It is
commonly supposed that there is a vital difference between ancient ethics and
modern morality. For example, there appears to be a vital difference between
virtue ethics and the modern moralities of deontological ethics (Kantianism)
and consequentialism (utilitarianism). At second glance, however, one
acknowledges that both ethical approaches have more in common than their
stereotypes may suggest. Oversimplification, fallacious interpretations, as
well as a broad variation within a particular ethical theory make it in general
harder to determine the real differences and similarities between ancient
ethics and modern morality. But why should we bother about ancient ethics at
all? What is the utility of comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the
particular approaches? The general answer is that a proper understanding of the
strengths and weaknesses of virtue ethics and modern moral theories can be used
to overcome current ethical problems and to initiate fruitful developments in
ethical reasoning and decision-making.
This
article examines the differences and similarities between ancient ethics and
modern morality by analysing and comparing their main defining features in
order to show that the two ethical approaches are less distinct than one might
suppose. The first part of the article outlines the main ethical approaches in
Ancient Greek ethics by focusing on the Cynics, the Cyrenaics, Aristotle’s
virtue ethics, the Epicureans, and the Stoics. This part also briefly outlines
the two leading modern ethical approaches, that is, Kantianism and
utilitarianism, in more general terms in order to provide a sufficient
background. The second part provides a detailed table with the main defining
features of the conflicting stereotypes of ancient ethics and modern morality.
Three main issues – the good life versus the good action, the use of the term
“moral ought,” and whether a virtuous person can act in a non-virtuous way –
are described in more detail in the third part of the article in order to show
that the differences have more in common than the stereotypes may initially
suggest. The fourth part deals with the idea of the moral duty in ancient
ethics.
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1. Ancient Ethics and Modern Morality
There
are at least two main criteria that each moral theory must fulfil: first, the
criterion of justification (that is, the particular moral theory should not
contain any contradictions) and, second, the criterion of applicability (that
is, the particular moral theory should solve concrete problems and offer
ethical orientation). However, many (traditional) moral theories are unable to
meet the second criterion and simply fall short of the high demands of applied
ethics to solve the complex moral problems of our times. Why is this the case?
The main point is that the traditional moral theories are not sufficiently well
equipped to deal with completely new problems such as issues concerning nuclear
power, gene technology, and cloning and so forth. Therefore, there is constant
interest in updating and enhancing a particular moral theory in order to make it
compatible with the latest demands. Examples are neo-Aristotelians such as
Hursthouse on abortion (1991) and on nature (2007), as well as neo-Kantians
such as Regan on animals (1985), Korsgaard in general and in particular on
animals and nature (1996), and Altman’s edited volume on the use and limits of
Kant’s practical philosophy in applied ethics (2011). This is a difficult and
often very complex process.
a. Ethics and Morality
When
people talk about ethical approaches in Antiquity, they refer to these
approaches by using the words “ancient ethics” rather than “ancient morality”.
They talk about “virtue ethics” and not about “virtue morality”. But, why is
this the case? The challenging question is, according to Annas (1992: 119-120),
whether ancient scholars such as Plato and Aristotle as well as the Stoics and
Epicureans are really talking about morality at all, since their main focus is
limited to the agent’s happiness, which obviously “doesn’t sound much like
morality” (119). Even if one acknowledges the fact that happiness means a
satisfactory and well-lived life according to the ethical virtues and not only
a happy moment or so, it still does not sound like morality. Furthermore, the
general idea in virtue ethics, that the good of other people enters the scene
by being a part of one’s own good and that, for example, the notion of justice
is introduced as a character trait and not as the idea of the rights of others
(see, Dworkin’s phrase, “rights as trumps”), makes it obvious that there is a
systematic difference between the notions of ethics and morality. Ancient
ethics is about living a good and virtuous life according to the ethical
virtues, that is, to become a virtuous person, while the modern notion of
morality is primarily focused on the interests of other people and the idea of
deontological constraints. That is, one acts morally because one has to meet
certain standards and not because it supports one’s own good life. But even
this simple picture might be premature depending on how one conceives the idea
of “moral motivation” in ancient ethics.
Historically
speaking, from a different perspective, there is no evidence which term is most
legitimate. In Ancient Greek history, the Greek term for ethics is êthos and
means something like character. When Aristotle analyses the good life in the
Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics, he therefore focuses on the central
topic of good and bad character traits that is virtues and vices. In this
original sense, ethics means an analysis about the character or character
traits. In Ancient Roman thought, which was essentially influenced by Cicero,
the Greek term ethikos (the adjective to êthos) was translated with the Latin
term moralis (the adjective of mores) whereas the Latin term mores, in fact,
means habits and customs. It is possible to translate the Greek term êthos with
habits and customs, but it is more likely that the translation of ethikos with
moralis was a mistranslation. The term moralis rather refers to the Greek ethos
whose primary meaning is habits and customs. If the term morality refers to
mores, then the term morality means the totality of all habits and customs of a
given community. The term moralis became a terminus technicus in the
Latin-shaped philosophy, which covers the present meaning of the term. In
modern times, the habits and customs of a given community are termed
‘conventions’, which are authoritative for the social life in society. Morality,
however, is not simply a matter of mere convention but the latter often
conflicts with morality (for example, an immoral convention), hence, it seems
inappropriate to shorten the term in this way (Steinfath 2000). At present,
there are, at least, four different possibilities to distinguish between ethics
and morality:
Ethics
and morality as distinct spheres: Ethics has to do with the pursuit of one’s
own happiness or well-being and private lifestyle, that is, how we should live
to make good lives for ourselves. Morality has to do with other people’s
interests and deontological constraints (for example Jürgen Habermas).
The
equation of ethics and morality (for example Peter Singer).
Morality
as a special field in the ethical realm: Ethics is the generic term for ethical
and moral issues in the above-mentioned sense. Morality is a special part of
ethics (for example, Bernard Williams).
Morality
as the object of ethics: Ethics is the philosophical theory of morality which
is the systematic analysis of moral norms and values (standard reading).
The
upshot is that it is always important to ask how the terms ethics and morality
are used and how one uses them for oneself. It is certain that one makes a
textual and not only a conceptual differentiation by claiming that the terms
differ.
b. Ancient Ethics
It is
impossible to give a complete depiction of the rich history of ethical
reasoning and decision-making in Antiquity here, therefore the focus of this
section concerns the main lines of ethical reasoning of the most important
philosophical schools in the classic and Hellenistic period. This rather
simplified overview is nonetheless sufficient for our purposes. One can roughly
distinguish the classic and Hellenistic periods into four different but closely
connected parts. The first part concerns Socrates and his arguments with the
Sophists (second half of the fifth century BC); the second part covers the
post-Socratian formation of important philosophical schools deeply influenced
by Socratic thought for example Antisthenes’ school of the Cynics, Aristippus’
school of the Cyrenaics, and Plato’s Academy which is the most influential
ancient school (second half of the fifth and fourth centuries BC). The third
part is characterized, on the one hand, by the formation of one new major
philosophical school, namely Aristotle’s peripatetic school, which developed
from Plato’s Academy, and, on the other hand, by the exchange of arguments
among the existing schools on various issues (fourth century BC). The fourth
part concerns the formation of two new important philosophical schools, which
become highly influential in Antiquity, first, Epicurus’ school of epicureanism
standing in the tradition of the Cyrenaics and, secondly, Zeno’s school of the
Stoics which partly developed from the Cynics (second half of the fourth and
third century BC). All the philosophical schools – being at odds with each
other – are still united by the fact that they are deeply concerned with the
most important ethical questions of how to live a good life and how to achieve
happiness. Their responses to these vital questions are, of course, diverse.
The
following brief depiction focuses on the basic ethical assumptions of the
philosophical schools of the Cynics and Cyrenaics, the peripatetic school, the
Epicureans, and the Stoics. Socrates and Plato’s Academy are left out by virtue
that Socrates did not provide any (written) systematic ethics. His unsystematic
ethical position is mainly depicted in Plato’s early dialogues, for example
Laches, Charmides, Protagoras and some of Xenophon’s works, such as Apology,
Symposium, and Memorabilia. Plato himself did not provide any systematic ethics
comparable to the other main ancient schools either, even though one can
certainly reconstruct – at least to some extent – his ethical viewpoint in the
dialogue Politeia. In addition, most (ethical) works of the classic and
Hellenistic periods are lost in the dark of history; what remains is a
collection of fragments, phrases, and (parts of) letters of various important
philosophers (and commentators) standing in the tradition of particular schools
at that time. Many rival views on ethics are mediated through the works of
Plato and Aristotle, in which they criticize their opponents. In addition, some
of these rudiments and testimonials were also mediated by famous writers and
politicians such as Xenophon (fifth and fourth century BC) and the important
historian of philosophy Diogenes Laertios (third century AD). Aristotle,
however, is the only ancient philosopher whose two substantial and complete
ethical contributions, that is, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics
– leaving aside the Magna Moralia of which the authorship is unclear – have
survived, even though all of his dialogues including those that are concerned with
ethics and ethical issues are also lost.
i. The Cynics and the Cyrenaics – The
Extremes
The
founder of the school of the Cynics, Antisthenes of Athens, taught that virtue
in terms of practical wisdom is a good and also sufficient for eudaimonia, that
is, happiness. Badness is an evil and everything else is indifferent. In accord
with Socrates, Antisthenes claimed that virtue is teachable and he also accepted
the doctrine of the unity of the virtues which is the general idea that if a
person possesses one ethical virtue, then he or she thereby possesses all other
ethical virtues as well (for a recent contribution to this controversial
doctrine, see Russell, 2009). The only good of human beings is that what is
peculiar to them, that is, their ability to reason. Against the Cyrenaics he
argues that pleasure is never a good. Things such as death, illness, servitude,
poverty, disgrace, and hard labour are only supposed to be bad but are not real
evils. One should be indifferent towards one’s honour, property, liberty,
health and life (committing suicide was allowed). The Cynics, in general, lived
a beggar’s life and were probably the first real cosmopolitans in human history
– a feature that the Stoics wholeheartedly adopted later. They were also
against the common cultural and religious rites and practices, a main feature
which they shared with the Sophists. They took Socratian frugality to extremes
and tried to be as independent of material goods as possible, like Diogenes of
Sinope who lived in a barrel. Furthermore, one should abstain from bad things
and seek apathy and tranquillity, which are important features the Stoics
adopted from the Cynics as well. According to the Cynics, there are two groups
of people: first, the wise people living a perfect and happy life – they cannot
lose their virtues once they achieved this condition (similar to Aristotle) –
and, secondly, the fools who are unhappy and make mistakes (Diogenes Laertios
VI, 1 and 2; Zeller 1883: 116-121; Long 2007: 623-629).
Aristippus
of Cyrene was well known and highly regarded among philosophers in Antiquity
and was the first Socratian disciple who took money in exchange for lessons. He
was the founder of the Cyrenaics – a famous philosophical school whose members
were devoted to (sensualistic) hedonism (which certainly influenced Jeremy
Bentham’s version of hedonistic utilitarianism). Thereby, the school of the
Cyrenaics stands in striking contrast to the Cynics. Aristippus claims that
knowledge is valuable only insofar as it is useful in practical matters (a
feature that the Cyrenaics share with the Cynics); all actions should strive
for the utmost pleasure since pleasure is the highest good. There are gradual
qualitative differences of the goods. Unlike Aristotle the Hedonists believed
that happiness understood as a long-term state is not the overall purpose in
life but the bodily pleasure of the very moment, which is the goal of life. The
past has gone by and the future is uncertain therefore only the here and now is
decisive since the immediate feelings are the only guide to what is really
genuinely valuable. Practical wisdom is the precondition of happiness in being
instrumentally useful for achieving pleasure. Aristippus and the Cyrenaics were
seeking maximum pleasure in each moment without being swamped by it. Aristippus
– known for his cheerful nature and praiseworthy character as well as his
distinguished restraint – famously claimed that one should be the master in
each moment: “I possess, but I am not possessed”. A. A. Long rightly claims:
“Aristippus Senior had served as the paradigm of a life that was both
autonomous and effortlessly successful in turning circumstances into sources of
bodily enjoyment” (2007: 636). Aristippus was a true master in making the best
out of each situation; he also taught that one should be able to limit one’s
wishes if they are likely to cause severe problems for oneself, to preserve
self-control (a general feature he shares with Socrates), to secure one’s
happiness, to seek inner freedom, and to be cheerful.
Obviously his teachings
of a life solely devoted to bodily pleasure – that is, his pursuit of lust and
his view concerning the unimportance of knowledge – stand in striking contrast
to Socrates’ teachings (as well as to Plato and Aristotle). His disciples –
most notably Aristippus the Younger, Theodoros, Anniceris (who bought the
release of Plato), and Hegesias – established new Cyrenaic schools offering sophisticated
versions of hedonism by virtue of fruitful disputes with Epicurus and the
Cynics (for a brief overview on Aristippus’ disciples, see A. A. Long 2007:
632-639 and for the teachings, for example, Diogenes Laertios II, 8; Zeller
1883: 121-125; Döring 1988. For the view that Aristippus’ hedonism is not
limited to “bodily pleasures”, see Urstad 2009).
ii. The Peripatetic School – Aristotle’s
Virtue Ethics
Aristotle
proposed the most prominent and sophisticated version of virtue ethics in Antiquity
and his teachings have become authoritative for many scholars and still remain
alive in the vital contributions of neo-Aristotelians in contemporary
philosophy. His main ethical work is the Nicomachean Ethics; less prominent but
still valuable and authentic is the Eudemian Ethics while Aristotle’s
authorship of the Magna Moralia is highly questionable. Aristotle claims that
happiness (eudaimonia) is the highest good – that is the final, perfect, and
self-contained goal – to which all people strive at. In particular, happiness
is the goal of life, that is, a life that is devoted to “doing” philosophy (EN
X, 6–9). Whether a person can be called “happy” can only be determined at the
very end of a person’s life, retrospectively. For a good and general overview
on Aristotle’s ethics see Broadie (1991) and Wolf (2007).
However,
the idea that life should be devoted to reasoning follows from Aristotle’s
important human function argument (EN I, 5, 6) in which he attempts to show -
by analogy - that human beings as such must also have a proper function in
comparison to other things such as a pair of scissors (the proper function is
to cutting) and a flute player (the proper function is to flute playing) and so
forth. If the proper function is performed in a good way, then Aristotle claims
that the particular thing has goodness (aretê). For example, if the proper
function of a pair of scissors is to cutting, then the proper function of a
good pair of scissors is to cutting well (likewise in all other cases). Since the
proper function of human beings - according to Aristotle - is to reason, the
goodness of human beings depends on the good performance of the proper human
function that is to reason well. In fact, Aristotle claims that the goodness of
human beings does not consist in the mere performance of the proper function
but rather in their disposition. This claim is substantiated by his example of
the good person and the bad person who cannot be distinguished from each other
during their bedtime if one only refers to their (active) performance. The only
possible way to distinguish them is to refer to their different dispositions.
It is a matter of debate whether there is a particular human function as
proposed by Aristotle.
All in
all, one can distinguish four different lines of reasoning in Aristotle’s
ethics: the virtue of the good person (standard interpretation), the idea of an
action-oriented virtue ethics, the application of practical wisdom, and the
idea of the intrinsic value of virtues. The different approaches are dealt with
in order.
The
virtue of the good person (EN II, 3, 4): according to Aristotle, an action is
good (or right) if a virtuous person would perform that action in a similar
situation; an action is bad or wrong (and hence prohibited) if the virtuous
person would never perform such an action. Three criteria must be met,
according to Aristotle, in order to ensure that an action is virtuous given
that the agent is in a certain condition when he performs them: (i.) the agent
must have knowledge of the circumstances of the action (the action must not
happen by accident); (ii.) the action is undertaken out of deliberative choice
and is done for its own sake; and (iii.) the action is performed without
hesitation, that is, the action is performed by a person with a firm and stable
virtuous character.
The
action-oriented virtue ethics (EN II, 6, 1107a10–15): Aristotle’s virtue ethics
contains some hints that he not only adheres to the standard interpretation,
but also claims that there are some actions that are always morally blameworthy
under any circumstances, that is, some actions are intrinsically bad. The fine
or the noble and the just require the virtuous person to do or refrain from
doing certain things, for example, not to murder (in particular, not to kill
one’s parents), not to commit adultery, and not to commit theft. This line of
reasoning contains deontological limitations insofar as the virtuous person is
no longer the overall standard of evaluation, but the virtuous person herself
must meet some ethical criteria in order to fulfil the external demands of, for
example, “the noble” and “the just” to act virtuously.
Practical
wisdom (EN VI): in some passages in book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle argues that it is our practical wisdom that makes our practical
considerations good, both with regard to the good or virtuous life and with
regard to our particular goals. He claims that a practically wise person has a
special sensitivity or special perceptual skill with which to evaluate a situation
in a morally correct or appropriate way. Here, the emphasis lies on the
practical wisdom - as the capacity of ethical reasoning and decision-making -
rather than on adhering to single ethical virtues, even though Aristotle claims
that it is impossible to be practically wise without having ethical virtues and
vice versa.
The
intrinsic value of the virtues: following the standard interpretation of the
role of the ethical virtues with regard to living a good life, Aristotle argues
in the Nicomachean Ethics (EN X, 6–9) that these virtues are somewhat less
important when it comes to the overall goal, that is, happiness of living a
good life. The primary goal is to live a life devoted to “doing” philosophy and
thereby living a good life; the secondary goal is to live a life among other
people which makes it necessary to adopt the ethical virtues, as well.
iii. Epicureanism and Stoicism
Epicurus
– educated by the Platonist Pamphilus and highly influenced by the important
teachings of Democritus – developed his philosophical school of the Epicureans
in controversies with the Cyrenaics and the Stoics and meeting their objections
and challenges. The lively exchange of arguments concerning the vital issue of
how to live a good life put Epicurus in the position to successfully articulate
a refined and sophisticated version of hedonism, which was regarded as superior
to the rival philosophical school of the Cyrenaics. He claims that sensation is
the only standard of measuring good and evil.
Epicurus shares the view with the
Cyrenaics that all living beings strive for pleasure and try to avoid pain.
But, unlike the Cyrenaic school, he argues that happiness consists of not only
the very moment of bodily pleasure but lasts a whole life and also contains
mental pleasure, which is – according to him – preferable to bodily pleasure.
In his Letter to Menoceus, Epicurus comments on flawed views of his ethical
position and claims: “For what produces the pleasant life is not continuous
drinking and parties or pederasty or womanizing or the enjoyment of fish and
the other dishes of an expensive table, but sober reasoning […]” (Epic. EP.
Men. 132, in: Long and Sedley 2011: 114).
The ultimate goal in life is not to strive for positive pleasure but to
seek for absence of pain. Unlike Aristippus, Epicurus claims in support of the
importance of mental states that bodily pleasure and pain is limited to the
here and now, while the soul is also concerned with the pleasurable and painful
states of the past and prospective pleasure and pain. Thus, sensations based on
recollections, hope and fear in the context of mental states with regard to the
past and future are much stronger than the bodily pleasure of the moment. Being
virtuous is a precondition of tranquillity, that is, peace and freedom from
fear, which is closely connected to happiness. In addition, Epicurus taught
that one should free oneself from prejudices, to master and restrict one’s
desires, to live a modest life (for example a life not devoted to achieve glory
and honour), which does not exclude bodily pleasure, and to cultivate close
friendships, for which the Epicureans were well known (see, Diogenes Laertios
X, 1; Zeller 1883: 263-267; Erler and Schofield 2007: 642-674; Long and Sedley
2000: §20-§25).
Shortly
after the rise of epicureanism, Zeno of Citium – the founder of stoicism –
established a new school in Athens. The members were well known for their
cosmopolitism that is the idea that all human beings belong to a single
community that should be cultivated (quite similar to Aristippus’ view and the
Stoics), their self-contained life style and deep concern for friendship as
well as their strong adherence to ataraxia that is the freedom from passions
such as pleasure, desires, sorrow, and fear which jeopardize the inner
independence. The Stoics were influenced by teachings of the Cynics. Human
beings, according to stoicism, are able to perceive the laws of nature through
reason and to act accordingly. The best life is a life according to nature
(Zeller 1883: 243). Zeno believed that the most general instinct is the
instinct of self-preservation; for each living being the only thing that is
valuable is what conduces to the being’s self-preservation and thereby
contributes to the being’s happiness. For example, in the case of rational
beings only what is in accord with reason is valuable; only virtue, which is
necessary and sufficient for happiness, is a good. Following the Cynics, the
Stoics argue that honour, property, health and life are not goods and that
poverty, disgrace, illness, and death are not evils. Against the Cyrenaics and
Epicureans, they hold the view that pleasure is not a good and certainly not
the highest good; they agree with Aristotle that pleasure is the consequence of
our actions – if they are of the right kind – but not the goal itself. Two main
doctrines are of utmost importance in the teachings of stoicism, first, the
significance of ataraxia and, secondly, the idea of doing what nature demands.
First, happiness is ataraxia – the freedom from passions – and a self-contained
life style. Secondly, the idea that one must act in accordance with one’s own
nature in terms of acting virtuously stands in striking contrast to the other
philosophical schools at that time. In addition, the right motif transforms the
performance of one’s duty into a virtuous action, completely independent of the
outcome of the particular action (an important feature that we find again in
Kant’s ethics).
Following Socrates and Plato, the Stoics believed that virtue
is ethical knowledge and that non-virtuous people simply lack ethical
knowledge, since virtue consists in the reasonable condition of the soul, which
leads to correct views. The Cynic idea of the sharp distinction between the
existence of a very few wise people and many fools, that is all non-wise
people, had become less sharp in the process of time. In addition, the Roman
philosopher and politician Cicero (106–43 BC) is the first author whose work on
the notion of duty survives, De Officiis, in which he examined the notion in
great detail in the first century BC (44 BC). It should be noted, however, that
the stoic philosopher Panaitios of Rhodes (180–110 BC) had already published an
important book on the notion of duty prior to Cicero. Panaitios’ work is lost
but we know some essential ideas from it mediated through Cicero since he often
refers to Panaitios in his De Officiis. Stoicism outlived the other
philosophical schools with regard to its ethics by being an attractive position
for many people and leading philosophers and politicians such as Seneca (first
century AD) and Marcus Aurelius (second century AD) in Ancient Rome. (see,
Diogenes Laertios VII, 1; Zeller 1883: 243-253; Inwood and Donini 2007:
675-738; Long and Sedley 2000: §56-§67).
c.
Modern Morality
The
two main moral theories of modern virtue ethics (or neo-Aristotelianism) are
Kant’s deontological ethics and utilitarianism. Both theories have been adopted
and modified by many scholars in recent history in order to make them (more)
compatible with the latest demands in ethical reasoning and decision-making, in
particular, by meeting the objections raised by modern virtue ethics. The
following briefly depicts Kantianism in its original form and the main features
of utilitarianism.
i.
Kantianism
The
German philosopher Immanuel Kant is the founder of deontological ethics. His
ethics, which he mainly put forth in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals (1785), Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and Metaphysics of Morals
(1797), is one of the most prominent and highly respected theories in
modernity. Kant’s ethics is deontological in the sense that one has to obey the
duties and obligations which derive from his supreme principle of morality,
that is, the Categorical Imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant
1785). The Categorical Imperative is a test for maxims which, in turn,
determine whether certain acts have moral worth or not. A maxim is an
individual’s subjective principle or rule of the will (in German, das
subjektive Prinzip des Wollen), which tells the individual what to do in a
given particular situation. If the maxim can be universalized, then it is valid
and one must act upon it. A maxim cannot be universalized when it faces two
severe instances: (i.) the case of logical inconsistency (the example of
suicide, which is against the “perfect duty”); and, (ii.) the case of
impossibility to will the maxim to be universalized (failing to cultivate one’s
talents, which is against the “imperfect duty”). Perfect duties are those
duties that are blameworthy if they are not met by human beings (for example
the suicide example); imperfect duties allow for human desires and hence they
are not as strong as perfect duties but they are still morally binding and
people do not attract blame if they do not complete them (for example failing
to cultivate one’s talents). Kant’s ethics is universal in the sense that the
system of moral duties and obligations point at all rational beings (not only
human beings). Morality is not based in interests (such as social contract
theories), emotions and intuitions, or conscience, but in reason alone. This is
the reason why Kant’s ethics is not heteronomous - by being a divine ethical
theory in which God commands what human beings should do (for example the
Bible, the Ten Commandments) or natural law conception in which nature itself
commands what human beings should do by providing human beings with the faculty
of reason who, in turn, detect what should be done in moral matters - but truly
autonomous with regard to rational beings, who make their moral decisions in
the light of pure practical reason. However, pure practical reason, in determining
the moral law or Categorical Imperative, determines what ought to be done
without reference to empirical contingent factors (that is, anthropology in the
broad sense of the term including the empirical sciences; see preface to
Groundwork) such as one’s own desires or any personal inclinations (in German
Neigungen). The pure practical reason is not limited to the particular nature
of human reasoning but is the source and the field of universal norms, which
stem from a general notion of a rational being as such (see, Eisler 2008: 577;
Paton 1967; Timmermann 2010; Altman 2011).
ii. Utilitarianism
Historically
speaking, Jeremy Bentham in his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation (1789) and John Stuart Mill in Utilitarianism (1863) are the
founders of utilitarianism, while Francis Hutcheson (1755) and William Paley
(1785) could be seen as their legitimate predecessors by pointing out that
utility should be seen as an important standard of evaluation in ethical
reasoning and decision-making. Bentham claims that the duration and intensity
of pleasure and pain are of utmost importance and that it is even possible –
according to Bentham - to measure the right action by applying a hedonistic
calculus which determines the exact utility of the actions. The action with the
best hedonistic outcome should be put into practice. His position is called
radical quantitative hedonism. Mill instead questions the very idea of a
hedonistic calculus and argues that one must distinguish between mental and bodily
pleasure by giving more weight to mental pleasures. His position is called
qualitative hedonism. Mill’s basic formula of utilitarianism is as follows:
The
creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By
happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain
and the privation of pleasure. (Mill’s Utilitarianism, chapter 2)
There
is widespread agreement that there exist numerous different utilitarian
theories in modern ethics; hence it would be impossible to provide an adequate
depiction of all important major strands in this brief subsection. However, the
following four main aspects are typical for each utilitarian theory. (1.) The
consequence principle: Utilitarianism is not about actions but about the
consequences of actions. This kind of theory is a form of consequentialism,
which means that the moral worth of the particular action is determined by its
outcome. (2.) Happiness: Utilitarianism is a teleological theory insofar as
happiness (but, not in the ancient sense of the term) is the main goal that
should be achieved. This particular goal can be identified with (i.) the promotion
of pleasure, (ii.) the avoidance of pain or harm, (iii.) the fulfilment of
desires or considered preferences, or (iv.) with meeting some objective
criteria of well-being. (3.) Greatest Happiness Principle: Utilitarianism is
not about mere happiness but about “the greatest happiness” attainable.
Utilitarianism is a theory with one principle that judges the consequences of a
given action regarding its utility, which is the general aim of actions. The
moral rightness or wrongness of actions depends on the goal of achieving the
greatest happiness for the greatest number of sentient beings, in short, “the
greatest happiness for the greatest number”. (4.) Maximising: The collective
amount of utility regarding sentient beings affected by the action should be
maximized. This line of reasoning contains strong altruistic claims because,
roughly speaking, one should only choose those actions which improve other
sentient beings’ happiness.
Furthermore,
one major methodological distinction should be mentioned briefly since it
really divides all utilitarian theories in two different groups by either
applying the principle of utility to actions or rules. In act utilitarianism
(or direct utilitarianism) the principle of utility is applied to the
particular action; in this case, one asks whether the action in question is
morally right or wrong in this particular situation. In rule utilitarianism (or
indirect utilitarianism), instead, the principle of utility is applied to rules
only which, in turn, are applied to the particular actions and serve as
guidelines for human behaviour in order to guarantee the greatest happiness for
the greatest number. Here, the vital question is whether a specific rule
maximises the general utility or not. From time to time, it happens that the
general utility will be maximised by rule utilitarianism to a lesser degree
than it would have been the case regarding act utilitarianism. For example, one
should act according to the general rule which says that one should keep one’s
promises which - in the long run - maximises the general utility (rule
utilitarianism). However, in some cases it would be better to adhere to act
utilitarianism since it maximises the general utility to a higher degree
depending on the particular situation and circumstances of the case in question
(act utilitarianism).
d. The Up-shot
The
depiction of the ethical views of some important philosophical schools as well
as their interrelatedness in Antiquity and the outline of the two leading moral
theories in modern morality show that there is – despite the systematic
difference concerning the importance of the question of the good life – a
significant overlap of important lines of reasoning. In addition, the supposed
distinction between ancient ethics and modern morality contains many misleading
claims. Socrates can be seen as the initial ignition of a broad variety of
diverse virtue ethical approaches such as cynicism, the teachings of the
Cyrenaics, Aristotelianism, epicureanism, and stoicism. All philosophical
schools were concerned with the vital questions of how to live a good life and
how to achieve happiness by pointing out what the appropriate actions were. The
brief outline of the different philosophical schools in Antiquity supports this
view. Modern morality is different in that its focus is on the basic question
of how one should act. The ancient question of how should one live is
secondary. However, modern morality in particular Kantianism and utilitarianism
did not start from scratch but already had some important and highly
influential ancient predecessors. For example, the Kantian idea of doing the
right thing because reason dictates it has its roots in stoicism (see, Cooper
1998, Schneewind 1998) and the utilitarian idea of living a happy life
according to pleasure has its roots in the teachings of the Cyrenaics (for
example Bentham 1789) and Epicureans (for example Mill 1863). The history of
ideas conveyed important ethical insights handed down from Antiquity to
modernity. The idea that there is a clear and easy distinction between ancient
(virtue) ethics and modern moral theories is premature and misleading. Indeed,
there are some important differences but one must acknowledge the simple fact
that there is no unity or broad consensus among ancient virtue ethicists
concerning the question of how to live a good life and which actions should
count as virtuous. Hence, it follows that there is no “ancient ethics” as such
but many important and diverse virtue ethical approaches, which have either
more or less in common with “modern morality”.
In
addition, modern morality, in particular contemporary morality, is
characterized by the fact that quite a few important scholars elaborated modern
versions of Aristotle’s classical virtue ethics in the twentieth century. These
scholars argue that virtue ethics was quite successful in solving ethical
problems in Antiquity and they believe that adhering to a refined version of
virtue ethics is not only useful but also superior in solving our modern moral
problems. Among the most important neo-Aristotelian scholars are Anscombe
(1958), Foot (1978, 2001), Hursthouse (1999), MacIntyre (1981), Nussbaum (1992,
1993, 1995), Slote (2001), Swanton (2003), and Williams (1985) who claim that
the traditional ethical theories such as deontological ethics (Kantianism) and
consequentialism (utilitarianism) are doomed to failure. In general they
adhere, at least, to two main hypotheses: (i.) People in Antiquity already
employed a very efficient way of ethical reasoning and decision-making; and, (ii.)
this particular way got lost in modernity without having been properly
replaced. Hence it follows that one should overcome the deficient modern
ethical theories and again adhere to virtue ethics as a viable alternative
without, of course, abandoning the existing ethical developments (see Bayertz
2005: 115).
The
following section depicts the old but still persisting stereotypical
differences between ancient ethics and modern morality in order to further
deepen our understanding about the supposed and real differences and
similarities of both ethical approaches.
3. Ancient Ethics and Modern Morality –
The Main Differences
a. The Good Life versus the Good Action
The
most common stereotype with regard to ancient ethics and modern morality
concerns the vital issue that ancient ethics is only about the question “What
is the good life” and that modern moral theories only deal with the question
“What should one do” or “How should one act”. Many stereotypes certainly depict
some truth, but there is almost always a lot of room for a better understanding
of the differences and similarities of the particular issue. To be more precise
with regard to this issue, it is true that ancient ethics concerns the vital
question of how to live a good life and to become a virtuous person by acting
in accordance with the ethical virtues. However, the idea that virtue ethics
does not deal with actions and hence is unable to provide concrete answers to
ethical problems is premature; it is not only modern moral theories that deal with
actions (see, Hursthouse 1999, chapters 1-3; Slote 2001, chapter 1; Swanton
2003, chapter 11). An ethical virtue, according to Aristotle, needs to be
completely internalized by its agent through many actions of the same type so
that the person is able to accomplish a firm disposition. In other words, a
brave person who has the virtue of courage has to perform many brave actions in
the area of fear and confidence in order to accomplish a brave disposition.
Performing the appropriate actions is the only way one can do this. Indeed,
modern moral theories are rather focused on the question of what should one do
in a particular situation, and usually ethicists do not pay much attention to
the question of living a good life. Ancient ethicists, instead, believe that
one cannot separate both issues.
A
related issue that seems to strongly support the initial idea concerns the
claim that, on the one hand, ancient ethics is self-centred because it only
focuses on the agent’s interests in living a good life and becoming a virtuous
person and, on the other hand, that modern morality is other-regarding by only
focusing on the interests of other people. Broadly speaking, ancient ethics is
egoistical and modern morality is altruistic. The interests of other people in
virtue ethics enter the stage by being incorporated into the person’s own
interest in becoming virtuous and living a good life. In her article Ancient
Ethics and Modern Morality, Annas examines this point in more detail and claims
“the confusion comes from the thought that if the good of others is introduced
into the agent’s own final good, it cannot really be the good of others, but
must in some way be reduced to what matters to the agent”. She points out that the confusion might be
that “the good of others must matter to me because it is the good of others,
not because it is part of my own good” (Annas 1992: 131). Annas thinks that
this is compatible with the overall final good of the virtuous person since the
good of others matters to the virtuous person not because it is part of the
agent’s own good but because it is the good of others.
Other
people, however, might claim that the difference is between “morality” and
“legality”, to use a Kantian distinction. In this context, legality means
simply to fulfil the moral claims that other people have; morality means to
fulfil the moral claims that other people have and, in addition, to have the
right motive in doing so, that is, to act out of “the good will” – to act out
of a sense of moral obligation or duty. Translated into “ancient” language, the
virtuous person should consider other people’s interests not because she feels
indifferent to them or because their interests are only instrumentally useful
to her as agent, but because the virtuous person wholeheartedly believes,
feels, and acknowledges the fact that the other people’s interests are
important in their own right. Another example is Aristotle who believes that
the good person is living a good life if and only if she devotes her life to
“philosophy” and, secondarily, lives a social life among other people. The
latter requires the usage of ethical virtues, which are by nature
other-regarding; the former does not require the usage of ethical virtues (see,
Aristotle EN X, 6–9), even though, according to Aristotle, one cannot be a
practically wise person without being virtuous, and vice versa. Both concepts
are mutually dependent (EN VI).
One
might claim that self-interest and the interests of other people do not stand
in contrast to each other in ancient ethics but converge by adhering to an
objective idea of the good (see, Bayertz 2005). The line between moral
questions that concern the interests of other people and ethical questions that
concern the well-being of the particular agent is disfigured beyond recognition.
In modern morality, however, there is a clear difference because the question
of the good life is secondary, and is systematically not important for the
question of how one should act in a particular situation. Modern moral theories
are rather subjective in character and hence lack the strong commitments of
virtue ethical theories concerning their objective basis, as well as their
claims regarding elitism and the devaluation of the moral common sense. The
upshot is, however, that there is a systematic difference between ancient
ethics and modern morality concerning the way in which moral problems are
solved, but the idea that ancient ethics is egoistic and does not appeal to
actions is premature and simply wrong.
b. The Moral Ought
Anscombe
points out in her classical paper Modern Moral Philosophy (1958) that modern
morality is doomed to failure because it only focuses on the analysis of
language and notions and, in particular, it adheres to the fallacious idea of
the moral duty. She argues that the idea of the moral duty and the moral ought
used in deontological ethics originally comes from religious reasoning and
theological ethics, where God was the ultimate source of morality and where the
people had to obey God’s commands. Here, the ideas of a moral duty and a moral
ought were appropriate. In secular ethics, however, there is no general consent
to the idea of a moral duty that is universally binding on all rational people.
The idea of a moral duty, according to Anscombe, should be replaced by the
notion of virtue. Furthermore, Schopenhauer convincingly claims in his book On
the Basis of Morality that even in the case of religious ethics there is no
categorical moral duty, since people obey God’s moral rules simply because they
do not want to be punished, if they decide not to act accordingly. But this
means that the moral duty is hypothetical rather than categorical. It is
commonly said that in ancient ethics there is no moral duty and no moral ought
simply because the Greek and Romans lack those particular notions. However,
from the bare fact that they lack the notions of moral duty and moral ought,
one cannot conclude that they also lack the particular phenomena as well
(Bayertz 2005: 122). In addition, one might claim that his point still misses the
general idea of using similar notions as main ethical key terms, which reflects
a certain particular way of ethical reasoning and decision-making. Whether
there is something like a ‘moral ought’ in ancient virtue ethics that is
comparable to deontological ethics will be briefly examined below by focusing
on Aristotle’s ethics.
c. Can a Virtuous Person Act in a
Non-Virtuous Way?
According
to ancient ethics, a completely virtuous person, who is the bearer of all
ethical virtues, is unable to act in a non-virtuous way. If a person bears one
virtue, he thereby bears all other virtues as well (that is the thesis of the
unity of the virtues). The practically wise person – according to Ancient
ethicists - will always act in accordance with the ethical virtues. In other
words, the virtuous person is always master of her emotions and, in general,
will never be swamped by her emotions, which otherwise might have led her to
act in a non-virtuous way. Generally speaking, this is a quite demanding line
of argumentation since it can be the case, at least according to our modern way
of thinking, that a brave person who has the virtue of courage might not be
able to show the virtue of liberality. However, even if one acknowledges that
person A is a virtuous person, one might not be convinced that this person will
never be able to act in a non-virtuous way. This particular problem has to do
with the famous hypothesis of ‘the unity of the virtues’ (for a recent
contribution to this problem, see Russell, 2009). In modern morality,
utilitarianism, for example, convincingly distinguishes between the evaluation
of the character of a person and his or her actions. It can easily be the case,
according to utilitarianism, that a morally bad person performs a morally right
action or that a morally good person performs a morally wrong action. This
distinction is impossible to draw for proponents of (classic) virtue ethics
because an ethically right action always presupposes that the person has an
ethically good character.
4. Special Problem: Kant and Aristotle –
Moral Duty and For the Sake of the Noble
There
is a widely shared agreement among philosophers that Kant’s deontological
ethics and Aristotle’s virtue ethics can be easily distinguished by
acknowledging the simple fact that Kant is concerned with acting from duty or
on the moral principle or because one thinks that it is morally right; while
Aristotle’s approach completely lacks this particular idea of moral motivation
and, hence, it would be unsound to claim that the virtuous person is morally
obligated to act in a way similar to the Kantian agent. In other words, there
is no such thing as acting from a sense of duty in virtue ethics. The common
view has been challenged by, for example, neo-Aristotelians (for example
Hursthouse 2010) who claim that there is not only a strong notion of moral
motivation in Aristotle’s approach, but also that the virtuous person is better
equipped to meet the demands of acting from a sense of duty than the Kantian
moral agent. The following sketches out the main line of reasoning (see, also
Engstrom and Whiting 1998; Jost and Wuerth 2011).
Hursthouse
claims in her book On Virtue Ethics that “there is a growing enthusiasm for the
idea that the ideal Kantian agent, the person with a good will, who acts “from
a sense of duty”, and the ideal neo-Aristotelian agent, who acts from virtue –
from a settled state of character – are not as different as they were once
supposed to be” (2010: 140). Her view is supported by some important works of
Hudson (1990), Audi (1995), and Baron (1995). This fact, however, has also been
acknowledged by neo-Kantian philosophers such as Korsgaard (1998) and Herman
(1998). In this respect it reflects a lack of awareness about current
developments in virtue ethics and neo-Kantianism if one still up-holds the
claim of the clear distinction between ancient ethics and modern morality, in
particular, concerning Aristotle and Kant that has been proposed for hundreds
of years. A related issue concerning the question of whether there is a
fundamental distinction between aretaic and deontic terms has been critically
discussed by Gryz (2011) who argues against Stocker (1973) who claims that
“good” and “right” mean the same thing. Gryz is convinced that even if both
groups of terms converge (as close as possible), there will still either remain
an unbridgeable gap or in case that one attempts to define one group of terms
by the other group, it follows that something is left behind which cannot be
explained by the second group. This contemporary debate shows that there is
still no common view on the relationship between ancient ethics and modern
morality.
Kant
claims in the Groundwork that the morally motivated agent acts from good will.
In more detail, to act from duty or to act because one thinks that it is
morally right is to perform an action because one thinks that its maxim has the
form of a law (Korsgaard 1998: 218). For example, if a person is in need the
Kantian agent does the right action not because – as Korsgaard claims – that it
is her purpose to simply do her duty, but because the person chooses the action
for its own sake that means her purpose is to help (Korsgaard 1998: 207).
Even
if the Ancient Greeks lacked the particular notions that can be translated as
moral ought, duty, right, and principle (for example Gryz 2011, Hursthouse
2010), it seems nonetheless correct to claim that the idea of doing the right
thing because it is right or because one is required to do it is also a
well-known phenomenon in classic virtue ethics in general and with regard to
Aristotle and stoicism in particular. There are quite a few passages in the
Nicomachean Ethics in which Aristotle clearly claims that morally good actions
are done for their own sake or because it is the morally right thing to do:
Now
excellent actions are noble and done for the sake of the noble. (EN IV, 2,
1120a23–24)
Now
the brave man is as dauntless as man may be. Therefore, while he will fear even
the things that are not beyond human strength, he will fear them as he ought
and as reason directs, and he will face them for the sake of what is noble; for
this is the end of excellence. (EN III, 10 1115b10-13)
The
standard of all things is the good and the good man; he is striving for the
good with all his soul and does the good for the sake of the intellectual
element in him. (EN IX, 4, 1166a10–20)
The
good man acts for the sake of the noble. (EN IX, 8, 1168a33-35)
For
the wicked man, what he does clashes with what he ought to do, but what the
good man ought to do he does; for the intellect always chooses what is best for
itself, and the good man obeys his intellect. (EN IX, 8, 1169a15–18)
If the
virtuous person acts because she thinks that it is the right thing to do,
because she acts for the sake of the noble without any inclination other than
to do good for the sake of the noble, then she is comparable with the Kantian
moral agent. For example, according to Aristotle the noble is “that which is
both desirable for its own sake and also worthy of praise” (Rhetoric I, 9,
1366a33); and in 1366b38–67a5 he holds the view that nobility is exhibited in
actions “that benefit others rather than the agent, and actions whose
advantages will only appear after the agent’s death, since in these cases we
can be sure the agent himself gets nothing out of it” (Korsgaard 1998: 217).
Hence it follows, the virtuous person will not be able to act in a non-virtuous
way because he or she acts from a strong inner moral obligation to act
according to the morally right thing, since it is the very nature of the
virtuous person to act virtuously. The Kantian agent, instead, sometimes acts
according to the universal law and hence performs a morally right action, and
on other occasions he or she fails to do so. This is because he or she has no
stable and firm disposition to always act in accordance with the universal law.
That is the very reason why the Aristotelian virtuous person can be seen as an
agent who is not only acting from duty in the sense of doing the right thing
because it is right, but also because the virtuous person constantly perceives
and adheres to the moral duty, that is, to act virtuously.
5. Conclusion
The
upshot is, however, that the vital question of how to live a good life cannot
be separated from the essential question of how one should act. Conceptually
and phenomenologically, both questions are intimately interwoven and a complete
ethical theory will always be concerned with both issues, independently of
whether the theory is of ancient or modern origin.
