Pyrronism

Pyrrhonism was a school of skepticism founded by Pirrón in the 4th century BC. It is best known through the surviving works of the Sextus Empiricus, which he wrote in the late 2nd or early 3rd century.

 

Origins

Pyrrho of Elis (circa 360 BC - 270 BC) is generally credited with founding this school of skeptical philosophy. He traveled to India with the army of Alexander the Great and studied with magicians and gymnosophists. Pyrronism as a school was revitalized or refounded by Enesidemus in the 1st century.

 

Philosophy

The goal of Pyrrhonism is primarily psychological, although it is best known for its epistemological arguments, particularly the criterion problem and the induction problem. Through epojé (suspension of judgment) the mind reaches ataraxia, a state of equanimity. Similar to Stoicism and Epicureanism, eudaimonia is the goal of the Pyrrhonic life, and all three philosophies place this goal in ataraxia or apatheia. According to the Pyrrhonians, personal opinions on non-obvious issues prevent eudaimonia from being achieved.

 

The most important principle of Pyrrho's thought is expressed through the word acatalepsy, which connotes the ability not to make affirmations of the doctrines relative to the truth of things in their own nature; against each statement, its contradiction can be presented with the same justification.

 

The Pyrrhonians refrain from making claims regarding non-obvious propositions, that is, dogma. They disputed the supposed truths that dogmatists had found regarding non-obvious matters. For any non-obvious matter, a Pyrrhonist tries to make the arguments for and against so that the matter cannot reach a conclusion, thus avoiding belief. According to Pyrrhonism, even the claim that "nothing can be known" is dogmatic. In this way, they tried to universalize their skepticism and thus avoid the problem of basing it on a new dogmatism. Mental imperturbability (ataraxia) was the desired result of adopting such a mental state. Skeptics (of which the Pyrrhonians are a part) can be subdivided into those who are effective (a "suspension of judgment"), Zeetics ("seeking"), or aporetic ("engaging in refutation").

 

Pyrronism is credited with being the first school of Western philosophy to identify the problem of induction, and the Münchhausen trilemma.

 

A large part of the knowledge we have of Pyrrhonism has come down to us through the preserved work of the late Skeptic Sextus Empiricus, author of the treatise Esbozos pirrónicos, which is a manual to achieve suspension of the trial. Although it is not a work of great originality within the skeptical current, it summarizes the work of the main previous skeptical philosophers and systematizes the way in which their arguments are used to achieve epoche

 

Two-dimensionalism

Two-dimensionalism is an approach to semantics in analytic philosophy. It is a theory of how to determine the sense and reference of a word and the truth-value of a sentence. It is intended to resolve the puzzle: How is it possible to discover empirically that a necessary truth is true? Two-dimensionalism provides an analysis of the semantics of words and sentences that makes sense of this possibility. The theory was first developed by Robert Stalnaker, but it has been advocated by numerous philosophers since, including David Chalmers.

 

Two-dimensional semantic analysis

Any given sentence, for example, the words,

 

"Water is H2O"

is taken to express two distinct propositions, often referred to as a primary intension and a secondary intension, which together compose its meaning.

 

The primary intension of a word or sentence is its sense, i.e., is the idea or method by which we find its referent. The primary intension of "water" might be a description, such as watery stuff. The thing picked out by the primary intension of "water" could have been otherwise. For example, on some other world where the inhabitants take "water" to mean watery stuff, but, where the chemical make-up of watery stuff is not H2O, it is not the case that water is H2O for that world.

 

The secondary intension of "water" is whatever thing "water" happens to pick out in this world, whatever that world happens to be. So, if we assign "water" the primary intension watery stuff, then the secondary intension of "water" is H2O, since H2O is watery stuff in this world. The secondary intension of "water" in our world is H2O, which is H2O in every world because unlike watery stuff it is impossible for H2O to be other than H2O. When considered according to its secondary intension, "Water is H2O" is true in every possible  world.”

 

Impact

If two-dimensionalism works,  it solves some very important problems in  philosophy of language. Saul Kripke has argued that "Water is H2O" is an example of a necessary truth which is true a posteriori, since we had to discover that water was H2O, but given that it is true (which it is) it cannot be false. It would be absurd to claim that something that is water is not H2O, for these are known to be identical.

 

However, this contention that one and the same proposition can be both a posteriori and necessary is considered absurd by some philosophers (as is Kripke's paired claim that the same proposition can be both a priori and contingent).

 

For example, Robert Stalnaker's account of knowledge represents knowledge as a relation on possible worlds, which entails that it is impossible for a proposition to fail to be a priori given that it is necessary. This can be proven as follows: If a proposition P is necessary it is true in all possible worlds. If P is true at all possible worlds and what we know are sets of possible worlds, then it is not possible not to know that P, for P is the case at all possible worlds in the set of worlds that we know. So if P is necessary then we know it necessarily, and ipso facto we know it a priori.

 

Under two-dimensionalism, the problem disappears. The primary intension of "Water is H2O" is the a posteriori component, since it is contingent that the referent of "water" is H2O, while the secondary intension is the necessary component of the sentence, since it is necessary that the stuff we in fact call water is H2O. Neither intension gives us both a necessary and an a posteriori component. But one gets the false impression that the sentence expresses a necessary a posteriori proposition because this single sentence expresses two propositions, one a posteriori and one necessary.

 

In the philosophy of mind

Two-dimensional semantics has been used by David Chalmers to counter objections to the various arguments against materialism in the philosophy of mind. Specifically, Chalmers deploys two-dimensional semantics to "bridge the (gap between) epistemic and modal domains" in arguing from knowability or epistemic conceivability to what is necessary or possible (modalities).

 

The reason Chalmers employs two-dimensional semantics is to avoid objections to conceivability implying possibility. For instance, it's claimed that we can conceive of water not having been H2O, but it's not possible that water isn't H2O. Chalmers replies that it is 1-possible that water wasn't H2O because we can imagine another substance XYZ with watery properties, but it's not 2-possible. Hence, objections to conceivability implying possibility are unfounded when these words are used more carefully.

 

Chalmers then advances the following "two-dimensional argument against materialism". Define P as all  sort of truths about the universe and Q as a truth about phenomenal experience, such as that someone is conscious. Let "1-possible" refer to possibility relative to primary intension and "2-possible" relative to secondary intension.

 

P&~Q is conceivable [i.e., zombies are conceivable]

If P&~Q is conceivable, then P&~Q is 1-possible

If P&~Q is 1-possible, then P&~Q is 2-possible or Russellian monism is true.

If P&~Q is 2-possible, materialism is false.

Materialism is false or Russellian monism is true.

 

Criticism

Scott Soames is a notable opponent of two-dimensionalism, which he sees as an attempt to revive Russelian-Fregean descriptivism and to overturn what he sees as a "revolution" in semantics begun by Kripke and others. Soames argues that two-dimensionalism stems from a misreading of passages in Kripke (1980) as well as Kaplan (1989).

 

 

 

 

Constructivism

In the philosophy of science and epistemology, constructivism or epistemological constructivism is a current of thought that emerged in the mid-20th century, from  researchers very diverse disciplines (philosophers, psychiatrists, anthropologists, physicists, mathematicians, biologists, psychologists, sociologists , linguists, etc.) who maintain that reality is a construction to some degree "invented" by the observer. You can never get to know reality as it is because always, when knowing something, we order the data obtained from reality (even if they are basic perceptions) in a theoretical or mental framework. In such a way, that object or reality that we understand "such" is not such, we do not have a "mirror reflection" of what is "there outside of us", but something that we have built based on our perceptions and empirical data. Thus, science and knowledge in general offer only an approximation to the truth, which is beyond our reach.

 

Gerald M. Edelman illustrates this idea by saying that "Every act of perception is to some degree an act of creation, and every act of memory is in a way an act of imagination."

 

History

The fundamental orientation of this current started from Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) when he distinguished between the phenomenon and the noumenon (or thing in itself). He affirmed that reality is not found outside the person who observes it, but rather is constructed by his cognitive apparatus. 

 

Other precedents of constructivist thought could be René Descartes (1596-1650) with his "cogito ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I exist"), David Hume (1711-1776) and, above all, Bishop George Berkeley (1685 -1753), whose "esse est percipi" ("to be is to be perceived") That principle  fits perfectly in this context.

 

Jean Piaget is one of the thinkers who differ from the above  mentioned. Piaget’s approach is based on the creation of schemes and his position on constructivism is skeptical, even when it is said that he is a thinker immersed in this scholl of thought

 

 

 

Different theories of constructivism

Radical constructivism

One of its main spokespersons in the German sphere was the Austrian scientist Paul Watzlawick (born in 1921 and emigrated to California), with the book The Invented Reality, published in 1981, where he brings together ten essays by different authors on the so-called «constructivist thought ». His coleagues, Heinz Von Foerster and Ernst von Glasersfeld are also Austrians and work in the United States.

 

For von Glasersfeld, the term radical constructivism refers to an unconventional approach to the problem of knowledge and to the fact of knowing. This begins with the presumption that knowledge, no matter how it is defined, is in people's minds, and that the knowing subject has no alternative but to construct what he or she knows, on the basis of his or her own experience. Knowledge is then built from individual experiences. All types of experience are essentially subjective, and although reasons can be found to believe that one person's experience may be similar to that of another, there is no way of knowing whether it is actually the same.

The theory of radical constructivism developed by von Glasersfeld starts from the statements of another Austrian, Heinz von Foerster. The vision developed by Von Foerster of constructivism posited that the nervous system could not distinguish at all between perception and hallucination, since both were simple patterns of nervous excitement. The neurophysiological implications of this statement were later developed in 1971 by the Chilean biologists Maturana and Varela, who perceived knowledge as a necessary component of the processes of autopoiesis (capacity of systems to produce themselves) that characterize living organisms. .

 

Von Glasersfeld's theory is part of a solid scientific school of thought that reaches Jean Piaget, from whom it draws numerous references, as well as authors such as Gregory Bateson, Paul Watzlawick, Ilya Prigogine, Niklas Luhmann, Edgar Morin and Humberto Maturana, among many others. It is inspired by the philosophical proposals of the Italian thinker Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) and considers him a direct precursor of radical constructivism, since the latter argued that truth is the particular reality of the person who expresses it, that is, a subjective construction ( "Verum ipsum factum" [what is true <is> the same as <that> what is done]). Von Glasersfeld maintains that ontological reality cannot be reduced to a rational interpretation. On the contrary, reality is constructed from the experience of reality itself.

In order to eliminate the presumption of reality in the explanation of knowledge, von Glasersfeld (1996) states the following basic principles:

 

Knowledge "is not received passively, neither through the senses, nor through communication, but is actively constructed by the knowing subject."

"The function of knowledge is adaptive, in the biological sense of the term, tending toward adjustment or viability."

"Cognition serves the organization of the experiential world of the subject, not the discovery of an objective ontological reality."

There is a demand for sociality, in terms of «a conceptual construction of the 'others'»; in this sense, the other subjectivities are constructed from the experiential field of the individual. According to this thesis, originated in Kant, the first interaction must be with individual experience.

 

Linked to this last point, von Glasersfeld postulates that meanings, or conceptual relationships, cannot be transmitted from one speaker to another. These blocks are derived solely from individual experience and can then be adjusted intersubjectively. In this way, meanings are subjective so "we cannot maintain the preconceived notion that words communicate ideas or knowledge." Man, according to this view, is solely responsible for his thoughts, his knowledge and his actions.

 

The importance of constructivism is evident when it is compared with the opposite epistemological approach or cognitive science, which bases knowledge on a passive reflection of external objective reality. This implies an external "instruction" process, since in order to obtain that image of reality, the subject must somehow receive some type of information from the outside. This approach, von Glasersfeld argues, involves a naive perspective, where the senses function as a camera that only projects an image of how the world actually appears in our brains, and uses that image as a map, encoding the 'external' structure into a different format. This vision conflicts with a series of conceptual problems, since it ignores the infinite complexity of the world. Furthermore, detailed observation shows that in practice, cognition does not work that way. On the contrary, it is shown that the subject actively generates enough potential models and that the role played by the environment is simply reduced to reinforcing some of these models while eliminating others (selection process). By means of this concept of viability (fit) of knowledge, it is indicated that this cannot be interpreted as a representation of reality, but rather as the key that opens different paths for Humankind.

 

This construction referred to, serves in the first place selfish purposes: the subject wants to take control over what he perceives, in order to eliminate any deviation or disturbance from the achievement of his own goals. Control requires a model of what you want to control, but this model will only include those aspects relevant to the goals and actions of the subject. Somehow, the subject is not interested in controlling the thing: he is only interested in compensating for the disturbances that he feels that this thing represents for his goals and therefore makes him capable of adapting to changing circumstances. That is why Maturana speaks of "objectivity" in quotation marks. And how objectivity becomes an instrument of power, for example in science. In Maturana's words, the result of assuming this position is the legitimate acceptance of the other. Since the place that the other occupies in the world is different from mine, and his "objectivity" will be different, I cannot but listen to him with respect.

 

Mathematical constructivism

There is also linked to constructivism a branch in mathematics, the result of reflection on its nature (such as the Dutch L. E. J. Brouwer), or on the assimilability of mathematical language (Michael Dummett, in the field of British analytical philosophy).

 

Genetic Epistemology

Although the expression was coined by James Mark Baldwin, it became popular a posteriori thanks to the meaning and elaborations of Jean Piaget, who in 1967 presented constructivist epistemologies in his famous article "Logic and Scientific Knowledge" in the Encyclopedia Pléiades.

 

There are differences between Baldwin's and Piaget's approaches and even divergences in various concepts.

 

While Baldwin proposes the crucial influence of both socio-environmental and epigenetic factors far beyond that attributed to natural selection by neo-Lamarckians, Piaget distinguishes above all genesis, that is, generation.  Although there would be those who propose as a more appropriate translation of the Piagetian concept that of a kind of  genetic epistemology,  the historical, editorial and academic consensus, elevates it as Genetic Epistemology.

 

In 1956, Piaget created the International pour l'Épistémologie Génétique (International Center for Genetic Epistemology) attached to the University of Geneva in which it brings together specialists in various scientific disciplines.

 

Piaget will henceforth participate in the writing of the Études d'épistémologie génétique (Studies in genetic epistemology), edited by the specialists of the Center, which he directed until 1980.

 

Concepts and ideas

For constructivist thought, reality is a construction to some extent "invented" by the observer. One of the most common criticisms of radical constructivism is its apparent proximity to solipsism.

 

Constructivism affirms that reality can never be known for what it is, since when facing the object of knowledge, one does nothing but order the data that the object offers in the theoretical framework that is available. Thus, for example, for constructivism science does not offer an exact description of how things are, but only an approximation to the truth, which works as long as there is no more valid intersubjective explanation. For constructivism an exact description of how things are does not exist, because reality does not have an existence independent of the observer-subject. Taking an example from Ernst von Glasersfeld, the path chosen by science when dealing with reality is like that of a key that fits the lock, although how the lock is made is unknown. For the moment, the key that is available serves the purpose of the user, even though he or she is ignorant of the substance of the matter.

 

The constructivist approach is opposed to the cognitivist theory of information processing; since it considers that reality is neither unique, objective nor independent from whoever seeks to describe and explain it. The subject actively constructs his own tools and symbols to manipulate in a concrete (physical) and abstract (semantic) way the external world and his conception of himself. It emphasizes that manipulated symbols are semiotic constructions, that is, patterns of communication behavior including signs and their systems of significance, and the means by which human beings communicate. In turn, these symbols are socio-historically produced, since the subject begins to construct meaning  when already immersed in the social and cultural systems in which he was born.

Ethics and morality

 

 

There are notable differences between ethics and morals, although sometimes people tend to confuse them. Ethics is a branch of philosophy that values and studies what is correct or not. In addition, it emphasizes the correct behavior patterns to be put into practice. Morality is a set of values, norms, and behaviors accepted by a society that serve to correctly structure that particular society and promote balance among the people who make it up.

 

Ethics is a branch of philosophy. It originated in Ancient Greece and focuses on studying the terms of good and evil. It is not framed within any specific culture, but rather seeks to differentiate what is right from what is wrong, along with other similar concepts.

 

Instead, morality encompasses those norms established by a given society and that affect the behavior of its members. These values are related to the social context and traditions of the individuals who belong to that society.

 

In addition, these certain values are usually inherited in order to enhance social stability and maintain an optimal structure for coexistence.

 

In economics, there is also a growing interest in ethics and morals. Especially in relation to the world of company and business.

 

What are the most notable differences between ethics and morals?

These are the most important differences between both concepts:

 

Morality is related to the most appropriate values and behaviors within a given context or society. It is about putting these concepts into practice so that this society is regulated in a balanced way.

Ethics defines the correct behavior or not based on general principles. It does not focus on determining these with respect to a specific society. Ethics is more related to the theoretical part of these types of terms.

Ethics has its origin in individuality. Different individuals reflect on topics such as good and evil. Later, they themselves implement these reflections in their lives. It is not something mandatory that they have to put into practice, it is optional, since they are individual reflections.

Morality is a more widespread, group concept, since they are socially accepted values and influence all the people who make up that specific society to which they belong.

Ethics is an individual value proper to reflection and the person who puts it into practice can apply it to his or her own life. They are rational values or beliefs that can be put into practice or not.

Morality is something that individuals who belong to a society cannot choose. It is something established and socially accepted. Misbehaving can result in punishment.

Ethics is a general principle, a thought, a reflection without application to any specific context. Morals can vary depending on the society in which the individual finds himself.

Example of ethics and morals

Telling the truth in a certain situation would be an example of morality. Helping an elderly man who can barely walk to cross a street would be another example of morality, since honesty is a very important social value.

 

On the other hand, when an individual reflects on what is good or not, based on his own beliefs, he would be included within ethics.

 

 

 

 

Ethics and the Law

 

Every moral decision is preceded by an evaluation of the reasons for the different courses of action. If deliberating  about  different reasons is necessary to make "good decisions," then must we learn about ethics in order to be morally better? In a sense Aristotle believed that ethics is related to learning.

 

What is legal is not necessarily ethical or moral. Therefore, although there is a legal framework, there is also ethics. In fact, laws reflect moral standards, which in some way regulate our conduct. However, these have evolved along with our understanding of what is good or what we understand by a just society. But there are also amoral laws. For example, driving on the right is an amoral law, that is, it has nothing to do with morality. But are there immoral laws? The answer is also yes.

The segregation law in South Africa - apartheid - was clearly immoral. The Greeks, in classical times, allowed infanticide. Although there is certainly a context behind all these laws, we currently consider them immoral. Moreover, it could happen that some behaviors that we accept today are immoral in the future.

 

Facing a bribery case is another example. In the deliberation process we think first of the business; later, legally, and only on a third level will be the apprehension that it is agreeing to pay a bribe. This could be legal, but not necessarily ethical.

 

Every moral decision is preceded by an evaluation of the reasons for the different courses of action. If deliberating reasons is necessary to make "good decisions," then must we learn about ethics in order to be morally better? In a sense Aristotle believed that ethics is related to learning, as already stated. Therefore, let's see what the ethics of Aristotle's on virtues says.

 

Ethics of virtues

 

In his great book "Nicomachean Ethics", Aristotle says that "we study ethics not to know what virtue is, but to be good." But studying ethics from a theoretical perspective does not necessarily make us better. In fact, someone with multiple PhDs in ethics will not necessarily be better.

 

 

Here Aristotle is inviting us to study ethics from a practical perspective. For this he asks himself: how do we become good home builders? "Very simple", he replies, "we become good house builders, building houses." Experience is essential to learn a trade. The same thing happens with ethics. According to Aristotle, by practicing justice we make ourselves more just and by practicing honesty, we make ourselves more honest. The practice of all the virtues brings us closer to a kind of optimal balance that is virtuous behavior.

 

Now, this process to achieve virtue has a certain peculiarity. Aristotle says that all virtues have an excess or a defect, that is, the virtues are like a pendulum that oscillates from the extremes towards a point at rest. For example, studying the virtue of courage, which is at the midpoint of equilibrium, one realizes that at one extreme there is "the one who throws himself into all dangers, the reckless one" and at the other extreme is "the who runs away from everything and is afraid, the coward ”. Virtue is in the middle of these extremes.

 

The ethics of virtues focuses on the formation of moral character. Through experience we learn to be virtuous or good. This way of looking at ethics has several interesting assumptions. For the time being, Aristotle believes that man is a social animal. That is, there is no ethics without society. In other words, if you are born alone on an island, you will not have moral notions, because ethics is a social issue. Thus, the process of learning virtue occurs in a social context. Aristotle would say that in business terms, the organizational culture in your work influences your behavior. The family and how you were  brought up, too.

 

So if ethics is social, will different societies have different moral norms? The answer of the ethics of virtues would be yes. Different cultures or communities develop different ethical codes. Different companies, NGOs or state agencies also develop from  diverse cultures that are associated with a long process of ethical learning.

 

But what is really important in virtue ethics is that custom (the ƐƮOS), forges our character . In other words, we are not born virtuous, but we become virtuous by practice.}

 

What is legal is not necessarily ethical or moral. While the laws reflect moral norms, there are also amoral laws, and even some that have been immoral.

 

The ethics of virtues is based on practice. More than a theoretical approach, to know what virtues are, the important thing for Aristotle is to be virtuous, and for this, experience is required.

 

For Aristotle, man is a social animal, and therefore there is no ethics without society. This principle would accept that different societies have different moral standards.

 

BUT,

Is it acceptable to conceive that different cultures may have different ethical standards? Would it be the same then that atrocities were committed in neighboring societies if they are accepted as a society?

 

 

Kantian ethics

 Kantian ethics is a deontological ethical theory formulated by the philosopher Immanuel Kant. Developed as a product of enlightened rationalism, it is based on the position that the only intrinsic positive thing is goodwill; therefore an action can only be good if its maxim — the underlying principle — obeys the ethical law. Central to the Kantian construction of the moral law is the categorical imperative, which acts on all people, regardless of their interests or desires. Kant formulated it in various ways. The principle of its universality requires that, for an action to be permissible, it must be possible to apply it to all people without being contradictory. His formulation of humanity as an end in itself demands that humans are never treated as a mere means to an end, but an end in itself. The autonomy formulation concludes that rational agents are bound to the ethical law by their will, while Kant's concept of the Kingdom of Ends demands that people act as if the principles of their own actions, could be established a law for a kingdom.  Kant distinguished between perfect and imperfect duties. A perfect duty, like not lying, is always true; an imperfect one, such as donating to charity, can be made flexible and applied in a particular time and space. Kant believed that the progress of enlightened reason would lead to ethical progress.

 

The American philosopher Louis Pojman has cited Pietism as an influence in the development of Kantian ethics, while the political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau points to the contemporary debate between rationalism and empiricism and the influence of natural law. Other philosophers argue that Kant's parents and his teacher, Martin Knutzen, influenced his ethics. Those influenced by Kantian ethics include the philosopher Jürgen Habermas, the political philosopher John Rawls, and the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan.

 

The German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel criticized Kant for not providing enough concrete details in his moral theory to affect decision-making and for denying human nature. The German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer argued that ethics should attempt to describe how people behave and criticized Kant for being normative. John Stuart Mill argued that Kantian moral laws are justified on utilitarian principles. Similarly, Bertrand Russell pointed out that some actions cannot be shown to be illegal according to Kant's principles without appealing their consequences, which Kantian ethical deontology emphatically rejects. Michael Stocker has argued that acting out of duty can diminish other moral motivations such as friendship, while Marcia Baron has defended the theory by arguing that it does not. Michel Onfray maintains that the Kantian philosophy does not allow in any case the disobedience of duty, thus being compatible with the blind obedience of a genocide and Nazi soldier. The Catholic priest Servais Pinckaers considers that Christian ethics are more compatible with the ethics of virtues than with Kantian ethics. Alan Soble pointed out that Kant's ethical studies have not reached a universal morality, as "they are full of comparable absurdities" and that "it seems that he has not become more empathetic towards the human condition or that he has not progressed morally".

Internalism and externalism in epistemology

 Not all of our beliefs are justified, nor are all of our justified beliefs to the same degree. That our beliefs are justified is something that concerns us and should concern us as epistemic agents, since it is assumed that if a belief is (well) justified, if we have good reasons for it or have formed it in an appropriate way, this will make its probability of being true increases. In this way, justification is considered a fundamental epistemological good. Now, what is the fact that a belief is justified? What kinds of facts, properties, states, or conditions can confer justification on a belief? What is the nature of justification?

 

If the distinction between coherentism and foundationalism —or infinitism— (see Epistemic Justification) referred to the structure of justification, the distinction between internalism and externalism refers to its nature, that is, to what type of factors can act as justifiers of a belief. This distinction is relatively recent, it appears for the first time in (Armstrong, 1973) and, although there it refers to the different types of definitions of knowledge, it has subsequently been imposed as a way to distinguish between two types of theories about the (nature of knowledge). the justification. According to the most generally accepted conception, the internalist conception of epistemic justification is one that defends that only what the subject has or can have cognitive access to (through introspection or reflection) can justify a belief; in general, then, only mental states (experiences, memories, other beliefs) can be justifiers. Externalism is the negation of internalism: it is not true that only what is cognitively accessible can be a justifier. For example, if A forms a certain belief from reading a news item in a serious newspaper and forms another belief by reading a tabloid newspaper, his first belief will be justified and the second will not, although the subject does not know that one of the newspapers deserves trust and the other does not. The objective reliability of the source, whether or not it is known to the subject, is relevant to the justification of the belief.

 

We can say that our appeal to justification responds to two different intuitions or presents a double aspect that, unfortunately, is not always easy to match. It is this double aspect that favors the different positions (internal and external) that we are dealing with here. If what centers our interest with respect to justification is what makes it reasonable for the subject to acquire or maintain a belief, our position will tend to be internalist. If, on the contrary, we emphasize what increases the probability that the belief is true, externalism will appear to us a more attractive position.

 

As we have characterized this distinction, we can see that internalism is the most demanding position, only what is internal to the subject's mind can justify a belief. To the extent that externalism is the negation of internalism, it could seem that it is more permissive: there would be phenomena that, without being cognitively accessible to the subject, nor being mental states of the latter, could be justifiers. However, there are two types of externalism: 1) that which considers that the internalist condition is not sufficient for justification; that is, in addition to what is internal to the subject's mind, some external condition is needed, something that does not have to be accessible to the subject, (which would be a more permissive externalism than internalism) and 2) which holds that internalist conditions are not only not sufficient for justification, but they are not necessary: ​​it is only some condition that does not have to be accessible to the subject (such as the reliability of the process by which they have been acquired) that determines the justification of the beliefs. In this second case, externalism would not be more permissive than internalism, but would simply introduce demands of a different nature.

 

Internalist theories of justification

Within internism we can also distinguish two types, according to their degree of demand: 1) what we can call status internism and 2) simple internism. Both types, as interns, agree on:

 

a) Only what is internal to the subject's mind can be a justifier.

 

But while simple internism requires only this condition, status internism further maintains that:

 

b) Nothing can be a justifier unless the subject is (or can be) aware that it is (that is, of his justifying status).

 

That is, for simple internalism it is not necessary that what justifies the belief is recognized as such by the subject, it is enough that it be cognitively accessible by mere reflection. Thus, according to this position, a perceptual experience, for example, can serve as a justifier of a belief. My perceptual experience of a tree before me justifies my belief that there is a tree before me. On the other hand, for status internism (BonJour, 1985, ch. 2; BonJour & Sosa, 2003), this same experience cannot justify said belief if, in addition to having it, I am not aware (currently or potentially) of the justifying relationship between one and the other; that is, if I do not believe in turn that such an experience makes it probable that there is a tree before me. In this way, an important difference between one type of internism and another is that status involves a doxastic conception of justification: it maintains that our beliefs can only be justified by other beliefs. On the other hand, simple internalism admits that also experiences, memories ..., can be justifiers. Simple internalisms are dogmatism (Pryor, 2000, 2001) and evidentialism (Feldman and Conee, 1985; Conee and Feldman, 2001).

 

Pryor's dogmatism rightly holds that such things as experiences and memories are immediate justifiers and that when a belief is based on them it is immediately justified. For its part, evidentialism maintains that (in the formulation of Bergmann, 2004, which corrects that of Fedman and Conee, 1985): “The belief C of S is justified if and only if C is an adequate doxastic response to the evidence of S ”(Bergmann, 2004, p. 35). That is, the subject's belief will be justified if it occurs in response to the reasons, experiences, memories, etc., that he possesses.

 

The problem with these theories is that they do not require as a condition for something to be considered evidence that it has to be a reliable indicator of the truth of the belief. For both dogmatism and evidentialism (and, in general, for internalism) an experience justifies whether it is a true perceptual experience or a delusional one. In other words, if two subjects are in the same mental state, it cannot be that the belief of one is justified and that of the other is not. For example, if the "perceptual" experience that a subject would obtain in the presence of a cat justifies him to believe that there is a cat in front of him, then if he has a qualitatively identical experience, this will also justify him to believe that there is a cat in front of him. , even if it is a case of delusion and there is really no cat before him. Even if we were brains in a vat or were systematically deceived by an evil Cartesian genius, our beliefs, insofar as they correspond to our evidence, would be justified, even if all or most of them were false. At the end of the day, what has caused the belief is not something that (at least not always) is within the cognitive reach of the subject, nor is it internal to his mind, with which he cannot influence the justification according to the internalist positions. But if evidence, and therefore justification, does not increase at all the probability that our beliefs are true, then why do we care? What epistemic value would they have?

 

On the other hand, with regard to evidentialism, as in this conception of justification only the evidences available to the subject are taken into account and not their responsibility and efficiency when acquiring them, it may happen that there are many counter-evidences of which the subject does not have due to having been negligent and, despite everything, his belief would be justified. Epistemic irresponsibility could favor justification.

 

As we can see, internalism places the emphasis on that aspect of justification that has to do with the subject's relationship with his belief and with the reasonableness of acquiring or maintaining a belief from such a perspective, and largely forgets the relationship of justification. with the truth, her role as conductor of the truth.

 

2. Externalist theories of justification

In general, when speaking of externalist theories, only those of the second type are usually considered as such, that is, those that defend that the justifiers of a belief are external to the subject's mind, that they do not have to be cognitively accessible. .

 

These include proper functionalism and, above all, reliabilism. According to the first of these theories, a belief is justified if it has been formed by properly functioning cognitive faculties (Plantinga, 1993; Bergman, 2006). For its part, reliabilism maintains that the justification of a belief does not depend at all on the reasons available to the subject, nor on the logical connections that the content of the belief maintains with the other beliefs of the subject, but on the fact of that the process that generated it is reliable, that is, that it provides (in the right circumstances) a high percentage of true beliefs. According to its highest representative, Alvin Goldman, (Goldman, 1976, 1986) this is all that is needed for a belief to be justified. Reliable processes are, in general, perception, memory, reasoning and introspection. Thus, for example, if under normal observation circumstances, I acquire the belief that there is a book before me as a consequence of my perceptual experience of the book, my belief will be immediately justified, for under such circumstances perception is a reliable process of understanding. obtaining beliefs.

 

A theory that straddles both types of externalism is Sosa's epistemology of virtues (Sosa, 1991). According to this author, a belief is justified if it has its origin in an intellectual virtue, that is, in a faculty (perception, memory, reasoning) that generates, in the right environment, a high index of true beliefs. Now, Sosa maintains that this type of justification is sufficient for "animal knowledge" (one in which beliefs are direct responses to the impact of one's own experience), but not for "reflective knowledge", which requires a " epistemic perspective ”, which is constituted by the beliefs that the subject has about the reliability of their faculties, etc. And, he argues, "reflective knowledge is better justified than animal knowledge."

 

We can see, then, that the fundamental interest of externalism is the connection of belief with truth. The justification of the belief must be an indication, a symptom of the truth: justified beliefs are much more likely to be true than those that are not justified. Justification has to do with the relationship between belief (the process that generated it) and the world. The difference between one type of externalism and another is whether only such a connection is required or it is also considered that the subject must have reasons or evidence in favor of his belief.

 

If internalism prioritized the relationship of the subject with the belief and the reasons that it had in its favor, centered its interest in the fact of whether it was reasonable to believe given the reasons that were possessed, externalism focuses on the relationship of belief with the environment and the connection of justification with the truth. But the externalist theories that we are seeing also have a clear drawback. If the subject's belief is justified from the external point of view, but he has no reasons that he can offer (not even to himself) to justify it, his epistemic position seems weak. Having a justification that is completely ignored does not seem like an adequate justification. Therefore, we have that, as Comesaña (2010, p. 571) says, “reliability without evidence is blind, evidence without reliability is empty”.

 

It seems, then, that an adequate theory of epistemic justification must incorporate both internalist elements (having evidence) and some externalist element. That is, it seems necessary to include some external element that helps to specify what constitutes evidence and what does not. If, for example, I say that there is a cat in front of me and I am asked how I know it or why I believe it, the fact that I say that I know it because I see it indicates something in this regard. I have said that I know because I see it and not anything else because I consider my experience as evidence in favor of the belief that there is a cat before me. I am assuming that my visual experience makes it likely that there is a cat before me. Well, we could demand that for something to constitute evidence in favor of a belief it must make the truth of the belief really probable. The intuition that the brain's perceptual beliefs in the vat would also be justified remains to be resolved, although their experiences did not make it probable that they were true. Indexical reliabilism aims to solve this problem . Ultimately, according to this theory, it is a matter of saying that the justification of beliefs depends on the reliability of the process in our world. Thus the beliefs of the brain in the vat will be justified because perception is a reliable process in our world (although it is not in yours).