condition for the emergence of
other beings, it is merely a condition and not the sole constitutive principle
of the other strata of being. The assumption that all being must be determinate
leads ensidic logic to present some stratum of being (the first natural stratum
of sheer determinacy) as if it were solely constitutive of each and every
stratum of being (or each and every being). As such, a wholly ensidic ontology
wrongly assumes that this de facto condition of determinacy is itself
universally constitutive in principle of all possible beings. It falsely
assumes that other strata simply conform to the ensidic strata (or stratum) of
being. In reality, ensidic thought itself posits this stratum of being as
primary, without the attendant awareness that this hypothesis is a hypothesis.
Thus, traditional ontology, like everyday language, gravely mistakes the
ensidic stratum itself for what being must be.
4. The Project of Autonomy
For Castoriadis, the psyche of each human is inevitably fragmented and
cannot remain in a strictly monadic state. Further, as the ground of
social-historical constellations of meaning, the creativity of the anonymous
collective—i.e. the social instituting power—is irreducible to individual
psychic creativity (Section 3.b.i). Thus, the question of genuine politics
arises necessarily for humans because humans must create themselves as they
exist in relation to others and in relation to society’s institutions (which
often mediate relations with others). Therefore, the question of true political
action is intimately linked to the question of which institutions we shall
institute, internalize, and lean on in our creations. Hence, we must engage in
lucid deliberation about what is good for humans and about which institutions
help us achieve the good. This lucid deliberation separates genuine politics
from demagoguery or cynical politics.
Importantly, genuine deliberation does not merely concern the means to
achieving a goal we assume we already know (as Aristotle had supposed in Ethics
that our goal of “happiness” is a given and we only need to deliberate about
the means to happiness). Rather, we must deliberate about the ends themselves
as well as the means. As such, political existence can never arrive at a total,
final conclusion. Since no set model of action is given to us (for example,
politics cannot be modeled on what is natural or ecological, in accordance with
evolution, and so forth), genuine politics cannot assume that any given
condition or state of life determines which laws it should lay down for itself
and which practices it should support or sanction. Rather, for Castoriadis,
genuine politics is a way of life in which humans give the laws to themselves
as they constantly re-engage in deliberation about what is good. In short,
genuine politics coincides with the question, and the ability of individuals
and society to pose the question, What is a good society? Societies and
individuals who can genuinely pose this question are capable of autonomy,
transcending the closure of the traditions and social conditioning in which
they emerge. This capacity for autonomy depends not only on the individuals and
society who actually give limits and laws to themselves, but also on those
institutions on which individuals and society lean when creating those laws.
a. Heteronomy and Autonomy
In 1989’s “Done and To Be Done,” (Castoriadis Reader 361-417)
Castoriadis restated some of the political arguments he had developed since his
tenure with Socialisme ou Barbarie. He argued that the problem of traditions
covering over the reality of creation (Section 3) is not merely a theoretical
error; it also immediately coincides with closure in political and moral
reality. All societies are self-creative and yet most, he argued, are utterly
incapable of calling into question their own established norms. In such
societies, the instituted situation immediately coincides without remainder
with what is good and valid in the minds of the people. Such a society, which
does not or cannot question its own norms or considers its norms to be given by
God, gods, nature, history, ancestors, and so forth, is heteronomous in
opposition to autonomous societies.
Castoriadis argued that heteronomy results when nature, essence, or
existence are understood to produce the law for the creative living being, for
individuals, or for society. On the one hand, Castoriadis’s definition of
heteronomy was not limited to, nor did it target, religious beliefs in any
special sense. Castoriadis’s examples were at times examples of religious
beliefs and at other times examples of closed, but not necessarily religious,
societies. In this way, the distinction cuts across any supposed divide between
sacred and secular, such that even the most seemingly enlightened and
anti-religious materialism could be a dominant instituted imaginary in a
largely heteronomous society. In such a society, humans are continuously regenerated
in a systematic state of closure. The necessary condition for the project of
autonomy is, thus, the breaking of such instituted radical closure, i.e. the
rupture of heteronomy.
On the other hand, what is essential for Castoriadis’s positive account
of autonomy is that there is no law of nature that is pre-set for the human.
That is, there is no substance or rule determining what a human qua human must
be or can be. However, this is not to say that the human is nothing at all: The
creativity of the human means that humans “cannot not posit norms” (Castoriadis
Reader 375). As such, humans can always pose and repose the question of norms
and of what they are to be; we can always in principle break away from a
heteronomous condition. The radical creativity of the psyche and collectivity
is never obliterated by a society or a set of social institutions, even if
autonomy is de facto absent. Nevertheless, it is possible for heteronomous
societies and individuals to largely cover over this creativity of the human,
to institute norms that cannot, in a de facto sense, be called into question.
As a result, Castoriadis did not identify creation (or self-creation)
with the moral and political project of autonomy. Rather, even heteronomous
societies create themselves and are self-constituting. Autonomy exists only
when we create “the institutions which, by being internalized by individuals,
must facilitate their accession to their individual autonomy and their
effective participation in all forms of explicit power existing in society”
(Castoriadis Reader 405). Autonomy thus means not only that tradition can be
questioned—i.e. that the question of the good can be posed—but also that we
continue to make it de facto possible for ourselves to continue to ask, What is
good? The latter requires that we establish institutional supports for
autonomy.
For Castoriadis there is therefore an exigency to embrace autonomy in a
sense not limited to the liberal ideal of non-coercive, negative freedom
wherein coercion as such is depicted as evil (albeit, a necessary evil).
Castoriadis argued that the object of genuine politics is to build a people who
are capable of positive self-limitation. This self-limitation is not limited to
weak suggestiveness; rather, autonomy “can be more than and different from mere
exhortation if it is embodied in the creation of free and responsible
individuals” (Castoriadis Reader 405). Castoriadis argued, against the liberal
ideal, that the elimination of coercion cannot be a sufficient political goal,
even if it is often a good thing. Rather, autonomous societies go beyond the
negative-liberty project of un-limiting people. Autonomous communities create
ways of explicitly, lucidly, and deliberately limiting themselves by
establishing institutions through which individuals form their own laws for
themselves and will therefore be formed as critical, self-critical, and
autonomous. Only such institutions can make autonomy “effective” in a de facto
way.
Finally, in defining what he meant by “effective” autonomy, Castoriadis
distinguished his view of autonomy from Kant’s. In the Kantian perspective, he
argued, the possibility of autonomy involves the possibility of acting freely
in accordance with the universal law, itself established once and for all,
apart from the influence of any other heteronomous incentives. Castoriadis
argued that Kantianism treats autonomy itself as a goal or as something that we
want simply for itself. Echoing Hegel, Castoriadis argued that Kantian autonomy
ends up as a purely formal issue or a desire for autonomy for itself alone.
Castoriadis, like Kant, did not deny the importance of the pursuit of autonomy
for itself, with the full knowledge that the law of one’s action is not given
from elsewhere. However, he added that we do not desire autonomy only for
itself but also in order to be able to make, to do, and to institute. The
formal, Kantian autonomy must also be made factual. “The task of philosophy,”
he argued, “is not only to raise the question quid juris; that is just the
beginning. Its task is to elucidate how right becomes fact and fact right—which
is the condition for its existence, and is itself one of the first
manifestations thereof” (Castoriadis Reader 404). As such, effective autonomy
means that the will for autonomy itself as an “end” must also be a will for the
de facto “means” to autonomy, namely the will to establish the institutions on
which autonomy leans.
b. Democracy in Ancient Greece
In 1983’s “The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy” (Philosophy,
Politics, Autonomy 81-123) Castoriadis argued that institutions of autonomy
have appeared twice in history: in Athens in the fifth century B.C.E. and in
Western Europe during the Enlightenment. Neither example serves as a model for
emulation today in institutions. If we recall that the existence of autonomous
institutions is never a sufficient condition for autonomy, we realize that
there can be no question of treating historical cases as models to emulate.
Rather, what makes these cases important, for Castoriadis, is that they are
examples where, within societies that have instituted a strict closure, the
closure is nevertheless ruptured, opened, and the people reflectively and
deliberatively institute a radically new nomos, or law, for themselves.
Societies, argued Castoriadis, tend to institute strict closure: “In
nearly all of the cultures that we know of, it is not merely that what is valid
for each one is its institutions and its own tradition, but, in addition, for
each, the others are not valid” (Post-Script on Insignificance 93). However,
Castoriadis argued that Greece—in grasping that other societies do not mirror a
nature found everywhere, but are radically creative of their own, unique
institutions—also thereby grasped themselves as self-creative of their own institutions.
The Greeks broke with their own established social closure and instituted
“lucid self-legislation.” The Greek discovery of social self-creation (i.e. the
social instituting power) led to the partial realization (institution) of
autonomy precisely because they both effectively imagined their potential
universality with others as an end (formal autonomy) and yet also established
some particular institutions as supports for autonomy’s effective realization.
Even so, the Greek creation remained partial and its institutions were limited
and narrow (for example, they excluded women). Castoriadis’s point was that the
potential universality of their creation (radical criticism and
self-criticism), which they understood to be their own creation, coincided with
the democratic institutions established as supports for rendering autonomy
effective. In the end, the Greeks inaugurated a tradition of radical criticism
that is, for Castoriadis, always something with which autonomy—and
philosophy—begins.
c. Public, Private, and Agora
Castoriadis did not shy from suggesting some specific institutional
characteristics that autonomous societies embrace. While he cautioned that
there can be no a priori or final decision about what autonomous society should
be, he proposed in “Done and To Be Done” (Castoriadis Reader 361-417) a
classical, three-pronged institutional arrangement of society’s strata. These
strata are:
ekklésia—the public/public
oikos—the private/private
agora—the public/private
In defining these terms, Castoriadis insisted that the first necessary
condition of an autonomous society is the rendering open of the public/public
sphere, or ekklésia. The task is to make self-institution by individuals and
society explicit through the public consideration of the works and projects
that commit the collectivity and the individual. The ekklésia is not a sphere
of bureaucratic management of individuals by social architects; quite the
opposite, it entails the establishment of institutions for public knowledge
production and lawmaking, thus making possible an intellectual space for
individuals to know and question laws in an informed way. Such considerations
that affect individuals cannot, however, be left to the private/private or the
public/private spheres; they must be undertaken by the collectivity together in
public. There seems to be no requirement that the ekklésia occupy what we
commonly call a physical place; rather, the site for knowing, deliberating
about, and questioning the law is any space that “belongs to all (ta koina).”
What is important is that the ekklésia involves the collectivity in a public
deliberation about the goals and means of society and individuals.
Second, Castoriadis argued that an autonomous society will render the
private/private sphere, or oikos, inviolable and independent of the other
spheres. Individuals, families, and homes create themselves with institutions.
That is, private life, as it creates itself, leans on an instituted fabric of
society, a fabric the very continuation of which must be the subject of
deliberation in the ekklésia. This fabric includes the institutions for
education, basic criminal law, and other society-wide conditions. Bureaucratic
communism or socialism, insofar as they destroy individual personality and
private life, are to be abolished through the ekklésia’s efforts to support the
independence and distinctness of the private/private sphere.
Third, Castoriadis defended the independence of the public/private,
mixed sphere, i.e. the agora. His defense of the term the Greeks used for their
marketplace has nothing to do with any defense of so-called free enterprise
(i.e. merely negative liberty to exploit workers). Rather, the agora is where
individuals (and not a particular set of individuals, as was the case in
Athens, where citizen males alone participated) can group themselves in
relation to others for purposes that are not explicitly questions pertaining to
the public/public sphere. The independence of the agora as a mixed sphere would
eliminate the possibility of forced collectivization of goods or the need for
the abolition of money forms, which are still useful in the agoric sphere. The
agoric sphere provides a kind of buffer between the tyrannies of the wholly
public or wholly private set of interests, thus supporting the ongoing
institution of autonomy as a whole.
For Castoriadis, each of the three institutional strata should be
treated as a proper sphere of its own. They should not be collapsed into one
sphere. “Autonomous society,” he wrote, “can only be composed of autonomous
individuals” (World in Fragments 416). The preservation of each stratum is
vital. Yet, on the one hand, the statist and bureaucratic societies of the
twentieth century, despite their intentions of establishing a genuine public
sphere, constantly collapsed the potential universality of the public/public
sphere into a massive, all-inclusive private/private stratum, i.e. into a
manipulative, bureaucratic society. On the other hand, the Western liberal
democracies were more properly oligarchic, totalitarian-capitalist societies
that happen to exist in a somewhat more fragmented and less total form than
their statist counterparts. They too tend to collapse the public/public into
private, bureaucratic, capitalist corporations. They thereby generate people
who do not know the law and therefore cannot question it or effectively
institute new laws. Thus, autonomy—while always in principle possible for us—is
nevertheless factually foreclosed across most of the world, even to this day.
